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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
THE DIFFUSION OF KNOWLEDGE IN FOREIGN POLICY: THE CASE OF
ISRAEL’S TECHNLOGY TRANSFERS AS TOOLS OF DIPLOMACY
by
David Tooch
Florida International University, 2017
Miami, Florida
Professor Shlomi Dinar, Major Professor
Since its inception, Israel has wrestled with attempts by adversaries to keep her politically
isolated in the international arena. To garner more friends and expand diplomatic reach,
Israeli leaders initiated a strategy of sharing specialized knowledge with other nations.
The technologies and knowledge shared were based on the experience gained from
Israel’s distinctive security and developmental struggles. The transfer of technology
developed into a foreign policy instrument in Israel’s overall international relations.
Technical cooperation became part of a broader foreign relations drive that sought to
deliver greater diplomatic recognition for Israel. This strategy, which continues to present
times, was born mostly out of two major necessities for the young struggling state. The
first, to boost Israel’s political stature in international forums. The second, to
counterbalance efforts by Israel’s rivals to keep the Jewish State isolated in the Middle
East and the rest of the world. In the early years of the initiative, the technology transfers
were mostly confined in fields related to agriculture and the military. In more recent
years, the rise of Israel’s hi-tech industry has attracted worldwide attention creating new
opportunities for Israeli foreign policymakers to widen the scope of technologies to be
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offered as part of international partnerships. The dissertation examines the interplay of
technology/knowledge transfers as a source of soft power for Israel in efforts to advance
relationships even with seemingly unlikely partner nations. It explores the usefulness of
know-how sharing in the making, growing and maintaining Israel’s relationships with
two influential Asian countries. The study considers the multiple factors including the
convergence of interests as drivers of Israel’s ties to India and China in both secretive and
open relationships. Over the span of five decades, the Jewish State’s international
cooperation efforts have grown in scope of expertise in areas like agriculture, defense,
anti-terrorist training, and disaster relief. The study explores the weight of Israel’s
technology transfers as tools of diplomacy in terms of propping up trade ties, gaining
more favorable policies towards Israel in the context of the conflict with Palestinians and
boosting bilateral exchanges in the form of official visits and treaties.
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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

An old story offers poignant insights about why a small struggling nation chooses
knowledge transfers as a vehicle in its foreign policy strategy. The tale goes like this: a
visitor to Israel asked his host why with all its challenges and problems the Jewish State
finds the means to engage in international projects. The host responded with the parable
of two (Galilee and Dead) seas. The waters of the Jordan River feed the two seas. The
Sea of Galilee gives and receives; supporting life while the Dead Sea only takes and is
void of life. The message, which emerges from the parable, is powerful. To support life
one must not only receive but also give. However, if one only receives it guarantees
death. The story echoes in part the ethos behind Israel’s technical cooperation strategy in
foreign relations.
Even in the early years of its fledgling statehood, Israel made the “export of
knowledge” a pillar of her foreign policy. This strategy, which continues to present times,
was born mostly out of two major necessities for the young struggling state. The first, to
boost Israel’s stature in international forums. The second, to negate the efforts by Israel’s
opponents to keep the Jewish State isolated in the Middle East and the rest of the world.
Technical cooperation became part of a broader foreign relations drive that sought to
deliver greater diplomatic recognition for Israel. Early technical cooperation programs
drew on know-how from Israel’s own development struggles like how to overcome water
scarcity to produce ample crop yields and foodstuffs.
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The transfer of technology developed into hallmark foreign policy instruments
in Israel’s overall international relations strategy especially in developing countries in
Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the former Soviet Republics. Over the span of five
decades, the Jewish State’s international cooperation efforts have grown in scope of
expertise in areas like agriculture, defense, anti-terrorist training, and disaster relief.
Despite its relatively brief existence, Israel has managed to accrue a sizable inventory of
groundbreaking and influential technological achievements to its credit. Israel’s leaders
relentlessly espouse opportunities to showcase Israel’s technical accomplishments.
Homegrown innovations are an immense source of national pride and have become tools
in diplomacy meant to portray Israel as an accomplished country which has much to
contribute in tackling global issues. In 2014, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
headlined Israel’s achievements before an influential audience of business leaders at the
World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. The Israeli leader asserted his country’s
inventiveness was a product of a distinct duel set of circumstances. Most notably Israel’s
demanding defense needs and the country’s collective sense of “no choice” mindset to
self-devise given the country’s unique set of challenges and circumstances. Like other
Israeli leaders before him, Mr. Netanyahu, touted technological achievements, making a
case for Israel as an appealing success story. Success, in science and technologies which
he said Israel has shared with others.
Israel’s use of technology as tools of public diplomacy is underscored by an
exhibition at the country’s main gateway -- Tel Aviv’s Ben Gurion Airport. In a hallway
leading to departure gates a large wall features a pictorial history of Israeli technologies,
which have influenced the world. Interestingly, the exhibits are positioned to specifically
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target the attention of passengers just about to leave the country. The exhibit projects
Israel as a formidable player in science and technology advances. The display is perhaps
representing a microcosm of Israel’s technology in diplomacy strategy.
Historically, much of Israel’s international technology transfers have been
channeled (often covertly) through state sponsored foreign outreach campaigns. Usually
these projects would happen under the auspices of the international cooperation arm of
Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Within a broad examination of
technology/knowledge transfers, the study that follows considers technology transfers as
viable tools of Israeli diplomacy in an incessant struggle to broaden bilateral ties for
Israel as Israeli policymakers silently hope to gain greater support for the Jewish State in
principal international arenas.
In the last few decades, state sanctioned technical collaborations in Israel’s
foreign affairs have continued, but they have also diminished, falling victim to domestic
politics in the form of budget cuts and reduced public support (Inbal and Zahavei, 2009).
Nevertheless, smaller yet more pointed programs have maintained a measure of strategic
significance. Ongoing programs continue to operate as mechanisms for initiating,
maintaining, and developing broader diplomatic opportunities for Israel. Israel's success
in specialized fields like agriculture and security offers much in way of selling talking
points for Israeli diplomats, leaders and NGO pro-Israel advocacy groups.
Israel is perceived as a small, but an advanced technological state (Aras, 1998).
Surprisingly, reinforcement of this seemingly positive view of Israel does not come from
Israel advocates. It is a reaction voiced in a paper published by the Doha Institute, a
think tank based in the Arab Kingdom of Qatar. The study suggests Israel’s technology
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assets were points of departure in bilateral discussions with Russian President Putin on
his historic 2011 trip to Israel. The Doha Institute (2012) asserts that Israel managed to
garner leverage in dealing with Russia because of its pronounced interest in specialized
Israeli nanotechnology and military drones. The Doha think tank alludes to a link
between Russia’s unsuccessful attempt to reverse-engineer Israeli drones and Moscow’s
proposal for a joint venture with Israel. The Doha Institute paper also notes a noticeable
decline of criticism of Israeli policies towards the Palestinians on the part of the Russians.
The notion of a direct association between technology cooperation and diplomatic gains
is precisely at the heart of the investigation in this dissertation.
Though there have been past examples where countries have used knowledge
transfers as tools of diplomacy, the Israeli case is important because it offers instances of
how even tiny states undertaking small scale project initiatives can yield valuable
contacts and by extension secure economic and perhaps political benefits. As such, the
dissertation goes beyond the study of Israel and the Middle East by considering overall
concepts in the study of International Relations.
ISRAEL’S TECHNOLOGY/KNOWLEDGE TRANSFERS
Israel’s technology/knowledge transfers in foreign affairs launched less than a
decade after independence in 1948. This happened at a time the country’s leaders
grappled with a collection of mounting existential threats, most notably in the form
political and military pressures imposed by a protracted state of war between Israel and
its Arab neighbors. Israel’s arid and semi-arid conditions too presented existential
questions in the form of water scarcities and with it limited capacity to develop a viable

4

agricultural sector able to produce adequate food production outputs. The Israeli
experience in overcoming such challenges lured the interest of others.
Israeli technology transfers on an international scale started through the
operations of a relatively little known department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Also
known by its Hebrew acronym, “MASHAV” Israel’s International Development
Cooperation Agency played a significant role in offering practical knowledge to partner
countries accrued from Israel’s own development experiences. Jacob (1971) contends
that one of MASHAV’s principle roles was to foster favorable diplomatic relations for
Israel.
MASHAV was instrumental in setting up training centers and propping up
projects, aiming to showcase the helpfulness of Israeli technologies in areas like farming
and water management. Such technologies were introduced in dozens of countries as part
of international partnerships. Collaborations typically involved MASHAV personnel in
managing joint ventures like demonstration farms and/or learning centers. The
technologies and techniques on display were designed to be learned and adopted in other
venues in partner countries. In some instances, MASHAV worked in cooperation with
third party development agencies of other countries. For example, in the former Soviet
Republics of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, MASHAV has teamed up with the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID) in agriculture and medical
projects (Bishku, 2012).
While Israel’s international technology/knowledge transfers have been in
existence for over five decades, they remain relatively under-explored in the field of
International Relations and as a subfield of Israeli foreign policy. Bialer (2002) points out
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that Israeli foreign policy is a relatively new field of study. As such, the study of Israel’s
international affairs suffers from a lack of sizable research. The lacuna in Israel studies
research is primarily attributed to unyielding declassification laws which have prevented
access to state documents of recent decades. Not until the late eighties was it possible to
access government papers about the 1948 Arab-Israeli War.
A growing volume of scholarly works explores forms of technology cooperation
as vehicles of political persuasion between states (Neumayer, 2003). However, only a
relatively small portion of literature considers small states like Israel. The case of Israel
offers a unique scenario of a small state with two noteworthy attributes; it has technical
knowledge, but a lack of financial resources in comparison to large states. A great deal of
the literature on technology transfers in foreign affairs is centered on the undertakings of
large countries and entities like the United States, European Union, Japan, and China.
Unlike Israel, big players like the US tend to be as much involved in bankrolling projects
as in advancing knowledge transfers. Such was the case in East Timor where Western
donor countries reportedly contributed billions of dollars to finance development projects
(Deutsch, 2009). The point being made here is that technical engagement by small states
like Israel rests predominantly on skills and not on political leverage which may be
associated with big money donor countries.
Although this dissertation’s primary focus is on state sanctioned programs, it is
important to be mindful of the rising role of non-state actors in Israel’s
technology/knowledge diplomacy. Non-state actors like business people and NGOs
increasingly play a role in exporting knowledge, becoming informal ambassadors of
Israel. Senor and Singer (2012) point to the case of Netafim, the Israeli company that
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developed drip irrigation, a technology which is designed to maximize crop outputs with
minimum water usage. The company’s extensive network of contacts and operations was
a factor in opening new otherwise non-existent channels of communications for Israel
with countries with which it had no formal relations. Senor and Singer’s research
underscores the phenomena of Israel’s business ambassadors who promote themselves
and their companies, but also, the entire economy of Israel. In doing so, they are public
diplomacy bridgeheads. Leonard (2002) denotes public diplomacy as a way to encourage
lasting relationships with influential persons.
Given Israel’s traditional foreign relations limitations due to attempts to isolate it,
the practice of technology transfers in international engagement offers possible pathways
to expand diplomatic networks. It is difficult to measure the weight of technology
transfers as tools of persuasion in foreign policy, but as Bozeman (2000) suggests, one
must recognize that the transport of knowledge produces political, economic and social
impacts. In turn, changes in these spheres may have bearing in changing a country’s
behavior in foreign relations.

TECHNOLOGY/KNOWLEDGE TRANSFERS AND SOFT POWER
It can be argued that Israel’s use of technology/knowledge transfers is a form of
soft power. The concept of soft power, developed by Nye (2004), proposes a non-military
means of changing the behavior of others by way of attraction. Soft power is realized
through the use of institutions, culture, political values, and innovation so as to foster
admiration and support. Since the inception of the concept, it has gained sway as a tool of
analysis in the study of foreign affairs especially in the subfield of international
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cooperation. Nevertheless, Nye’s concept is broad making it difficult to gauge. Soft
power can be depicted in relative terms (Fan, 2008). One form of power may be
perceived as “soft” relative to another form of power, and yet, “hard” in relation to
another. For example, economic power may be considered “soft” vs. military power, yet
might be considered “hard” in relation to cultural power. Holyk (2011) offers a
breakdown of soft power by considering separate categories: economic soft power,
human capital soft power, cultural soft power, diplomatic soft power and political soft
power. These soft power modules will be fully described in forthcoming chapters.
Considering such soft power nuances can be helpful in identifying more specific accounts
of the concept at work in the case of Israel’s foreign relations.
Israel is a small state in terms of territory and size of economy. Therefore, the
dissertation domain of research explores the significance of small states, and considers
why they have gained importance in the international system since the fall of the Soviet
Union.
As the title of the dissertation implies, diplomacy and technology transfers are the
principal concepts in the study. As such, the dissertation considers what actually
constitutes diplomacy, and explores what it might be expected to achieve. It also
discusses the merits of technology in fostering international cooperation. Similarly, the
study reviews unique aspects of technology transfer frameworks which play a part in
promoting dialogues and advancing international cooperation among partner countries.
Technological transfers as Larson (1998) suggests are driven by the prospects of
achieving maximum mutual benefits for the technology receiver and sender. Interactions
to achieve this goal could offer opportunities for face-to-face talks.
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The study considers “soft power” features in Israel’s technical international
engagements. It examines a possible linkage between Israel’s technical ties in the
international arena and diplomatic gains in its favor broadly defined. (in terms of trade,
bilateral exchanges and Middle East policy) as detailed in upcoming chapters. Gains may
be direct like political support at the UN or indirect and tacit in the form of quiet joint
collaborations. Callick (2012) notes Israel has gained ground in gradually building
relationships with Asian countries, even as a trend of hostile votes against it in
international arenas persist. Largely, Israel has struggled to prevent hostile anti-Israel
declarations at the UN but continues to experience noteworthy achievements in terms of
increased trade and recognition. Israel has succeeded in partaking in international
collaborations and attaining membership status in exclusive influential international
organizations [for example, admission to the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) and the European Organization for Nuclear Research
(CERN)]. The inclusion of Israel in these organizations perhaps demonstrates how the
Jewish State’s technical skills and experience may at times be viable factors in outplaying
Middle East political dynamics, which have historically constrained Israeli diplomatic
reach.
The dissertation considers the role of Israel’s technical offerings in advancing
informal and formal ties with China and India. China and India were selected as cases
studies because they share a number of distinct attributes. First, both have experienced
periods with and without full diplomatic relations with Israel. Second, China and India
are both countries which are outside the spheres of Israel’s traditional western allies.
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Third, both Asian giants are influential players in international arenas. Fourth, both have
demonstrated long standing pro-Arab positions in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. Finally, technology ties played major roles establishing formal relations with
Israel. Hence, Israel’s relations with China and India offer strong examples of the
usefulness of technology/ knowledge transfers in Israel’s sometimes fragile foreign
dealings. The study focuses mostly on the export of knowledge in the fields of
military/security and agriculture. In areas of security/military it reviews the likes of
armament transfers, intelligence sharing and joint technology ventures. In the area of
agriculture, it will cover joint farming projects. Military/security and agriculture are two
sectors in which Israel is widely recognized as technology leader. What follows is a
chapter-by-chapter outline of the dissertation.

OUTLINE OF DISSERTATION

CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW

The chapter reviews a broad spectrum of key concepts and theoretical
assumptions in the literature, which are pertinent to the study of knowledge and
technology transfers as tools of diplomacy. The terminologies and concepts surveyed
include: diplomacy, soft power, technology transfers and international negotiations. Also
reviewed: science and technology as a source of soft power, small state soft power,
motives in technology transfers, challenges in technology transfers, technology transfers
as forms of communications, and technology/knowledge transfers in Israeli foreign
relations. It is noteworthy to mention a review of literature directly relating to Israel’s ties
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with China and India are positioned in case country specific chapters 4 (China) and 5
(India).
Chapter 2 also reviews the merits and benefits of formal and non-formal
diplomacy. Within the realm of diplomacy, soft power is explored as a tacit tool of
statecraft, particularly in the case of small states like Israel. It also considers the evolving
significance of small states in the international system in the last 50 years. Furthermore,
the section will look at the implications of technology transfers in international relations
and how this type of interaction can be associated with soft power.

CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODS
The examination of the utility of technology transfers in Israel’s bilateral
undertakings draws on a host of primary and secondary sources. Primary sources in the
form of conversations with journalists, diplomats, government officials, and scholars.
Secondary sources being, scholarly literature, archival materials, and news media.
Materials were reviewed in either English and Hebrew without the need for translation.
Field research in Israel and elsewhere has affirmed the relevance of the dissertation topic
to the study of IR. It also revealed instances of difficulty in accessing Israeli state archival
materials due to regulations placing limitations on the release of state documents
associated with national security including foreign relations issues. Much of Israel’s
international dealings remain guarded knowledge.
The chapter outlines the overall research design, specifying methods used to
gather, organize, analyze and interpret data. The section, introduces the hypothesis and
the independent variable (technology transfers), dependent variables (robustness of
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relations with Israel) and intervening variables (politics & conflict). To be clear, the study
does not intend to suggest that any correlations which may be observed between the
variables necessarily infer causation. However, interview data demonstrates there is a
relationship between Israel’s technology transfers and the improving nature of relations
with China and India. Due to the multi-disciplinary nature of the dissertation topic, the
study employs a mix of quantitative and qualitative research approaches, making use of
primary and secondary sources (detailed earlier). The chapter also specifies the utility of
sourcing data trends and computer assisted content analysis (NVivo) in the investigation.
Furthermore, it provides an overall account of research limitations and the introduction of
a broad-minded analysis strategy, which does not conform to a specific paradigm. The
chapter describes the benefits behind the use of particular research approaches and
explains in greater detail why China and India are appropriate country case studies.

CHAPTER 4 ISRAEL IN CHINA

The chapter examines the nature of Sino-Israeli cooperation in the last few
decades mainly from the late 1980s to 2014. In doing so, it will illustrate specific
timelines which highlight technology transfer milestones between Israel and China both
before and after the establishment of diplomatic relations. In this time span, China and
Israel have forged technical ties in specialized fields. The section explores the
significance of relations between the two countries in terms of mutual benefits. It also
considers the role of technology transfers in initiating, maintaining and broadening
bilateral ties. Well before the formation of full diplomatic relations, the countries had
mostly informal clandestine contacts. Much of the quiet dialogues centered around
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technology cooperation stretching over several years. Israel’s experience in the security
and farming sectors drew special interest among Chinese decision makers as China
looked to the world for new technologies in lieu of rapid economic growth and
modernization ambitions starting in the late 1970s. At the same time, Israeli leaders
sought to expand Israel’s diplomatic network in Asia beyond traditional allies in the
West. The combination of China’s technological interests and Israel’s diplomatic hopes
to expand its international reach played a pivotal role in setting the stage for dialogue,
cooperation and ultimately formal full diplomatic ties. After diplomatic relations became
a reality, military and agriculture continued to be major vehicles of collaboration between
the two countries. The chapter will demonstrate how state interests can supersede
ideological sentiments as part of dual track foreign policies. While China generally
follows a pro-Palestinian position, at least officially, it developed close ties with Israel.
Despite China’s sometimes public and critical approach toward Israel, bilateral ties have
flourished involving joint technology projects in a broad range of knowledge areas.
Finally, the chapter offers case specific conclusions about the role of technical ties in
advancing Sino-Israeli relations.

CHAPTER 5 ISRAEL IN INDIA

The chapter examines the development and evolution of Israel-India relations in the
last few decades. In doing so, it will also sketch a series of timelines which highlight
technology transfer milestones in ties between Israel and India both before and after the
establishment of diplomatic relations. Israel’s ties with India like those with China have
experienced tremendous overall growth and cooperation especially in areas of specialized
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agricultural and military technologies. The section explores the significance of ties
between the two countries in terms of mutual benefits and examines the role of
technology transfers in starting, and expanding India-Israel relations. As was the case in
Sino-Israeli relations, full Indian-Israeli relations ties only became a reality after a string
of guarded stop and go encounters occurring over the span of several years. In the early
years of the India-Israel relationship, encounters between Israeli and Indian officials were
primarily informal but touched on technical issues.
With the end of the Cold War, India lost its primary source of military and
diplomatic support from the Soviet Union. This new situation pushed Indian leaders to
forge new partnerships to fill the void. India’s decision to formalize ties with Israel was
part of a wider strategy intended to broaden New Delhi’s inventory of strategic ties.
Relations with Israel provided access to advanced weapon technologies and by extension
to influential contacts in the US. Since the start of full diplomatic ties in 1992,
cooperation between Israel and India has significantly increased.
For India, one of the dominant determinants in the warming of relations with
Israel was national security. Israel’s military know-how was viewed as beneficial to India
in the face of past conflicts with China and lingering tensions with Pakistan. Israel
assisted India during the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict and the Indo-Pakistani wars of 1965
and 1971.Israel’s particular experience in manufacturing and deploying arms was also of
interest to India. As bilateral ties moved forward and matured, Israel and India sought
partnerships in co-producing specialized military equipment. New Delhi’s eagerness for
advanced military technologies combined with Israel’s desire to expand its scope of
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diplomacy and arms exports contributed in the push to full formal relations (Inbar, 2004).
Consequently, Israel became India’s second largest arms provider.
Not to be outdone by rival China’s closer ties with Israel, India also moved closer
to the Jewish State. Interestingly, echoing Chinese policy, Indian decision makers started
to de-link moving towards expanded ties with Israel and issues related to the conflict with
the Palestinians. This meant the conflict was no longer a factor in hindering tighter ties
with the Jewish State. Over time, Singh (2012) suggests that growing Israeli technology
collaborations played a role in the subsequent decline in vocal opposition to ties with
Israel, which were a mainstay source of heated debates in Indian politics.
The India-Israel connection has never been a secret, but its significance has never
been so expansive as it has become in recent years. Israeli and Indian media regularly
underscore how India has become one of Israel's largest global trading partners in Asia,
overtaking China and Japan. Hafeez (2009) asserts that since ties between the two were
formalized, scores of joint agricultural projects have been established. The two countries
have also signed mutual agreements encouraging development in areas other than
agriculture like telecommunications, trade and economic cooperation. In conclusion, the
chapter offers case specific assessments about possible linkage between the proliferation
of technical ties and diplomatic gains for Israel in India-Israel relations.

CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION

This chapter illustrates an overview on how the export of knowledge has
benefited Israel in its relations with China and India. It will consider commonalities and
differences in Sino-Israeli and Indian-Israeli relationships. The section will offer
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conclusions about the validity and implications of utilizing technology and knowledge as
tools of diplomacy. Finally, it will suggest what other countries, in particular small states,
can learn from the Israeli experience.
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CHAPTER II LITERATURE REVIEW

INTRODUCTION

The dissertation examines the diffusion of knowledge and technology transfers as
tools of diplomacy. As the topic suggests, the study explores variant approaches in the
practice of diplomacy. It does this by drawing on a myriad of key traditional and nontraditional concepts from inside and outside the field of International Relations. The
investigation aims to contribute in shaping a sub-discipline, which underscores the
significance of technology transfers in the realm of foreign relations.
This study seeks to evaluate the efficiency of knowledge and technology as
currencies of attraction between states and thus possible sources of leverage in
international engagement. This dissertation topic does not appear to have accumulated a
sizable inventory of scholarly literature. No definitive or significant volume of literature
directly explores the implications of technology/knowledge transfers as tools of
diplomacy especially in the case of small states like Israel. However, an ample volume of
scholarly literature does cover individual topics, which make up core conceptual
components of the overall dissertation topic. A review of these concepts will help to
better understand the underpinnings of the primary research question of this study and the
theoretical foundations on which it rests. What follows is a review of literature covering
principle terms which are relevant in the examination of knowledge and technology
transfers as tools of diplomacy. The terms explored below are: diplomacy, soft power,
small state soft power, science and technology as a source of soft power, technology
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transfers, technology transfers motives, technology transfers challenges, technology
transfers and communication theory, technology/knowledge transfers in Israeli foreign
relations, and international negotiations. It is important to note that literature (reviews)
directly related to each of the two case study countries (India and China) under
examination are not covered in this section but will be positioned in respective country
specific chapters.

DIPLOMACY

Diplomacy (dependent variable) is a function of foreign policy (independent
variable). Kleiner (2008) describes diplomacy as a tool expected to help states peacefully
deal with and solve problems with other states. More specifically, the primary purpose of
diplomatic activity is to fulfill a country’s foreign policy goals. It is important to note that
diplomatic goals vary from country to country as policymakers respond to fluctuating
foreign relations challenges. Diplomatic dealings constitute dialogue encompassing
several forms of communication or channels of engagement between states. In general,
diplomats on the ground work to operationalize or advance their government’s interests
in a host country. They do this by drawing on a bank of contacts and resources. In the last
few decades, the way diplomacy is practiced has changed with the increased inclusion of
non-traditional or non-governmental players to help boost international outreach on
behalf of governments. Pigman and Demos (2008) and Lee (2004) point to examples of
non-professional pools of diplomats which can include business executives and others
who, in the course of their business activities, also help to foster relations between their
home and host country. Public-private partnerships have also helped to expand the scope
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of international exchanges thorough increased trade, development projects, joint ventures,
and other forms of state-to-state collaboration. Kraft (2002) denotes the activism of
multinational non-government organizations (NGOs) as promoters of international
debate, which in turn can open non-traditional platforms for diplomatic exchanges.
India’s international outreach efforts of recent years exemplify the veering away
from conventional protocols and signify the utility of uncustomary diplomatic practices
in pursuit of enhancing relations with other nations. Kumaraswamy (2010) illustrates how
India’s external affairs dealings do not necessarily happen through the work of traditional
channels like foreign affairs-specific governmental offices or professional diplomats.
Instead, a growing contingent of non-external affairs ministry personnel are enlisted to
promote and carryout foreign relations undertakings. India’s Ministry of External Affairs
for example, often draws on specialists from other government departments to help
advance diplomatic business. The practice is not unique to India but clearly reflects an
overall trend in the efforts that some countries undertake to promote their foreign affairs
goals. Kelly (2010) contends the professional diplomat’s role started to change with the
end of the Cold War, when a rethinking in international relations began, opening new
pathways for informal diplomacy. More recently the advent of the Worldwide Web has
also contributed to further broadening the scope of possibilities of non-conventional
country-to-country exchanges. India’s case also brings to light another interesting and
emerging inclination in international relations, which is, the practice of paradiplomacy.
The concept denotes sub-national states like provinces and states engaging in their own
brand of external affairs. Santos (2010) contends that paradiplomacy is becoming a more
common practice in recent years. Its origins can be traced back to the British Empire of
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early 20th century, and was devised to enable dominions like Canada, South Africa, and
Australia to directly take part in international trade agreements. Santos (2010) points out
that Hong Kong was one of the early adapters of paradiplomacy, as Britain permitted the
then colony to deal directly with other states, particularly on economic issues. Paradiplomacy undertakings are pursued by sub-national states to address local specific
interests in areas like trade, technology, and economic development, which perhaps are
not adequately addressed by the central government. In doing so, sub-states turn to
outside sources (states) in an effort to seek solutions to overcome both emerging and
longstanding problems. They do this also in the hope that connecting in the international
arena raises the prospects of improving their visibility and competitiveness in the global
economy. India’s federal political system, which is composed of individual semiautonomous states and territories offers numerous paradiplomacy avenues for
international cooperation in a wide spectrum of sectors. Kumaraswamy (2010)
emphasizes an important point, suggesting Indian States have reached out to other
countries to address local problems, but not necessarily to implement foreign policy or
negate polices shaped by the national government in New Delhi. Nevertheless, such para
diplomacy arrangements are of significance since they create wider opportunities for
bilateral cooperation between sub states and other countries like Israel.
As mentioned above, non-state players have also gained prominence in the field
of diplomacy. This often happens as part of symbiotic-like private-public partnerships.
Kleiner (2008) points out private sector corporations may seek their government’s
support in gaining contacts to penetrate external markets. In some instances, professional
diplomats are called upon to help companies based in their home country to launch
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businesses in the host country where they are stationed. However, public-private
relationships can also work in reverse, whereby business concerns manage to establish
political contacts and initiate dealings, even in the absence of formal relations between
their host and home country. In these circumstances, a role reversal is likely at work
when a company’s brand gains popularity and manages to attract the interest of key
political and economic players in the host nation. As a consequence, a commercial
interest may succeed in establishing a presence ahead of full diplomatic ties. In such an
instance, the private sector concern becomes by default a primary and perhaps the sole
link between its host and home country. In turn, the home country governments seek to
seize on the success of commercial penetration in a prospective target country by
recruiting business leaders as ambassadors of goodwill or business ambassadors with the
view to promote wider bilateral ties. Israel is a case in point. Senor and Singer (2011)
describe Israel’s recent transformation in the business of exporting knowledge as the
country evolved into a hotbed of technological innovation. Emerging as notable leaders
in some areas of hardware and software technologies, Israeli entrepreneurs in the hi-tech
sector have become a source of charm and indirectly a channel of “soft” power
(explained below) for Israel’s policymakers to exploit. Israel’s Netafim, a pioneer of dripirrigation technology is a profound example of a company, which was highly successful
in establishing ties in countries which had no formal relations with Israel. Such ties
eventually assisted opening otherwise closed foreign affairs channels for Israel.
While Senor and Singer’s research is not primarily concerned with the foreign
relations of Israel, it does underscore the phenomenon of Israel’s private or “business
ambassadors”. The authors contend that Israeli technology entrepreneurs who travel the
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world tend to not only promote themselves and their companies, but also the entire
economy of Israel. Pigman and Deos (2007) point out that governments and private
sectors can tend to collaborate in nation branding strategies. In recent years, government
policymakers have pursued branding strategies to boost positive images of their country
by cloning private sector multi-national corporation marketing techniques. Public
relations professionals are recruited to generate positive images to help bump up trade
and attract more foreign investment, and even bolster a county’s international clout (geopolitical influence). Essentially the idea is to link a country’s image to a particular
positive feature.
Van Ham (2001) asserts that companies can play a role in building a country’s
brand. This can be accomplished by associating a company’s brand to the image of the
country where it has headquarters. For example, BMW and Mercedes-Benz have created
brands popularized as efficient and reliable, and these traits have also been touted to be
products of German engineering. In other words, constructing a linkage between
efficiency and reliability features not only to the automotive producers but also with other
German products and, by association, with the entire German economy. Lee (2004)
cautions that the growing number of non-traditional players in diplomatic business can
make it increasingly difficult to distinguish between state and non-state actors. This
concern is important to note especially looking forward as an increasingly number of
affluent leaders in sectors like hi-tech join the growing pool of business ambassadors.
Trans-boundary commerce and exchanges, whether through formal or informal
means, can assist in prying open bilateral contacts, which would otherwise be
unattainable or exist on a very limited basis. The exchange of ideas and technologies
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whether covert or done through openly public pathways can draw attention and perhaps
attraction to a technology’s country of origin. States possessing sought-after problem
solving technologies can likely be in a position to attract new contacts from other
countries. Attraction between states in the realm of international relations is a form of
soft power. The concept has developed as an important foreign affairs feature in the last
few decades.

SOFT POWER
The terms “power and “soft power,” have long been staple concepts in the field of
International Relations (IR). Barnett and Duval (2005) point out that IR theorists largely
interpret hard or military based power as a concept exclusive to Realism. Realists view
states as the key actors in the international system, which vie for self-preservation.
Simply, states are seeking security to survive (Waltz 1979). To do so, they act in pursuit
of national interests, and compete for power with other states. Realism is usually
distinguished from Idealism or Liberalism, which tends to highlight international
cooperation. Along these lines, Wilson (2008) contends that IR Neorealist thinkers in IR
often stress the principles of hard power or mostly military might to influence other state
actors’ behaviors, while the followers of Liberal Institutionalism view international
organizations (soft power) as a tool of statecraft allowing states to exercise power
through non-military means. Furthermore, Andrews (2010) points out prescribers of NeoLiberal institutionalism argue interdependences between states are born out of on mutual
or shared interests.
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In essence, Neo-Liberal Institutionalists view international institutions as boons
for setting norms of behavior in the absence of a central authority (anarchy) in the
international system and thus help to diminish distrust and fears between states reducing
the need to turn to military force. International institutions thus create environments
favorable to promoting cooperation, reciprocity, yielding compromises, and producing
mutual benefits. Keohane (2012) points to international institutions as enablers of
cooperation between states, helping to advance shared interests. However, Andrews
(2010) cautions that mutual interests may not always result in mutual benefit because
transnational organizations and most of what happens in the international system is
commandeered by a small group of powerful states which tend to marginalize the status
of other states.
The concept of soft power gained wide acceptance and currency in the study of
foreign relations and diplomacy in the last few decades through the theoretical work
developed by Nye (2004). Nye (2010), suggests institutions can play a part in boosting a
country’s soft power reach. He points to the examples of the United Kingdom and the
United States, which advanced their values in the international arena by having a hand in
shaping international institutions like the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade
Organization and the United Nations which, in effect mirror the American and British
economic systems. Nye makes an interesting point, suggesting countries that are able to
make their power be seen as legitimate by others, will likely encounter less disagreement
with their viewpoints. Nye (2010) distinguishes between soft power and hard power,
contending that soft power is realized through agents of attraction. Agents include:
national institutions, culture, and political values as well as a host of other values, which
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can be associated with the supposed soft power holder. Nye makes a point of dismissing
loose interpretations of the concept (soft power) solely in terms of influence. Influence,
he contends, should be viewed more broadly because it could also be a result of other
variables like hard power policies. Instead, the mechanics of attracting others is the
bedrock feature of soft power. That attraction could be key in achieving bilateral and
multi-lateral understandings. It is important to note that soft power heavily rests on the
consent of those affected by it. Cristo (2005) reinforces the view that actual utilization of
soft power is contingent on how others, namely other states, recognize it. Furthermore,
this form of power may take long periods of time to produce desired results, but any
gains could also slip away relatively quickly. Such soft power vulnerabilities appear to
have emerged in the case of Israel’s diplomatic legacy in Africa in the 1960s and 70s.
Soft power’s sometimes fragile shelf life could help explain, at least in part, why some of
Israel’s foreign relations campaigns fell short on long term goals. Despite a substantial
period of technical cooperation engagement in Africa, Israel experienced a dramatic
severing of diplomatic ties when all but two African countries dropped relations with
Israel in the wake of the 1973 Middle East (or Yom Kippur) war. Attraction in the
context of soft power should not be equated with the notion of control over others. Soft
power is more about attraction than about influence. It’s important to underscore this
distinction because this understanding of the concept can help better identify instances of
Nye’s soft power. Soft power is a viable feature in the dynamics of the international
system but it can be operationalized in various forms. Therefore, Nye rightly cautions
that soft power should not be considered in broad terms, but should rather be viewed on a
case-by-case basis.

29

The development of Nye’s soft power has triggered a scholarly debate about the
usefulness of the concept and raised poignant questions about plausible theoretical
shortcomings. Fan (2008) argues that simple distinctions between “hard” and “soft”
power can often be confusing and even counterproductive. That is because power can be
characterized in relative terms. One type of power may be perceived as “soft” in contrast
to another form of power, and yet, “hard” when compared to another. For example,
economic power may be seen as “soft” when contrasted with military power, but could
also be depicted as “hard” when compared to cultural power. Furthermore, attempts to
quantify soft power have proved difficult to demonstrate. Nye himself (2006)
acknowledges lingering challenges in measuring soft power but contends that hard power
too can be difficult to gauge, pointing to America’s Vietnam War experience as a
formidable example. He asserts the US possessed more military capabilities (a
measurable variable) than North Vietnam, and yet lost the war. Nye (2006) contends soft
power features like cultural capital and communications may be measured and compared.
He also points to gauges like public opinion polls as metric tools and indicators about a
country’s levels of attractiveness in the eyes of other states.
Further insight on this point comes from Holyk (2011) who asserts positive steps
have been taken to empirically investigate soft power. Measurement methods, he reasons,
have started to gain ground in recent years, with more in-depth approaches to determine
quantitative features. Holyk (2011) proposes a more defined way of examining the
concept through a model. The model excludes the possibility of viewing soft power as
one size fits all, instead breaking down the makeup of the concept into smaller units of
analysis. The model considers five primary categories of soft power: economic soft
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power, human capital soft power, cultural soft power, diplomatic soft power and political
soft power. Each of these are further unpacked into smaller parts. For example, economic
soft power is broken down into: economic importance of soft power benefactor,
economic benefits, product reputation and entrepreneurial reputation of soft power
holder. Human capital soft power can be examined in terms of: state’s universities’
reputation (rankings) in comparison to other countries, education level of population (percapita university graduates), science technology achievements (measured by rates of
technology patents generated). Cultural capital soft power can be considered through
cultural spiritual heritage connections (common religious beliefs). Diplomatic soft power
is diplomatic reputation (diplomatic influence). This is just a sampling of Holyk’s overall
approach. A more detailed treatment of the model in terms of Israel’s soft power will be
addressed in the next chapter, which outlines the research methodology.
Israel’s record of disrupted ties in Africa (mentioned above) raises questions
about the limitations of soft power and suggests the interplay of intervening variables like
geo-political and interdependency issues between partners. On this point, Kroll (1993)
rightly points out that states in bilateral relationships may be susceptible to lopsided
levels of interdependence. In other words, one state may have greater leverage over the
other state making it the less dependent. Ruggie (1975) asserts that asymmetrical
relationships in which one state enjoys advantages over another can disrupt viability in
international partnerships. Baldwin (1980) advocates considering interdependence in
terms of cost factors. He suggests looking at the price partner countries would likely have
to pay to end a relationship as an indicator of interdependency strength. In other words,
the higher the price a country has to pay to end its ties with another state, the greater its
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dependence on that state. In the case of mutual equal vulnerability, both parties will pay a
similar price in the event the relationship ends. Baldwin offers a simple way to explore
whether two states are genuinely interdependent: if the demise of a relationship has little
or no effect on the parties it (the relationship) was never interdependent. Keohane and
Nye (1977) describe interdependence as one of the underpinnings of international
cooperation. They posit that out of self-preservation motives, states may be forced to
advance their interests through direct country-to-country cooperation or through
international organizations instead of embarking in unilateral actions. Interdependence
fosters reciprocity and is a chief tool in helping states gain benefits unlikely achieved by
any other means. Kutys (2009) maintains that the emergence of a global economic system
is conducive to interdependency between states, and thus generates international
cooperation opportunities to deal with problems. In turn, increased calls for cooperation
can offer soft power opportunities especially for countries holding particularly useful
capabilities. States of all sizes may be in a position to retrieve soft power rewards.
However, the utility of Nye’s concept has gained a nuanced significance in the case of
small states (like Israel) as more of them came into existence in the last few decades,
especially with the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, Israel’s ties with China and India
can be explained along the lines of functionalism as described by Mitrany (1971) as a
mechanism set up to tackle overall problems. On this point, Mitrany’s notion of
functionism echoes the theme of common interests as central drivers behind international
collaborations to resolve problems. Technical collaborations or joint ventures like those
between Israel and her partners tend to focus on commonalities rather than differences.
Such endeavors promote the exchange of ideas and open new contact opportunities. Joint
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ventures in one sector can also help set the stage for discussions on wider spheres of
bilateral cooperation. In this way, non-political collaborations could expand into
collaborations on political levels.

SMALL STATE SOFT POWER

Kutys (2009) lays out factors, which explain why small states have gained more
significance in the international system after the Cold War. First, the emergence of
breakaway republics from the Soviet Union gave rise to the formation of over a dozen
new small states. Second, and more importantly, newly established small states like
former eastern bloc countries gained the freedom to shape and advance their own
independent foreign policies in the absence of Soviet constraints. This notable
development bolstered the diplomatic standing of small states by forming a fresh
contingent of political forces in the global system, which up to that point in history was
mostly was dominated and driven by large states. The new diplomatic landscape meant a
greater number of small states were seeking to advance their interests, and at times
working in competition with their larger counterparts. Their stepped up activity and
presence in international arenas has triggered fresh interest and thinking in scholarly
circles about small state behaviors. This may have inspired some thinkers to move away
from conventional understandings of how small states operate and propose novel
approaches. Sutton (2011) for example, rejects the view that geographic or population
limitations can be determinants of whether a state can be considered small or large.
Physical features, he contends, cannot define state behavior. Therefore, he implies small
states can act as large states while large states can act like small states. Sutton (2011) and
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Hey (2003) suggest it is how people of small states perceive themselves that can
determine attitudes towards their country.
Chong (2010) points out a soft power feature unique to small states. He contends
soft power is essentially one of the only ways small states can extend their presence and
influence beyond their borders. In contrast, large states generally have extended resources
beyond soft power to project themselves internationally. Large countries have the means
to draw on a wider scope of assets, which may include a mixture of soft and hard power
capabilities. Consequently, larger states may employ soft power strategies either in
isolation or in combination with hard power in order to realize goals. Wilson (2008)
refers to the mixed soft power-hard power approach as smart power. The absence of
viable hard power opportunities for small states, suggests that soft power likely plays a
prominent role in their diplomatic toolkit.
Chong (2010) considers two robust examples of small states (Singapore and the
Vatican) as models that have effectively extended their presence and influence
internationally despite lacking hard power capabilities in the international arena.
Singapore’s recognized economic success and the Vatican’s accomplished mediation
reputation have drawn positive attention, likely acting as agents of attraction. The lure of
these qualities could translate into diplomatic soft power. These examples support the
view that small states whose achievements are recognized can be in a position to enjoy
soft power opportunities. The case of Singapore is particularly important in the context of
this study because it offers strong similarities to the case of Israel. Both countries possess
small tracts of territory bordering larger and mostly un-friendly neighbors. The two
countries have also historically suffered from limited diplomatic sway and lack natural
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resources. Yet Singapore and Israel have both succeeded in translating domestic
hardships into marketable experiences of use to other states.
Ooi’s (2008) sketch of Singapore’s efforts to advance a more positive image of
itself to the world in the last decade provides real world testimony about the possible
value of soft power for a small state. Singapore’s public relations push touted itself as a
center of innovation, creativity, and as a good place to do business. The promotion builds
in part on Singapore’s reputation as an economic success story. Ooi’s description
suggests that Singapore’s recognized business achievements may have played a role in
muting other less positive perception, about the country. Put differently, economic
reputation as a source of positive attraction may have been a factor in softening critical
voices which disapprove of Singapore’s less likable restrictive social and political
policies. Ooi points out that Singapore’s economic achievements appear to have
overridden the negative perceptions; this is perhaps reaffirmed by Singapore’s
consistently high ranking in the World Economic Forum’s Annual Global
Competitiveness Reports published in recent years. However, economic achievement is
but one of many sources of soft power as Holyk’s model above suggested. The model
also implies a country’s knowledge and technology assets can also yield soft power
opportunities.
Teece (1977) neatly hones in on the significance of technology transfers in
international relations by pointing out that a country’s fiscal growth and success rest to
some extent on its ability to procure know-how from external sources. Nevertheless, a
technology transfer is a wide-ranging process, which can encompass numerous
practices. In its simplest form, it is the movement of technology and/or know-how from
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one place or entity (country) to another, from the sender to the end user recipient party.
It is this overall understanding of the concept that is adopted in this study. Technology
transfers can involve hardware, software, maintenance, and training components, and
may also be part of international technical cooperation agreements. Transfers in the form
of state-to-state technical cooperation, are generally a part of diplomatic initiatives.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AS A SOURCE OF SOFT POWER

The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (2007), a publication that primarily reports
on technology and world security, posits that scientific cooperation can help abate
tensions in the international community. This view backs the idea that scientific
knowledge or technology can act as bridges of cooperation and offer valuable tools in
advancing diplomatic undertakings. Collaboration in the technological sector, after all,
commands an exchange of ideas, which can create a host of contact opportunities through
joint ventures and partnerships, which tend to promote a focus on commonalities rather
than differences between stakeholders. Joint ventures in one sector can also help set the
stage for discussions on wider spheres of multilateral and bilateral cooperation. Such
partnerships are born to advance mutual partner benefits and tackle problems. In this
sense, the transfer of knowledge and technology sharing can be agents of state-to-state
attraction and hence a form of soft power in the international arena. Yakushiji (2009)
points out that global economic growth has created more ways for non-diplomatic
personnel like technicians and scientists to represent their countries informally, in areas
not covered by traditional diplomacy. These opportunities may also open technology
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diplomacy for uses under different pretenses to advance a country’s foreign policy
objectives.
Since technology or know-how offer promises of resolving problems, they are
viable sources of attraction. Technology collaboration, as will be explored later in this
study, is plausible even between countries with major or long-standing policy
disagreements. The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (2007) asserts that even states opposed
to US policies have expressed appreciation for American innovation. This understanding
implies that a technology’s usefulness for the “greater good” can overshadow negative
attitudes towards the technology’s country of origin. In others words, technology if
deemed useful can possibly trump politics in international relations. The process of
technology cooperation, in the form of transporting knowledge from one party to another
can be a tricky undertaking, which may be up against a horde of unpredictable
challenges, including economic and political constraints.

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS

It is important to note that technology transfer is a broad concept referred to in the
literature through a variety of terms. Technology transfers may, for example, be
characterized as forms of technical cooperation, development assistance, and/or scienceand-technology diplomacy and trade just to name a few. Bozeman (2000) points out that
technology transfers could be used to describe a wide range of organizational and
institutional interactions. This can include private sector government agencies and
research centers, universities, nonprofit research organizations, and even entire nations.
As movements of knowledge or technology from one setting to another, technology
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transfers are time-based endeavors, which generally involve multiple actors and
numerous stages. Project progressions require crucial decision-making steps, and may
entail long stretches of time to implement. The transfer timeline can encompass:
evaluating opportunities, making choices, procurement, preparation leading up to
transfer, implementation, and post-transfer interactions like after market training and
development.
Wahab, Rose, Wati and Suzana (2012) raise noteworthy questions, one should
consider while examining international technology transfers. One question, for example,
denotes the importance of preferences made in consigning one technology over another
for transfer. The selection of a particular technology by a sender state is important
because it could reveal specifics about the technology sender’s foreign policy priorities
while also spotlighting problematic issues in the recipient nation. For example, the
transfer of advanced weaponry from the US to Israel is testament to America’s efforts to
maintain the Jewish state’s qualitative military edge while highlighting Israel’s existential
security challenges. Other important factors in the transfer process include: composition
of participants, method of transfer, and possible implications like economic growth
(Millman, 2001). Intent or motives are also noteworthy aspects of technology transfers,
especially in foreign affairs.

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS MOTIVES

Technology transfers generally the results of two sets of motives, one, on the
technology donor side and the other from the technology recipient side. Furuoka and
Munir (2011) bring up an obvious yet paramount point relating to donor motives. The
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notion of altruism does not necessarily paint a complete picture of the driving forces
behind technology transfers like those in the form of seemingly generous technical
assistance initiatives. Instead, motivations may be driven by the desire to achieve a broad
range of political and strategic goals, which could include gaining advantages over rivals,
boosting trade volumes, and enhancing diplomatic prestige. On the recipient side, the
motivations stem from necessity or desire of securing fresh sources of knowledge. Ray
(2012) points out technologies are generally acquired in one of two ways: either selfdeveloped or brought in from elsewhere in the form of a technology transfer. Technology
transfers can act as catalysts, helping countries speed up developmental progress. Reddy
and Zhao (1990) confirm the idea that states pursuing external knowledge is a fairly
common practice. As mentioned above, international technology transfers draw on both
public and private sources. However, a combination of factors like new trade
opportunities, business interests, informal diplomacy efforts, and increased ease of
transporting know-how have given rise to state and non-state partnerships in international
technology transfers. No matter the underlying motives, or the make up of players,
transfers are intended by design to produce mutual benefits for technology senders and
receivers. Benefits of these transactions may be realized in tacit or non-tacit forms.
However, expected or ideal outcomes may not unfold as intended. There are several
explanations why this could happen. Results may be time-delayed, null or even
damaging, as occurred in the case of Sino-Israeli relations, which will be detailed in
chapter four.
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TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS CHALLENGES

Omar, Takim & Nawawi (2012) explore possible missteps and a checklist of
fundamental tools and conditions they assert are essential to successfully carry out
technology transfers. These include specialized equipment, operating instructions and
skill sets. Failure to provide any of these operational components either in isolation or in
combination could prevent or slow the transfer process. In addition, the technology
sender must take steps to ensure intended or suitable use of transferred technology. In
cases in which the transfer requires recipient state input in technology development, that
involvement may inadvertently disclose otherwise guarded information about the
technology senders’ strategic capabilities. This could unveil the scale of technological
disparities between partner (sender and receiver) nations. Misunderstandings, language
issues, differences in culture and attitudes could be factors in disrupting the transfer
process. Mismatched or unsuitable technologies could also be culprits when shared
technology cannot be applied adequately in the recipient country. Lack of trust and
discrepancies in management styles as well as difficulties with technology upgrades,
training and funding can all sabotage transfer projects. Any of these tricky issues can also
translate into political problems in international partnerships. One main objective of
technology transfers is to advance development by closing or reducing technology gaps
in the destination country. However, Chan and Daim (2011) caution that the technology
gap reduction may not be realized in the long term when transfers do not translate into
innovation. This possibility will most likely unfold when the technology sender limits
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transfers to low/medium-level technologies, as Wang and Zhou (1999) point out. Other
major transfer constraints could include conflicting interests between domestic and
international parties. Some knowledge stakeholders may be in danger of losing their
technological advantage in transfers, but may conclude that the prospects of new market
opportunities outweigh such risks. Knowledge originators may be forced to consider
putting safeguards in place to offset theft of intellectual property or unauthorized
technology sharing with third parties, a practice that is also known as technology
forwarding.

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS AND COMMUNICATION THEORY

At its core, a technology transfer is a process in which knowledge is translated into
practical use to solve a problem. As such, the practice instinctively comprises knowledge
sharing through training and movement of technology between people and places. Hence,
a technology transfer enterprise can be framed as a channel or medium through which
skills and knowledge are transmitted. As stated above, technology transfers can be a
source of attraction (soft power) when the process entails the delivery of new ideas and
methods which promise benefit to others (states). A knowledge transfer could also be an
instrumental agent of change in the behaviors of others, by introduction of new working
or operating techniques. Chong (2010) suggests newly introduced technology (soft power
feature) can concurrently serve as a message (“we support you”) and creator of new
opportunities (new industries and jobs), echoing Marshall McLuhan’s (“the Medium is
the Message” 51–66, 70–71) in Understanding Media. Chong’s (2010) understanding of
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soft power, applied to the technology transfer process, emphasizes the idea of a transfer
that is both a message and shaper of content (or policy).
Federman (2004) simplifies McLuhan’s theory by explaining change brought
about by the introduction of a new idea is more significant than the new idea itself. In
effect, this notion proposes that the secondary effects of a new technology are the most
important issue to be aware of. Applied to a technology transfer (framed as a medium), a
technology’s ability to sway a recipient’s behavior is of greater significance than the
actual technology being transferred. Generally, technology can be a driver of change.
McLuhan suggests avoiding focusing on the immediate effects of change, and instead
suggesting being cognizant of the non-obvious outcomes triggered by something new.
Federman asserts that McLuhan is saying the medium is a tool, which helps extend our
presence and, in doing so, empowers us to do more than would otherwise be possible on
our own. This belief mirrors the key premise of soft power (as discussed above) as a tool,
which enables states to extend their presence beyond their borders.
This dissertation examines Israel’s export of knowledge and technical cooperation
in diplomacy. In doing so, the study looks at how technology transfers can translate into
broader forms of cooperation helping to widen the scope of Israel’s foreign relations.
Below are some examples.

TECHNOLOGY AND KNOWLEDGE TRANSFERS IN ISRAELI FOREIGN RELATIONS

While this study focuses on instances of Israeli technical ties with Asian countries
it is important to note the use of technology sharing as a diplomatic tool by Israel also
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played a role in other regions, particularly in Africa. Knowledge sharing programs were
launched with the aim of boosting Israel’s diplomatic relations on the continent (Oded,
2009). Mogire (2008) contends Israeli technical activities in Africa served as vehicles to
build and maintain relations with several countries. Israel’s initial outreach to the
continent in the 1960s offered an attractive option for emerging nations. Oded (2011)
suggests that Israeli offerings were inviting because they shared practical agricultural
techniques to improve crop production. As noted earlier, carrying out technology
transfers can be complex and fraught with problems. Some of Israel’s technical
cooperation efforts were indeed troubled by cultural issues, social dissimilarities and
allegations of corruption, which reportedly harmed relations with some African countries.
However, overall, Israel experienced noteworthy growth in its diplomatic reach in Africa
in the mid to late 1960s. This success has been attributed in part to technical cooperation
activities mostly in the agriculture and security sectors. Specialized training in farming
facilitated by Israel’s International Development Agency (MASHAV) was of special
interest to African leaders grappling with nation-building challenges. Israel’s outreach in
Africa was also part of a wider foreign policy strategy known as the Periphery Doctrine.
The doctrine was designed to develop alliances with non-Arab countries, like Kenya,
which form a geographic ring around the Middle East (Alpher, 2013). Perhaps the
importance of technology links in Israel’s diplomacy can be best appreciated in times
marked by the absence of formal relations. It is interesting to note that even after a string
of African states dropped ties with Israel in the wake of the 1973 Arab-Israeli Yom
Kippur War, technology links continued to play a role in Israel’s ties with various
countries. The case of Kenya’s relationship with Israel is a good example. Albeit on a
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smaller scale, ties were maintained with Kenya where Israeli technical personnel and
entrepreneurs kept a quiet presence despite the absence of diplomatic relations (Chazan,
2006). Military cooperation also continued as evidenced by Nairobi’s well-publicized
logistical help in the 1976 rescue of hijacked airline passengers held hostage at Entebbe
Airport, Uganda. The Israeli plane carrying the freed passengers was permitted to land
for fuel in Nairobi on the return journey to Tel Aviv. The gesture was a crucial factor in
accomplishing the successful completion of the mission given the round-trip distance
from Israel to Uganda.
Israel and Kenya eventually renewed diplomatic ties in 1988. Security
cooperation has been historically demonstrated to be a key pillar in Israel-Kenya ties both
in distant and recent times. Defense and security concerns have been at the center of the
relationship between the two countries, especially following a series of major attacks in
Kenya targeting US and Israeli interests. Examples include the 1998 bombing of the
American Embassy in Nairobi, the 2002 attack on an Israeli owned resort hotel in
Mombasa, and an attempt to shoot down an Israeli airliner the same year. Bilateral
security cooperation has proven to be a deeply entrenched fixture of the Kenyan-Israeli
relationship since the 1960s when Israel was said to be instrumental in helping to set up
branches of the Kenya’s security services. A testament to the ongoing security
collaboration was demonstrated in the handling of the 2013 terror attack on Nairobi’s
upscale Westgate Mall. A multitude of media sources underscored the positioning of
Israeli security personnel on the ground to assist Kenyan forces to end the ensuing siege
after the initial attack, which killed dozens. Since the restart of formal relations in 1998,
ties have been robust with Kenya not inclining to automatically support every anti-Israeli
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resolution at the UN. Yet Kenya did join the majority of member states at the UN in
2012 favoring upgrading the Palestinian delegation to non-member observer in the face
of Israeli objections. This is a clear example of the role of technology transfers can
promote bilateral considerations but also a testament to the fact that technology transfers
do not offer fool proof tools in diplomacy.
Over the last few decades, Israel has returned to Africa, re-establishing lost
relations and even fostering new ones. Oded (2011) credits positive perceptions of past
Israeli technical and military cooperation as one of the reasons for the Jewish State’s
fruitful renewed presence on the continent. Oded’s assertion implies that Israel’s
technical legacy in Africa may have been a factor in helping to re-start and expand
bilateral opportunities. Israeli cooperation projects trickled back to parts of Africa, but
with a few new distinctions in comparison to past decades. Israeli involvement returned
on a much smaller scale, and not as stand-alone endeavors but instead in some instances
as part of joint ventures with third party countries. Also, rarely does Israel deploy longterm technical personnel in Africa as it did in the 1960s and 70s. One of MASHAV’s
most notable operating changes after Israel’s return to Africa was the shift away from
field operations, instead training foreign nationals in Israel itself. By doing so, Israel is
endeavoring to make itself known as a center of learning in areas like agriculture, social
development, and computing and energy conservation. Trainees participate in courses
some of which are facilitated through partnerships with UN organizations like UNESCO,
FAO, WHO, UNICEF, the World Bank, and donor nations like the United States,
Holland, Germany and Denmark. In a media interview, MASHAV’s Director of Policy
Planning acknowledges the small scale of the agency’s activities in Africa but also points
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out Israel’s participation in high-impact programs like Grand Challenges Israel (GCI) and
the Israeli-German Africa Initiative, which support projects in public health and food
security in countries like Kenya.
The initial rekindling of Israeli relations in Africa, which began in the 1980s, was
marred by prolonged doubts in Israel about the usefulness of relations on the continent
given a history of severed ties in the previous decade. Sentiments of betrayal in Israeli
circles lingered since African leaders dropped relations during the 1973 Yom Kippur war.
However, in recent years a change in Israel’s approach towards Africa has emerged.
Chazan (2014) contends that Israeli policymakers have reevaluated the importance of
Africa, especially in light of mounting international recognition of economic and strategic
prospects in African countries. Recent discoveries of fossil fuels and forecasts of new
business opportunities in emerging markets have recharged interest in Africa. A bevy of
global powers like China, the United States, Russia and the European Union have
allocated large sums of capital on development projects around the continent as they vie
to reap political and commercial benefits. Pronounced interest in Africa has prompted
government, private sector, and NGO voices within Israel to push the Jewish State to
rethink the scale of its involvement in Africa, urging the launch of new technology based
initiatives which they argue is not only good for business, but will also advance Israel’s
standing as a noteworthy player in the overall international development aid arena.
Israel’s rebooted but limited engagement in Africa through state sanctioned MASHAV,
has created opportunities to involve more Israeli commercial companies, entrepreneurs,
nonprofit organizations and NGOs in developmental work. The development of Israel’s
relationships with most African states tended to follow identical timelines. That is,
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initially establishing and maintaining formal (and technical) ties with Israel in the 1960s
until severing relations mostly in 1973 (some countries retained quiet ties informally in
the absence of diplomatic relations), and then restoring relations in the 1980s.The case of
Cameroon’s relations with Israel also adhered to such a path.
Formal relations between Israel and Cameroon restarted on the heels of Israeli
involvement in recovery efforts after a major volcanic eruption disaster in the central
African country. The warming of relations came as Cameroon’s leadership also sought
new ways to wrestle with persistent developmental struggles. Press reports suggest
renewed ties were initiated with the expectations of re-introducing Israeli technical
cooperation (Broder, 1986). Cameroon's President, speaking to the press, hinted that his
country’s past partnership experience with Israel in the form of technical cooperation was
a factor in the decision to restore relations. On the 20th anniversary of the 1986
reestablishment of formal ties, the Cameroonian ambassador to Israel emphasized
technical cooperation as one of the underpinnings of his country’s relationship with the
Jewish State. On the same occasion, an Israeli government minister went on public record
acknowledging Cameroon’s support of Israel in the International arena. Similarly, the
website of the Israeli embassy in Cameroon touts the transfer of technology as a central
feature in bilateral relations. Israel has played a role in advancing Cameroon’s
agriculture, which is a significant part of the country's economic development. Israel has
done this by partnering with other countries like Brazil to boost Cameroon’s poultry
industry as featured in on-line publications Cameroon Today (2011) and the Poultry site
(2008). Media reports also imply military cooperation between Israel and Cameroon, but
details about collaboration in this area are mostly murky and unverifiable (Brooke, 1987).
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The export of arms, and the sharing of counterinsurgency techniques was a major factor
in reinstating relations with Zaire, Liberia and Cameroon.
In 2010, the Israeli ambassador in Yaoundé, Cameroon’s capital, called
Cameroon his country’s best friend in Africa, affirming it has diplomatically stood by
Israel. Indeed, Cameroon’s UN voting records of recent years perhaps demonstrate
distinct support for Israel. One can point to Cameroon’s positions at the United Nations
(2012) Sixty-Seventh General Assembly plenary 44th & 45th meetings. In these sessions,
Cameroon voted either to strike down resolutions unfavorable to Israel or simply
abstained altogether. One of the resolutions covered the highly charged topic of
Palestinian refugees. In that instance, the motion only drew two votes against (UN,
2013). Besides the obvious objection from Israel, the only other vote against was cast by
Cameroon. Even Israel’s staunchest allies like Canada and the United States, abstained in
this instance. On the highly contested status of Jerusalem, Cameroon also abstained while
most UN members voted against Israel (UN, 2013). The General Assembly
overwhelmingly voted to accord Palestine Non-Member Observer Status in United
Nation in 2012. Cameroon chose to abstain in this case as well, while other countries
with close ties to Israel like Kenya and India voted in favor of the resolution (UN, 2012).
Cameroon’s recent voting record on Middle East issues sharply contrasts with its policies
in the period before the restart of formal bilateral relations with Israel. In 1980, when
Cameroon held the chairmanship of the African Union it tended to support policies
against Israel especially in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Conceivably this
notable shift in policy towards Israel in recent years can be attributed to technology
transfers which is a central feature of the relationship between the two countries.
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In Asia, technology and knowledge sharing also played a notable role in creating
relationships for Israel. Bainerman (1994) illustrates how an agricultural initiative
spearheaded by MASHAV had assisted Israeli policymakers to broaden contacts in the
Philippines. Collaboration in agriculture reportedly helped lay the groundwork for
additional cooperation in the military sector, which facilitated the sales of armaments,
including big items like fighter jets. A report in a Philippines-based newspaper provides
further testament how Israel's reputation in the field of agriculture may have also played a
role in broadening bilateral ties. Aning, J (2012) documents a visit to Israel by the Vice
President of the Philippines. On his tour, the senior politician stated his country could
benefit by adopting Israeli food production techniques and expressed a willingness to
tighten overall bilateral relations (Aning, 2012). In another instance, Gottlieb and Radler
(2002) point to the Federated States of Micronesia’s (FSM) pro-Israel stance at the UN
and possible linkage to technology transfers. Through MASHAV, Israel was said to be
instrumental in developing an agricultural sector in the FSM. Bilateral cooperation in this
area was noteworthy since the farming industry is one of the largest employers in the
island chain nation. Gottlieb and Radler attribute tight ties between the countries to
technical collaboration in agriculture. The example of Israel’s engagement in
developmental projects, like those in Asia, the South Pacific, and other regions, perhaps
further reinforces the utility of technology transfers in the business of diplomacy. The
consistency of Micronesia’s solid political support for Israel has generally been on par
with the level of backing usually extended to the Jewish State by Israel’s closest allies
like the US, and only a handful of other nations. Given the extent of technical
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cooperation with Israel in a sector crucial its economic well being, Micronesia’s firm
diplomatic support for the Jewish state is not surprising.
Overall, recognizing similar links between technology sharing and gains in the
realm of Israel’s foreign relations may not be as apparent in other cases. The dissertation
largely seeks to identify linkages between technology transfers and bilateral benefits for
Israel in obvious and non-obvious form. Callick (2012) notes Israel's efforts to widen ties
in Asia in recent years are helping to gradually build or strengthen relationships with
countries which have historically maintained close ties to Arab nations. Technology
cooperation to some degree appears to be a factor in driving advances in these bilateral
dealings. While growing technical ties with countries like China, India and Vietnam, for
example, rarely deliver outright diplomatic gains (defined narrowly) they do help widen
overall bilateral links in important areas like trade.
Ostrovsky (2012) touches on an interesting trend, which has emerged recently in
Israel’s foreign relations dealings. Israel has in some instances expanded ties with other
countries irrespective of their objections related to the Israel-Palestinian conflict. While
Israel has not been able to necessarily curb hostile motions at the UN, it has experienced
a string of noteworthy accomplishments in the realm of trade and international
recognition. This could mean Israel has managed to promote an environment in which its
bilateral agreements are increasingly judged on merits, regardless of the conflict with the
Palestinians. In other words, partners may consider what Israel can contribute in skills
and experience despite differences about political issues. Two notable examples of
Israel’s achievements in terms of international recognition include acceptance as a full
member state in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
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and admittance as the first non-European member of The European Organization for
Nuclear Research (CERN). On this very point, Ido Aharoni (2012) Consul General of
Israel in New York, speaking to the Wharton School of Business, talked about country
“positioning” in describing Israel’s efforts to utilize the county’s competitive edge in
selected sectors to market itself. Aharoni asserts that people who ardently care about
particular issues will set aside political differences to listen to offers in areas they are
interested in.
Technology transfers and cooperation exchanges, typically involve several
stakeholders, each with their own set of interests and goals. As such, transfer
arrangements require participants or partners to agree on conditions and rules of
engagement. This is generally accomplished through negotiations. Interestingly, even
countries which do not have diplomatic or warm political relations, will negotiate over
certain issues if it is in their benefit. A strong example is the case of the Russia-NATO
relationship in which both parties are generally at odds over arms control issues and yet
work to collaborate in a handful of areas. These include dealing with maritime piracy,
cyber security and radical Islamic groups.

INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS

Negotiations have become vital tools in the international system. The purpose of
negotiation is to tackle complex and pivotal global issues like trade and international
cooperation endeavors, many of which entail forms of technology transfers. Such stateto-state interactions as Larson (1998) suggests are driven by the prospects of achieving
mutual benefits or gains for all parties involved. To that end, face-to-face talks provide a
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forum to iron out differences in demands. Fearon (1998) asserts that no matter what the
talks are about, there are usually several ways to lock in an agreement, and those
involved will likely have differing ideas on which direction to proceed. Larson (1998)
contends that the possibility of a tug of war of positions and attempts to hold out for more
favorable outcomes as parties propose offers and counter offers with the intention of
maximizing gains for themselves. As each side works to advance their interests, they
must deal with a bargaining partner’s competing interests, and at the same time figure out
the minimum terms the other side would accept to reach an agreement. This means the
consideration of concessions by both sides. Negotiation discussions can be put at risk of
faltering and stalling if demands are excessive and/or the proposed agreement limitations
are deemed unacceptable by any side. To better position themselves, negotiators will
likely benefit by learning a bargaining partner’s strengths, weaknesses, customs,
traditions, economic system, and expectations from an agreement. In any case, the parties
must work to build mutual confidence and trust to enhance the probability to reaching an
impartial agreement outcome.
Pfetsch, Frank R, Landau, Alice (2000) detail factors, which could influence
negotiation outcomes. These can be for example, power capability disparities between the
parties and the presence of a third party mediator. Talks involving a mix of small and
large state players could exemplify the challenge of power asymmetry. Conceivable
power unevenness around the negotiating table puts into question the ability of small
countries to effectively negotiate with larger countries and manage to avoid a skewed
outcome in favor of the more powerful party. Zeitoun, Mirumachi, and Warner (2011)
suggest that international negotiations can produce a one sided conclusion when one of
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the parties has more soft power opportunities to advance an outcome in their favor. Page
(2003) cites a number of issues that can undercut small state leverage in negotiations.
These can be for example smaller budgets, fewer personnel and training resources in
comparison to larger states. However, Page (2003) also asserts that small states are
nevertheless able to yield gains in discussions because even a strong (larger) state’s
bargaining power may be curtailed when it recognizes a necessity to seal a deal. The
more powerful party may be forced to cut back on its demands and offer more
concessions when it concludes its goals can be better accomplished through the
cooperation of another less powerful (smaller) player. Fearon (1998), points out that once
an agreement is reached, the deal must be implemented and observed for compliance.
Agreements may be open to self-monitored arrangements. Negotiating parties may also
insert opt out clauses, which allow signatories to shy away from select portions the deal
terms. Urpelainen (2010) emphasizes that agreements are not likely to be discontinued as
long as incentives exist. The notion of agreement incentives can be helpful in explaining
ties between otherwise seemingly unlikely partnerships like those between Israel and
states with which it has maintained technical ties even in the absence of formal relations.
In other words, it is possible perhaps regardless of political differences for two parties to
cooperate as long as mutual benefits continue be delivered.

SUMMARY

Drawing on a broad range of literature, this chapter reviewed a myriad of overall
concepts and issues of relevance in support of the overview topic of the dissertation.
Major theoretical assumptions and critical terms like diplomacy, soft power, the
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significance of small states, technology transfers, and international negotiations in
managing common interests/benefits have been explored. It is important to note literature
directly related to the study case countries (India and China) not included above will be
reviewed in country specific chapters 4 and 5.
This chapter also considered the role of formal (diplomatic) and non-formal
channels in the international arena. Within the realm of diplomacy, soft power was
examined as a tool having special significance, particularly the case of small states.
Namely, soft power’s utility was assessed as a key way for smaller states to extend their
presence and influence internationally despite their physical size. Furthermore, this
chapter explored why small states have gained more importance in the international
system after the end of the Cold war. Examined, too, was the relevance of technology
transfers in the realm of international relations and the reasons this form of engagement
can function as a source of soft power and hence tools of diplomacy. Also, it was
proposed to look at technology transfers as modes of communications, which involve
actions and can impact the behaviors of other parties and in that sense may constitute a
form of soft power. Diplomacy through supplementary means like technology transfers is
of special significance in the case of Israel in efforts to counter attempts to isolate it
politically and economically.
On that point the dissertation explores the usefulness of technology transfers as
tools of diplomacy through the investigation of case studies, showcasing Israel’s bilateral
exchanges with China and India. Naturally, this raises questions about what constitutes
diplomatic success and how it could be measured. No prevailing definition of diplomatic
success appears to have taken hold among foreign policy practitioners and IR theorists.
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Joe Johnson, a veteran of the US State Department (2006), points out there is no
agreement about what public diplomacy can be expected to deliver. Leonard (2002)
characterizes public diplomacy as developing lasting relationships with important and/or
influential persons through scholarships, exchanges, training, seminars, conferences and
the media. Technology transfers are forms of public diplomacy since they primarily
involve such undertakings. Johnson surmises the absence of a definitive diplomatic
success metric is problematic, but contends the most important token of achievement
comes in the form of anecdotes. Anecdotes can help identify significant changes in the
host government or society made possible through public diplomacy. The US State
department for example records anecdotal victories in a database called RESULTS.
However, the research design of this project goes beyond the scope of anecdotal
parameters by drawing on a broad range of data sources to gauge robustness of Israel’s
bilateral relations.
To be clear, this study is not suggesting that knowledge transfers promise
diplomatic sway for the technology sender. Instead, the dissertation argues the
technology originator is likely to achieve diplomatic or other gains when certain variables
are present during transfers. The dissertation hypothesizes that under certain
circumstances technology transfers are more likely to produce favorable outcomes in the
foreign relations of Israel (technology sender).
The next chapter, chapter 3, Methods, will delve deeper into these factors and
suggest a hypothesis that will then be tested through the case studies using both anecdotal
information as well as other forms of data. Furthermore, what follows in the next chapter
is a detailed account of research considerations, limitations, techniques and the use of
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content analysis tools (software).
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CHAPTER III RESEARCH METHODS

INTRODUCTION

The primary goal of the dissertation is to evaluate the use and usefulness of
technology transfers as tools of diplomacy in the case Israel’s foreign relations. The
research topic comprises a wide range of issues inside and outside the field of
international relations (IR). As such, the nature of this study is multi-disciplinary. The
investigation draws its theoretical grounding from an assortment of sources including IR
themes such as soft power, diplomacy and additional fields like geography, history, and
others. This chapter describes why particular research approaches were adopted and how
primary and secondary data sources were identified and accessed. The dissertation
considers interviews done face to face, by phone, and/or through electronic
correspondence as primary sources. Archival, media, literature, and internet retrieved
data are regarded as secondary sources. The chapter will also layout the merits of
introducing and utilizing a particular content analysis software package. In doing so, it
will detail measures taken to identify to classify, examine, and display data. Furthermore,
the chapter will explain why particular countries were selected and deemed appropriate
case study objects. The hypothesis will also be introduced here. What follows is a layout
of the research design, sketching the challenges, constraints, and considerations in
gathering, organizing, analyzing and interpreting acquired data.
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BACKGROUND
As argued and illustrated in chapter 2, the “export of knowledge” has played a
role in Israel’s overall foreign relations operations. The strategy was conceived with the
view to broaden international recognition of Israel. Jacob (1971) emphasizes that one of
the underlying purposes of the (knowledge transfer) practice was to foster positive
relationships for Israel in the international community. Since the start of the strategy in
the early years of Israel’s statehood, the use of technology transfers in Israeli foreign
policy has experienced shifts in terms of scope of execution. In past decades, the bulk of
Israel’s knowledge transfers were almost exclusively channeled through the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. Technology transfers were operationalized mostly in the form of
development cooperation through Israel’s international development agency known by its
Hebrew acronym MASHAV, short for “Center for International Cooperation”.
Interestingly, the abbreviation (MASHAV) also spells out the Hebrew word (mashav),
which means resource. In more recent decades, state sanctioned technology transfers
(through MASHAV) have diminished. Inbal and Zahavi (2009) attribute public doubts
about the usefulness of technical cooperation in foreign affairs and changes in domestic
politics for the shrinking of MASHAV’s operations. Nevertheless, the agency’s smaller
scale facilitation of know-how transfers has maintained a measure of significance,
operating as tools for opening, maintaining and expanding Israel’s diplomatic reach,
especially with major regional and international players like India and China. However,
as state involvement in technical engagement abroad dwindled, private sector interests
have increasingly played a role in facilitating the export of knowledge, and doing so
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contributed formally and informally to Israel’s efforts to step up its diplomatic reach and
make more friends. Senor and Singer (2010) contend that Israeli entrepreneurs in the hitech sector have become a source of charm, and indirectly, a channel of soft power for
Israel’s foreign policymakers by boosting international recognition of the Jewish state as
a notable producer and player in novel technology driven sectors. Some Israeli
entrepreneurs and executives have taken on self-appointed diplomatic missions,
becoming de-facto ambassadors on behalf of the state. Thus, private sector activism,
coupled with success in research and development efforts of techniques and technologies
have created diplomatic opportunities similar to knowledge transfer programs in the early
stages of Israel’s statehood, laying foundations for joint ventures and partnerships with
other countries.
Though there have been past examples of states using knowledge sharing as a part
of diplomacy, Israel’s example is important because it demonstrates how even small
states in competition with larger counterparts, may achieve some gains in foreign
relations through relatively small scale initiatives. Israel’s case offers a unique scenario
of a tiny country with two noteworthy attributes. First, it possesses sought-after technical
knowledge. Second, it lacks large financial resources comparable to that of a larger state
or major world power. Israel’s reputation as possessor of specialized knowledge draws on
its successful experience in overcoming many of its own development struggles. Given
Israel’s history of diplomatic isolation, coupled with its unending existential challenges,
knowledge transfers stand out as one of few viable instruments in advancing the Jewish
state’s international engagement endeavors.
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As noted in the previous chapter, the successful exploitation of soft power is
conditional on how it is recognized by others. Along those lines, Israel’s know-how
transfers could be a source of soft power (attraction) when others identify value or benefit
in what Israel has to offer. Within a broad examination of technology or knowledge
transfers as tools of diplomacy, this study explores Israel’s relationships with a pair of
partner nations: China, and India.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The dissertation seeks to answer:
 Are technology transfers a source of soft power for Israel?
 In what ways have technology transfers created gains for Israel?
 What, if anything can be learned from Israel’s experience in utilizing technology
transfers in foreign policy

HYPOTHESIS

The study is not suggesting technology transfers guarantee gains for Israel in her
foreign relations dealings. Instead, the dissertation hypothesizes that knowledge transfers
are more likely to play a role in advancing Israel’s relations with other (partner) states,
when one or more of the following conditions exist:

1. Technology/knowledge transfer shows promise of addressing critical issues in a
partner nation. For example, increasing crop yields even in challenging conditions
like arid and semi-arid environments as in the case of India and China.
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2. Israel and partner nation share similar concerns. For example, military and
national security threats. Israel, China and India all face the risk of military
confrontations with neighboring and surrounding states.
3. The prospect of expanded commercial ties between Israel and partner nation
through state or non-state actors. Israel has experienced exponential growth in
trade with China and India.
These circumstances may be contributing factors in advancing Israel’s foreign
relations individually or as part of an interplay between one or more of these conditions.
The study will also consider intervening issues, like geo-political policy shifts which
could negatively or positively impact the operationalization of knowledge transfers in
diplomacy. For example, a negative impact on Israeli diplomacy was experienced when a
group of African countries made policy changes in response to growing and tighter ties to
the Arab World, mostly in the late 60s and early 70s. It is believed the warming of
relations between African and Arab states contributed to the en-masse abandonment of
formal relations with the Jewish State despite Israel’s well-seated technical engagement
in Africa. However, in contrast, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of decades old
alliances are believed to have helped open new pathways for technical and overall
relationships with Israel.
Nye’s notion (2004) of soft power broadly defined is the ability to attract rather
than strong-arm as a means of persuasion (as discussed in the previous chapter). The
eclectic perimeter of the concept raises doubts about whether the concept is too broad to
be useful. Recognizing this issue as a theoretical limitation, the dissertation looks at ways
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to more narrowly identify and evaluate variant soft power factors. Holyk (2011) proposes
a model, which considers the concept in more specified themes. The dissertation features
Holyk’s model as a guide because it breaks the concept down into smaller units of
analysis, and in doing so, mitigates the view of soft power as one size fits all or catch-all
concept. The model illustrates distinct theme-nuanced soft power categories. These are:
economic soft power, human capital soft power, cultural soft power, diplomatic soft
power and political soft power. Modules are further broken down into smaller feature
components illustrated in Holyk’s Model in the Figure 1 below.
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Source: Holyk (2011)
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While Holyk’s approach contributes to overall efforts meant to improve ways of
isolating soft power attributes, not all of the model’s modules and subcategories are
relevant in the case of Israel foreign relations. For example, one of the subcategories,
which is a component of Human Capital soft power, features the “necessity of main
language” referring to the helpfulness or advantages associated with knowing the
language of the supposed soft power holder. In the case of the US or the UK, English is a
source of attraction because it is of value to non-native speakers as a language which can
be a bridge in international trade, business and cooperation. However, knowledge of
Hebrew, Israel’s most spoken language unlike English is of no benefit and therefore not a
source of interest (attraction) from the perspective of other nations. Therefore, the
dissertation utilizes the model in a modified form, which filters out irrelevant soft power
sub categories to better investigate the intricacies of Israel’s case. Qualities listed in the
modified model may be contributing factors to Israel’s overall soft power (attractiveness)
potential in foreign relations. The modified model encompasses the following
components: Economic Soft Power, Human Capitol Soft Power and Diplomatic Soft
Power.

Economic Soft Power
•

Economic importance: Israeli free trade status with other states, most notably the
United States, may be viewed by some other countries as a bridge to US markets

•

Economic benefit to local populace: Israeli initiatives in partner country which
could be associated with local business opportunities
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•

Product reputation: Israel is a highly regarded innovator in a number of sectors
like security, military, agriculture and hi-tech goods

•

Entrepreneurial reputation: Israel is recognized in achieving a high per capita rate
of successful startup ventures

Human Capital Soft Power
•

University reputation: principal universities in Israel have achieved noteworthy
ranking positions among the world’s leading institutions of higher learning.

•

Educational level of population: per-capita university level graduates is high in
Israel

•

Science/technology capabilities: high numbers of technology patents secured by
Israeli companies

Diplomatic Soft Power
•

Diplomatic reputation: access to Israeli ties with other states most notably to
policy makers in the United States

•

Humanitarian assistance: Israel regularly takes part in disaster rescue and relief
efforts around the world in places like Nepal, Haiti, and the Philippines

LEVELS OF MEASUREMENT

Typically, phenomena can be measured using one or more of the following four
levels of measurements: nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio. On the nominal level, the
lowest level, data are distinguished solely by name. Ordinal level attributes can be rank-
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ordered, but no differences between the data can be collected. On the interval level,
distances between data values can be determined. At the ratio level, the highest-level,
sums and differences can be detected. At this level, values can also be divided to yield a
meaningful number. Of these, only nominal and ordinal levels of measurement are
applicable in this study because the data on which the dissertation rests can at best be
labeled (nominal level) and ranked (ordinal level). As suggested by Fan (2008) in the
previous chapter, concepts like power can be characterized in relative terms. This view
supports the possibility of ranking one type of power as “soft” in contrast to another form
of power, and yet, “hard” when compared to a third form of power. For example,
economic power may be seen as “softer” when contrasted with military power, but could
also be depicted as “harder” when compared to cultural power. Nye (2006) acknowledges
limitations associated with attempts to more precisely measure soft power but also points
out that some features like cultural capital and communications may be rated and
compared. Metric tools in the form of public opinion polls too can point to indicators
about the scale of a country’s level of attractiveness in the eyes of people in other nations.
Such measurements can at the very least be best expressed at ordinal levels.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND CASE SELECTION

This dissertation considers Israel’s dealings with China and India as strong and
wide-ranging examples of technology transfers at play in Israeli foreign relations. China
and India have experienced long, drawn out periods in the absence of full diplomatic
relations with Israel before advancing to closer formal ties. These histories feature
relationship transitions from non-formal (quiet) to formal (open) ties. The Sino-Israeli
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and Indian-Israeli narratives offer valuable “before” and “after” scenarios from which to
consider the contributions of technology transfers in starting and broadening bilateral ties.

COUNTRY CASE SELECTION

The dissertation explores the export of knowledge from Israel to case study
partner countries in various fields of technology. For the purpose of this study, transfers
are any form of movement or transportation of know-how. This can be articulated in the
form of advisors and technicians on the ground and/or in the transferring of hardware or
software technologies. Israel’s technological transfers cover a number of specified areas,
but the bulk are agri-tech and security/military related. These are the fields of knowledge
for which Israel has gained a noted reputation of expertise and which are recognized to be
of value to others. Hence technology transfers in agriculture and security/military sectors
may likely be sources of soft power for Israel.
Technology transfers are forms of collaboration (as pointed out in chapter 2).
Such undertakings involve the exchange of ideas, which can create a host of contact
opportunities. Most importantly, in the realm of international relations, technical
cooperation exchanges tend to promote an emphasis on commonalities between partner
countries which are stakeholders in joint ventures. Multi-national partnerships are born to
address common concerns and produce mutual benefits. Israel and some partner nations
tend to share comparable military/security threats and risks, which can produce platforms
for distinct bilateral discussions. The same can be said about challenges in agriculture,
which is another major area of state to state cooperation. However, common areas of
cooperation (security/agriculture) should not be viewed in isolation, unchanging or
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confined terms. Bilateral contacts in one sector can be points of departure for discussions
to broaden collaboration in other technology areas as well.
SIGNIFICANCE OF ASIA IN ISRAEL’S FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Setbacks in Israeli diplomacy in Africa in the 1960s and 70s prompted
policymakers in Jerusalem to rethink the Jewish State’s overall outreach tactics in the
international arena. Seeking to offset an agonizing major loss of relations in Africa,
Israel’s foreign policy strategists looked to broaden ties in other regions of the world.
Chazan (2006) asserts that Israeli policymakers redirected their attention elsewhere after
the African diplomatic watershed and the 1975 United Nations resolution equating
Zionism with racism, (a resolution which was later overturned). These events pushed
Israeli leaders to turn eastward to Asia to initiate new relationships and expand existing
ones. Israel’s renewed efforts to find friends took it beyond the comfort zone of ties with
traditionally friendly states in the West. Asia is the continent where much of Israel’s
international cooperation efforts have been directed in the last few decades. Israel’s
military and developmental experiences strongly speak to the needs of some Asian
countries, which seek to alleviate a myriad of daunting challenges including but not
limited to areas of security and agriculture. The Israeli presence in Asia offers Israel an
array of strategic/partnership opportunities in the company of influential regional and
global players like India and China. It also provides Israel with large new lucrative
markets for its services and products.
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WHY CHINA?
China is the world’s most populous country. It also holds a territory, which
contains large swaths of arid and semi-arid land making mass crop cultivation endeavors
increasingly challenging. It is no surprise, therefore, that the efficiency of food
production would be a growing cause of concern in Chinese policymaking circles.
Troublesome foodstuff output issues came at a time dominated by major social and
economic transformation (Zhang, 2000). China’s rapid development pressed decisionmakers to seek new ways to meet the demands of a fast growing population. Leaders in
Beijing also had an interest in modernizing China’s large military given the ideological
rift with Russia in the 1960s (which contributed to border tensions between the two
countries). Technology transfers offered China an accelerated path to reduce
technological gaps in both the military and civilian sectors which would help the country
become more competitive as it is strove to be more engaged in the global marketplace.
China’s growth, developmental issues, and move towards more openness to the
outside world, coupled with Israel’s desire to broaden its diplomatic reach created a
“perfect storm” of opportunities with which to drive technical contacts (initially quietly)
between the two countries. Israel’s experiences in overcoming developmental and
security difficulties, while on a small scale in Chinese terms, nevertheless attracted
noteworthy attention in Beijing. Chapter 4 explores the intricacies of Sino-Israeli
relations - a relationship frustrated by highs, lows, and diplomatic drama, at times raising
eye brows in Washington and rattling US-Israeli relations.
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WHY INDIA?
India is the world’s second most populous country and its largest democracy. Like
neighboring rival China, it has faced a host of challenges both internally and externally.
India’s protracted territorial dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir and other looming
national security threats in the region has given rise to the need for a military enlargement
and an advanced defense sector. During the Cold War, India maintained tight strategic
and military ties with the Soviet Union, which was its major arms supplier. After the
collapse of the USSR, India looked to boost relations in the Western world including
finding new sources of military supplies and technologies.
Also, a significant portion of India’s economy is agrarian making the farming
industry a major source of livelihood for many of its citizens. Despite struggles with
overpopulation, environmental issues, and poverty, India has emerged as a formidable
regional power and global economic force. India’s quest to deal with national security
and alleviate developmental vulnerabilities made Israel’s experience a practical and
attractive source for technical collaboration. India’s sizeable and rapidly growing market
also offers significant economic opportunities for Israel. Against this backdrop, the
Indian-Israeli relationship has blossomed. Chapter 5 examines technical cooperation
factors, which have brought about significant bilateral partnerships in critical areas,
making India one of Israel’s closest allies. In doing so the Indo-Israeli ties shifted from a
foe-like demeanor to a multi-layered friendship over the past two decades.
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CASE PARTNER COUNTRY TREATMENTS (CHINA AND INDIA)

Each of the partner country case (China & India) chapters will include the following
treatment components:

•

Partner country profile: this section is an introduction which reviews a
country’s history, key institutions, political and economic circumstances, and
overall involvement in international affairs

•

History of relations with Israel: this section will consider milestones in bilateral
relations, surveying what has been written or said about the development of
Israel’s ties with case study countries by scholars and media sources which
includes a country specific literature review and interview comments

•

Partner country challenges: this section will highlight central vulnerabilities and
issues of national concern (i.e. conflict, national security and food
production/agriculture) in the case study country

•

Mutual interests and commonalties with Israel: this section will review
benefits and perhaps tradeoffs in bilateral relations

•

Areas of cooperation: this sections looks at the sectors which have opened up
partnership opportunities

•

Content analysis: this section will describe and display (graphical
representations) results of bilateral relations-specific content analysis, which
seeks to explore and identify possible interconnections between Israel’s
technology transfers and robustness (strength) of relations with a partner country.
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This will be accomplished using NVivo, a software package which can help
facilitate transforming qualitative data to quantitative data (additional information
on NVivo is detailed below)
•

Summary and conclusion of relationship with Israel: this section will offer
conclusions about the nature of Israel’s relations with a specific partner nation
while accounting for the hypotheses as stated earlier

DATA SOURCES

The study draws on primary and secondary data. It utilizes a mix of quantitative
and qualitative data types. Data sets were compiled from a variety of sources like field
and phone interviews, electronic correspondence, government documents, development
agency materials, press reports, scholarly literature, and international organizations.
Interviews were conducted with an assortment public officials, diplomats, scholars,
journalists, business people and others. Interviewees were based in the US, Israel, India,
China, and Singapore. International trade data in the form of statistics and background
information were principally sourced from organizations like the United Nations, the
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI). Political statements about the Middle East conflict used for
content analysis were drawn from the United Nations Information System on the
Question of Palestine (UNISPAL). The UNISPAL database, which contains UN material
specific to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, from which a large assortment of textual data
was analyzed. Data was accessed directly (interviews), from online archives or through
third party database gateways like LexisNexis, ProQuest, NewsBank, Academic Search
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Complete, and other available databanks. Such data and information portals provide a
way to explore and pull a vast range of content from newspapers, magazines, news wire
reports, academic journals, peer-reviewed journals, and multimedia assets.
Research efforts also involved substantial fieldwork in Israel over the course of
multiple visits. This research enterprise included Israel based interviews, and was
accompanied with searches for and examination of helpful Israel government materials,
which are unclassified and available for public viewing. Hundreds of Israel Foreign
Ministry documents were reviewed on site at the Israel State Archives, which is a
division in the Prime Minister’s Office. It is the government’s central document
depository located in Jerusalem. Researchers do not have direct physical access to
materials. This is so, because archival assets are stored in isolation offsite, outside the
public viewing room. Most documents at the State Archives may only be examined in
person, which means they cannot be seen prior to the research visit. To access documents
of interest, one must make a request to pull materials in advance of a visit to the archives
viewing room. Once approved, documents are delivered to the archive’s reading room
where they are held for the requester. In accordance with this procedure, items of interest
were selected and pre-ordered prior to arriving at the reading room. Document searches
and selection was accomplished by entering keywords in the archive’s limited on-line
search engine. Searches used Hebrew and English keywords to maximize search results.
Most, if not all, original documents were composed originally either in English or
Hebrew, but rarely if at all simultaneously in both languages. The search engine’s scope
of retrieval is limited because queries do not reach the archive’s entire inventory of
materials. Some documents have not yet been declassified and thus are off-limits for
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public viewing. However, a separate set of materials, which are unclassified are also not
searchable on-line, but may be searched in Hebrew only on an internal computer located
in the public reading room. Both internal and external searches were utilized. I am a
native speaker of Hebrew, so the review of materials did not necessitate the use of a
translator. It is unclear why some unclassified materials were not searchable on-line;
whether because of cyber-security, technical, organizational, or budgeting issues. Time
spent onsite at the state archives was dedicated to practicing a triage-like filtering of
retrieved materials to determine which documents are of relevance. Materials deemed
relevant were scanned and stored on a portable device for closer examination offsite at a
later time. Israel State Archives permits the photographing/photocopying/scanning of
materials once they are cleared for viewing in the public reading room.
A great deal of time, funds and overall effort were expended in searching,
collecting and reviewing the documents from Israel State Archives. Yet the information
contained in these materials led to blind alleys failing to reveal extensive in-depth
insights about Israel’s diplomatic dealings. However, these documents did provide some
suggestion of Israeli international technical engagements in distant decades beyond the
overall time span of the dissertation. Hints of technical activity were found mainly in the
form of diplomatic correspondence between Israeli overseas missions and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs in Jerusalem. A large portion of the documents pertained to the
operations of MASHAV. It is important to note that sizeable volumes of official (Israeli)
government documents about Israel’s diplomatic history have not yet been declassified or
made public. Materials in Israel State Archives are subject to the Archives Law of 1955.
According to the Archives Law records are to be available for research purposes
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generally after 30 years. However, some documents may be subject to more stringent
protocols. For example, personal (Prime Ministers, Ministers and Military Leaders) and
national security records may be sealed for 70 years and 50 years, respectively. Bialer
(2002) suggests that some of Israel’s important initiatives have retained a measure of
secrecy in part due to access restrictions. Furthermore, various materials and the
information they contain may remain closed (classified) indefinitely if they are associated
with national security matters. Given the historical prominence of defense issues in Israel
it is not unusual for security and civilian sector undertakings to be intertwined, thus
offering the possibility of categorizing even civilian driven dealings (government
ministries, agencies) as classified beyond the standard 30 year time period.
Overall, access restrictions of historical government documents explain in part
past limited academic treatment of milestones in Israel’s overall history and foreign
affairs enterprises. It was not until the late 1980s that it was possible to begin to access
documents about Israel’s 1948 War of Independence. Besides declassification issues,
Israel State Archives has experienced difficulties in procuring documents from various
ministries and government bodies as explained in a talk by its chief archivist. On this
point, Dr. Yaacov Lozowick who heads Israel State Archives candidly answered
questions at a graduate research workshop at the 2014 annual Association for Israel
Studies (AIS) meeting at Ben Gurion University in Israel. Dr. Lozowick revealed that
some government records were not appropriately preserved or were altogether misplaced.
He attributed inadequacies in archiving materials to a combination of poor record
keeping, and, in some cases, outright neglect. As a consequence, he acknowledged some
documents might never be salvaged thus creating gaps in time and material coverage of
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some types of government documentation. He also publicized mounting efforts to
advance a new multi-year digitization plan aiming to put significant volumes of state
archives documents online, especially in response to the growing interest in Israel as a
field of study.
In addition to archival inquiries and interviews, field research also included other
arenas like major academic conferences such as the annual meetings of the International
Studies Association (ISA) and the Association for Israel Studies (AIS) in the US and
Israel. Participation at these gatherings offered the opportunity to present papers on the
dissertation topic and draw feedback in panel discussions. Conference participation also
enabled face-to-face meetings with scholars who were otherwise not easily accessible in
person. Prior to attending conferences, contact (via email) was made with scholars and
contemporaries who were identified as having similar or related research interests. The
aim of the correspondence was to make others aware of my interests, request an informal
meeting, and to further build a bank of research contacts.
The study primarily focuses on Israel’s foreign relations in the years between
1989 and 2014. This span of time encompasses notable periods in Israel’s ties with case
study partner countries. For example, lead up times to the establishment, and
development of formal ties. Inclusion of these time markers facilitates opportunities to
better survey the beginning and advancement of Israeli diplomacy in Asia. Nevertheless,
this period is largely subject to the general 30-year rule mentioned above. For this reason,
the research of the dissertation mostly rests on datasets drawn from a wide range of
sources other than official Israel government state archive sources. The sources will be
detailed in the sections below. What follows is the overall research approach.
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MIXED METHODS APPROACH

Owing to the multi-disciplinary nature of the research topic, the dissertation
comprises a mixed-methods research approach. Trochim (2006), for example, argues for
the usefulness of combining both qualitative and quantitative methods. A mixed methods
design provides the largest number of ways to probe the primary research question,
especially given data access and collection limitations associated with the dissertation
topic which draws on a vast assortment of dataset types (descriptive and numeric), and an
expansive scope of theoretical concepts. At the same time, a combined approach can
help maximize analysis and integration opportunities. Blending qualitative and
quantitative methods when possible also allows the study an advantage of drawing on the
strengths of each.

BROAD THEORETICAL APPROACH

The wide scope facets of the topics covered in the dissertation coupled with data
retrieval availability restrictions (described above) necessitate the use of liberal research
and analysis strategies. On this point, Sil and Katzenstein (2010) offer a theoretical
approach they call Analytical Eclecticism, which does not conform to a specific
paradigm. This non-conforming approach offers the researcher investigative
maneuverability. The open approach is especially useful in the case of the dissertation,
which does not follow a particular theoretical tradition in International Relations.
Analytical Eclecticism as Sil and Katzenstein (2010) point out, can fill capability gaps,
which are not available in traditional research approaches and may furthermore be useful
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in identifying interactions between unique mechanisms, which are usually considered
separately. The significance of this feature opens the possibility of exploring a wide range
of research spheres. The approach supports the exploration of odd or non-traditional
topics, which cannot adequately be examined within the theoretical boundaries of a
particular discipline. Overall, this means opening up to diverse ways of investigating
research interests. Analytic eclecticism offers two non-unique yet valuable and suitable
attributes:

1. Practical approach
2. Tackles broad range issues (i.e. diplomacy, technology transfers)

These features can help facilitate an across-the-board look at technology transfers in the
context of international relations, and specifically, as tools of diplomacy.

CONTENT ANALYSIS

The purpose of data analysis is to test the strength of the hypothesis. Data analysis
seeks to validate or contest the hypothesis. At the very least data analysis can help
determine if the hypothesis represents a measure of possibility and if so, under which
conditions. The investigation herein utilizes both quantitative and qualitative datasets. In
doing so, the dissertation maximizes the number of pathways to data interpretation that
might otherwise go unutilized. Notably, however, the overwhelming majority of data
utilized in this dissertation is in text form while a smaller portion in numeric (mostly
economic figures). Therefore, the bulk of analysis is the treatment of qualitative data. To
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make data more meaningful or usable for analysis purposes, coding techniques have been
devised. Trochim (2006) points out that the coding of quantitative data enables forms of
analyses, which would otherwise not be possible, and in doing so could help to uncover
important information. All qualitative data can be quantitatively coded. The
quantification of qualitative data is also possible. This is accomplished by assigning
meaningful numerical values (coding) to qualitative data. In turn these values can be
operated to examine the validity of specific hypotheses with the aim to achieve a grander
understanding of data and recognize its significance. A principle research technique used
in this dissertation is quantitative content analysis. Devi (2009) describes quantitative
content analysis as a process that seeks to quantify the occurrences, significance,
positioning, and interplay of words or concepts, to infer meanings. Qualitative content
analysis also involves a particular (subjective) interpretation of text data through
classification methods or coding to identify themes or patterns. Salenda (2009) describes
coding as a subjective act, which involves the use of words or short phrases to represent
an idea. A code profile may include labeling data sources, a description of the code, its
function, and applications of the method used. Coding organizes large quantities of text
into fewer and more manageable groups (Weber, 1990). It is a conversion of data into
noteworthy clusters or categories. Coding is principally a middle step between data
collection and analysis. It links the data to the main research theme. Weber (1990) points
out that qualitative content analysis goes beyond simple word counts, and enables the
researcher to identify themes. Put another way, content analysis opens opportunities to
explore relationships between categories. It is important to note that coding schemes are
often revised and/or refined as the analysis process advances. The determination of
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whether coding was necessary and which coding methods to practice in this study was the
product of trial and error as the project progressed. Along these, lines of data collection,
and overall the dissertation, did not advance in a linear fashion. Once data was obtained it
was either placed in applicable dissertation chapters or stored for future consideration and
positioning. This process shaped a workflow in which portions of the dissertation were
not necessarily pieced together and positioned in the document in the order in which data
was acquired. Content analysis is a primary part of the research design toolkit and as such
it is imperative to carefully consider various content analysis categories.

CONTENT ANALYSIS TYPES

Hsieh and Shannon (2005) highlight three principal categories: conventional,
directed, or summative. The content analysis types can be distinguished by the way codes
are formulated. Conventional content analysis involves creating code categories
stemming directly from the text. The directed approach rests on theoretical or research
findings from which to identify which codes to use. The summative method deals with
counting and comparisons of keywords or content, which provides context interpretation
opportunities. A summative approach to qualitative content analysis starts with
identifying and counting certain words or content to determine circumstantial use of the
words or content. Word frequency counts are computed, and sources are identified. Next,
text search results are examined for initial assessment to create codes. In the summative
approach, keywords or codes are classified before and during data analysis. The
keywords used are driven by the investigator’s interest or review of literature content.
Besides word counts, the approach seeks to identify and interpret hidden content. The
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summative approach text can be analyzed as single words or in relation to particular
content. Patterns uncovered could help interpret the contextual meaning of terms or
content. For these reasons the summative approach best suited the purpose of the
dissertation.

STUDY VARIABLES

The dissertation seeks to evaluate the efficiency of technology transfers as tools of
diplomacy in the case of Israel. Diplomacy, broadly defined for the purpose of this
dissertation, is the robustness of bilateral relations, between Israel and case study partner
nations (China and India). To assist in the exploration of possible links between
technology transfers and aspects of bilateral relations, the study considers three categories
of variables: a dependent variable, an independent variable, and an intervening variable.
Independent Variable (Technology Transfer)
Technology transfer is considered the independent variable. It is important to note
that technology transfers are expressed through variant descriptions or framed in different
ways like: developmental cooperation, technical assistance, technology collaboration,
joint ventures, intelligence sharing, and other means of knowledge transmission.
Therefore, any of these and a host of other possible similar terms would be considered
independent variables for the purpose of this study.

Dependent Variable (Robustness of Bi-lateral Relations with case study partners [China
and India])
Robustness, infers a demonstration of strength and vigor of ties.
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For the purposes of the dissertation, the robustness of relations will be based on
trends/volumes in three categories. Each of these is considered a dependent variable as
follows:

1. Trade/Economic indicators such as import/export numbers
Data Sources: International trade monitoring organization UN Comtrade, official
Israel, China and India government published announcements
2. Political/Cultural Exchanges such as visiting delegations and treaties
Data Sources: official Israel, China and India government published announcements
3. Policies towards Israel/ Middle East based on statements like speeches
Data Sources: United Nations
Intervening Variable
The following factors may be considered intervening variables:
1. Technology/knowledge transfer addresses critical issues in partner/recipient nation.
For example, crop growing techniques, which can raise the level of food security and
human security.
2. Mutual national security concerns such as similar military challenges and/or terror
threats.
3. Efforts to gain access to the US through Israeli channels.

4. Potential for viable commercial ties for Israel through state or non-state actors
providing new markets for Israeli based technologies. However, in the opposite
direction, Israel’s tiny economy is too small to offer much export growth for large
partner nations like China and India.
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5. Geopolitical shifts like, change of leaders, domestic politics, change of global and
regional alliances (end of Cold War), Middle East politics (Arab Spring), Middle East
conflict flare-ups (Gaza conflict)

RESEARCH TOOL

The analysis mostly involves the examination of text data. After considerable
consultation with faculty and informal conversations with fellow graduate researchers, it
was determined that computer-assisted content analysis would be the most useful method
of advancing some the dissertation’s research objectives. Several qualitative data analysis
software packages are available. All are designed to handle vast volumes of files. The
most notable software packages include ATLAS.ti, NVivo and MAXQDA. Of these
NVivo was selected.
NVivo was chosen after considering scores of research tools, which could
accommodate particular research constraints like data, collection limitations, quantity of
data and scope of data types. Based on these conversations with NVivo users and a test
use of the software, it was determined that NVivo was an appropriate research tool
because it can assist in the following:

1.

Storing, organizing, querying, interpreting data, and displaying findings

2.

Qualitative and mixed methods research

3.

Numeric and non-numeric data analysis

4.

Detect possible subtle links in datasets.
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5.

Accommodate large data sets

6.

Data visualization with charts, graphs and matrices

NVivo helped to facilitate the query of non-numeric data like press reports,
literature, documents, and web content. NVivo also features visualization functions,
which can convert data into forms of meaningful information, like matrices showing
numerical frequencies by characteristics/codes and graphical representations like charts.
These display vehicles can show patterns while demonstrating the extent and nature of
links in datasets.

DATA GATHERING

Data was gathered in two phases. The first phase included a series of field, email
and phone research interviews with a mix of public officials, diplomats, scholars,
journalists, business people and others. Dozens of interview subjects were approached.
Most agreed to take part. They were sought for interviews or general information because
their areas of expertise covered both theoretical and/or geopolitical themes of direct and
indirect relevance to the overall dissertation theme. Interviewees (as mentioned) were
based in India, China, Israel, Singapore and the United States. Interview subjects were
identified through a multitude of resources such as scholarly publications, media
appearances, news reports, conference panels, and colleague contacts. They did not
represent any one specific group or entity, and spoke only on behalf of themselves.
Interviewees were approached to take part in the study through email correspondence
using two distinct steps. The initial step included outreach correspondence, which served
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multiple primary purposes: first, as a letter of introduction about the researcher, second,
to provide the interviewee background information about the overall dissertation theme,
third, to state the purpose of the study, and to finally request participation in answering a
series of research related questions. Once consent to take part in the study was secured
from the prospective interviewee, follow up contact was initiated in the form of email
correspondence or phone conversation depending on respondent’s preference.
Correspondence proposed interview times, dates and venues. Whenever possible,
interviews in person were preferred, but otherwise subjects were asked to indicate if they
could participate via phone, Skype, email, or social media messaging. In some instances,
interviews with particular subjects were completed in more than one sitting, and may
have involved a combination of email, phone conversations and/or face-to-face meetings.
Field interviews were conducted in a variety of formal and informal settings like
offices, private residences, conference venues, and public areas like cafes. Some of these
included noteworthy venues like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of Israel (two
visits). The setups of MFA meetings were multi-faceted processes involving prolonged
correspondence with relevant officials, the setting of conditions to proceed and bound by
advanced security checks about the researcher. Public officials, while willing to
contribute, were generally bound by Israel government regulations with regard to whom
they could speak and what they can say. This was not the case with non-government
interviewees. Most interviews were audio recorded with permission, and later transcribed
for analysis purposes. On one occasion, recording of the conversation was not permitted
at the request of the interviewee but notes were allowed. Interviews generally lasted
anywhere between 30 and 90 minutes per sitting. All interactions were in English.
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Conversations were informational and at times informal allowing a free exchange of
ideas within the realm of the research theme. Topics discussed were drawn from a pool of
prepared and (IRB) pre-approved research questions (See Appendix 2). However, since
the roster of questions covered a broad range of issues, not all of these queries were of
relevance to the areas of expertise of each and every interviewee. As such, a refined
selection of questions was made from the original overall questionnaire inventory to
ensure a match of query topics, which conform to the knowledge area of the interviewees.
Some interview subjects went beyond merely responding to questions, and directed the
researcher to additional data sources outside of interviews. These sources include video
materials, media appearances, or literature of which interviewees directly or indirectly
played a part in creating. This phase of research (interviews) provides a background for
the second phase of data collection. As was stated and detailed earlier, public archives of
the period under examination were not available due to Israeli state archive laws and
regulation constraints. Therefore, the study adopted an information-mining model often
utilized by Israeli media to report on issues of which no official domestic sources are
publically accessible on the grounds of national security or other security classification
matters. Israeli public and commercial media typically pursue and report on classified
issues by turning to foreign sources to side step being at risk of violating
publication/broadcast regulations. Israeli media treatment of Israel’s nuclear capabilities
serves as an outstanding example of this practice. Israel’s nuclear capabilities have been
an open secret for decades and yet local media shy away from directly (as a primary
source) reporting even on the very existence of the Jewish State’s atomic program. News
organizations in Israel nevertheless report on this secretive issue by attributing stories
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about Israel’s nuclear reactor to foreign press reports and sources outside of Israel to tell
the story. This approach of utilizing external sources is especially of utility to the
dissertation because the primary research focus is Israel in the world at large. For this
reason, an inventory of some Israeli but mostly non-Israeli foreign media were used as
sources of textual data on Israel’s international technical ties.
The second phase of data gathering involved the retrieval of textual data like
newspaper stories, news agency reports, online publications as well as transcriptions of
news broadcasts. These includes an array of prominent Israeli and international news
outlets like Jerusalem Post, Ha’aretz, New York Times, BBC, The Associated Press and
many others. Relevant materials were identified and retrieved through search platforms
like ProQuest, LexisNexis Academic and News Bank. In this way, a data bank containing
tens of thousands of news pieces was compiled. Also, data on trade and political/bilateral
exchanges was retrieved electronically directly from official Israeli, Indian and Chinese
government and UN on-line sources.
The search criterion used to capture data from the above mentioned sources was
designed to cast the widest possible net in order to maximize the gathering of data
objects. For example, in seeking material about technology transfers in the case of SinoIsraeli relations, a sweeping search was used. “Israel” and “China” were used as the
search terms instead of just pursuing a narrower search field using a longer string of
keywords like “Israel”, “China”, “Technology Transfers” and “Diplomacy”. The broad
search strategy is helpful because it can help prevent the possibility of missing useful
data. As detailed in the previous section, the concept of technology transfer is broad,
covering multiple activities. It may be described in different forms like technical
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cooperation, developmental assistance, agricultural, security or military collaboration just
to name a few. Using technology transfer, as a search criterion would likely fail to
capture pertinent information. This strategy was applied in both case country searches.
The wide-sweeping search tactic only pertains to the initial searches. It was put into
practice after consultation with faculty, and rested on the premise that greater data
capture in preliminary searches would enable a wider range of targeted secondary
searches. On the other hand, a narrow initial search would inhibit research catchment
efforts. The initial search results are stored in NVivo for more targeted secondary text
searches, data management and analysis operations in order to seek and detect possible
significant relationships between terms. Secondary data was sought within the initial
search results by utilizing a list of pre-complied keywords (see appendix 1). These words
represent commonly used terms to describe the various aspects of subject matter in the
dissertation. Data processing was achieved through specified search criteria and coding
filters like: keywords (terms), range of dates, and country names. All materials under
examination were in English or were official translations into English in the case of some
U. N. speeches/statements. However, (as previously described above) some archival
material was read in the original Hebrew by the researcher without the need of a
translator. The Hebrew documentation turned out to be of only general informational
background value, and was not part of the data management and analysis phases of the
study.
SUMMARY
The dissertation explores notable milestones in Israel’s overall international
affairs and examines Israeli technology transfers as part of its foreign relations primarily
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in Asia from 1989 to 2014. During this time span, the Jewish State experienced
noteworthy growth in relations with a number of Asian countries. The period was
selected for analysis because it covers stretches of time in which Israel and case study
partner nations (China and India) shifted from seemingly low level engagements to the
formation of full formal or upgraded relations. As such, this timeline offers adequate
opportunities to follow the start, maintenance, and growth of Israel’s bilateral relations
with some of Asia’s most powerful players.
The research question and the hypothesis were introduced along with descriptions
of data types and sources. In addition, the dependent, independent and intervening
variables were defined and outlined. Due to the multi-disciplinary nature of the
dissertation, a case was made for a mixed-qualitative and quantitative methods research
approach. Atypical facets of dissertation topics coupled with data availability limitations
(described above) have prompted the adoption of a flexible analysis strategy called
analytical eclecticism, which does not conform to a specific paradigm. Analytical
Eclecticism can be useful in identifying interactions between mechanisms, which are
usually considered separately.
Data treatment was assisted using a software package called NVivo. NVivo was
selected as a primary tool of inquiry because of its extensive content analysis capabilities
especially in the case of text-rich non-structured data. NVivo’s data handling
functionalities enable a summative content analysis which seeks to identify and interpret
hidden content.
The research design also includes case country profiles and how key issues in
those countries are of relevance in relations with Israel. Chapter 4 considers China’s
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challenges in agriculture and security/military sectors against a backdrop of diplomatic
ups and downs in Sino-Israeli ties. Chapter 5 looks at how aspects of India’s geography,
national security, economic and political factors play a part in Indo-Israeli technology
relations which began as low-key cooperation but eventually transformed into open
collaboration in specialized areas.
Finally, the Conclusion chapter 6, will provide an overview of how the export of
knowledge may have benefited Israel’s efforts to expand its diplomatic network. The
chapter will sum up the philosophical foundations and pragmatic underpinnings of
Israel’s diffusion of knowledge as part of its foreign policy strategy, Finally, it will offer
overall conclusions about the effectiveness of technology transfers as forms of soft power
tools of diplomacy.
The purpose of the investigation is to identify a plausible interplay between the
independent variable (technology transfer) and dependent variables (aspects of bilateral
relations) between Israel and partner nations. However, the dissertation does not make
any definitive claims about the implications of technology transfers in Israel’s foreign
affairs. Though, it does postulate that the movement of technology does play a role in
Israeli foreign relations and seeks to investigate its efficiency as a tool of diplomacy
under certain circumstances (detailed above). The rest of the dissertation includes country
case study chapters. What follows next is chapter 4 on Sino-Israeli relations and the first
of 2 chapters, which examine the significance of Israel’s technology transfers in relations
with partner states.
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APPENDIX 1 SEARCH KEYS WORDS
Cooperation
Development
Technical Assistance
Collaboration
Technology
Innovation
Military
Security
Terror
Diplomacy
Israeli
Prime Minister
Foreign Minster
Defense Minister
MASHAV
Israel
China
India
ISRAELI LEADERS
1973- Present
Golda Meir
Yitzhak Rabin
Menachem Begin
Yitzhak Shamir
Shimon Peres
Benjamin Netanyahu
Ehud Barak
Ariel Sharon
Ehud Olmert
Israeli delegation
CHINESE LEADERS
1987 – present
Li Peng,
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Wen Jiabao,
Li Keqiang,
Jiang Zemin,
Hu Jintao,
Xi Jinping,
INDIA LEADERS
1984-present
Narendra Modi
Manmohan Singh
Atal Bihari Vajpayee
IK Gujral
HD Deve Gowda
AB Vajpayee
PV Narasimha Rao
Chandra Shekhar
VP Singh
Rajiv Gandhi
APPENDIX 2
QUESTIONS INVENTORY
1. It has been often argued in the past that Israel did not really have an overall
formal foreign policy but instead a collection of ad hoc international initiatives Is
the argument a valid?
2. Media reports indicate Israel regularly maintained informal quiet relations with
other countries in the absence of diplomatic relations. How did Israel benefit from
this arrangement?
3. Was technical cooperation in the form of technology/knowledge transfers a main
driver of informal relations between Israel and other states?
4. Typically, what kind of conditions for cooperation were stipulated by Israel and
partner states.
5. After years of Israeli technical assistance programs in Africa almost all African
states severed relations with Israel at the start of the Yom Kippur War.
What lesson did Israeli policymakers learn from the African experience?
6. How have domestic perceptions of Israeli overseas technical cooperation
programs evolved over the last 6 decades?
7. What if anything is applied from diplomatic setbacks in Africa today?
8. Does Israeli involvement in technical cooperation programs translate to soft
power?
9. What’s unique about Israeli Soft Power?
10. What kind of initiatives can be considered tools of diplomacy?

100

11. What kind of feedback are you getting from those impacted by Israeli technology
transfers?
12. How have technology transfers helped Israel establish, expand and maintain
relations with other states?
13. What area of technology is most in demand for Israel transfers – military,
agriculture, medical?
14. What is the feedback from those negatively affected by transfers i.e. rivals or
recipients?
15. What are general unintended consequences as a result of technology transfers?
16. How are Israeli technology transfers different from those of large states like the
United States, Japan and EU countries?
17. Is what Israel is doing or did with technology transfers unique for a state of its
size?
18. Would you say the Israel’s technology transfers is a pivotal part of diplomatic
gains?
19. What are the negative and positive aspects of technology transfers on recipients
and transferring party?
20. What are common challenges in the before during after stages of technology
transfers?
21. Are technology transfers as a source of Soft Power in the case of Israel.
22. What role is the private sector playing in Israeli international technology transfers
23. Who can be considered a business ambassador?
24. How do state and and non-state actors collaborate in carrying out technology
transfers?
25. Who would you say are Israel’s most business ambassadors?
26. Is the Israeli hi-Tech industry a growing source of Israeli Soft Power?
27. Has the military/trade cooperation softened ( county name ) policies towards
Israel and approach over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 28. Are Israel’s military and other connections with China a source of influence with
China and others or perhaps putting Israel at risk vulnerability
29. What safeguards are in place to prevent technology transfer forwarding to others
like Iran a country which has a close ties to China (recently it was alluded to that
Iranian have a similar to those made in Israel
30. I’ve been to Israel State Archives in Jerusalem but not much material released
there about military cooperation - just basically a few diplomatic cables about
various contacts
31. Most of these are summarized by Zeev Sufott in his book a china diary book
32. Is Israel tech offering so unique in way that China can not get similar knowledge
else where
33. What’s unique about the relationship for China for Israel?
34. Where else can I search archival materials?
35. How does this form cooperation spillover into other forms of cooperation?
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CHAPTER IV ISRAEL IN CHINA

INTRODUCTION

With rapidly growing economies, massive markets, huge population centers and
large deposits of natural resources East Asia understandably draws interest from the rest
of the world. China, also known by its full name, the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
stands out in the region as a major economic and security player among other powers like
Russia, India and Japan. Generally, China and overall the East Asia region, have been of
interest to the West for several reasons--with economic considerations being one of the
most noteworthy. China can offer much in the form of strategic, economic and diplomatic
partnerships. Such opportunities are of pronounced significance in the case of Israel
considering the Jewish State’s campaigns to widen its contacts, especially with pivotal
regional and global powers. Yet despite early efforts, Israel’s push to forge formal ties or
diplomatic recognition in Asia came at a somewhat sluggish pace, hindered mainly by the
complexities of Middle East conflicts and Cold War constraints. Nevertheless, for the
past two decades Israel has made diplomatic gains, and now enjoys robust relations with
most Asian states and the continent’s key players: China, Russia, India and Japan. Israel’s
outreach to the PRC is an ongoing process, coming after decades of diplomatic setbacks
and the forging of formal relations. This chapter traces the significance of knowledge and
technology sharing as factors in bringing China and Israel closer together against a
background of adversary efforts to isolate the Jewish state.
Israel’s initial technical engagement in East Asia happened shortly after Israeli
independence, but in that instance did not include contacts with the newly established
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PRC. Instead, Burma (now Myanmar) was the first country to interact with Israel in the
realm of military and agricultural know-how, which drew on distinctive Israeli
experiences in those sectors. Ties between the two countries eventually withered as
Burma experienced political transformation and a change of government. The demise of
Israeli relations in the region in the distant past contrasts with more recent times in which
Israel established and maintained official ties with numerous East Asian states. Israel’s
relations in Asia are widespread, but the levels of interactions can vary in intensity from
country to country. Countries like China have extensive trade with Israel valued in the
billions, while ties with smaller partners like Vietnam, are only in the hundreds of
millions of dollars. By far, of all Israel’s relationships in Asia, ties with the PRC are
noteworthy in terms of trade volumes and Beijing’s diplomatic affluence.
China is enormous and diverse, experiencing an array of domestic struggles.
Some of the most persistent problems within a vast inventory of challenges have been:
food production, national security matters, and a collection of other developmental
concerns. As the PRC experienced growing pains, its policymakers sought to boost food
output capabilities to meet the demands of swelling population levels. The modernization
of China’s aging mammoth military was also on Beijing’s list of national priorities. The
import of knowledge offered the PRC an accelerated track with which to address these
and other outstanding developmental issues. The reduction of technology gaps also
served as a boon to push China into a more competitive position in an emerging global
economy. As will be detailed below, eventual policy changes in China created
possibilities to introduce foreign technologies to deal with persistent domestic problems.
The demands created by China’s growth coupled with Israel’s zeal to broaden diplomatic
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reach, produced opportunities (supply and demand principles) with which to initiate and
drive bilateral dialogues (initially quietly). Israel’s record of overcoming some of the
same issues of pronounced concern to Chinese leaders put the Jewish State on the radar
screen in a positive light (attraction) among Beijing’s policy makers.
The sections below consider the efficiency of technology transfers as tools of
diplomacy in Sino-Israeli relations. To facilitate the probe of possible associations
between technology transfers and aspects of bilateral relations, the study considers
independent, dependent and intervening variables.
The independent variable represents technology transfers or technical cooperation
with the PRC. The dependent variable represents the degree of diplomatic relations.
Diplomatic relations are broadly defined here as the robustness of bilateral relations
between Israel and China. Robustness is based on three categories. Each of which are
dependent variables as follows:

1. Trade volumes
2. Sino-Israeli exchanges such as visiting delegations and treaties
3. China’s policies towards Israel/ Middle East based on statements such as speeches
(at UN)

Intervening variables represent overriding factors, which may promote or impede
causality between independent and dependent variables like:
•

Technology addresses priorities in China. For example, crop growing techniques,
which can raise the level of food security and human security.

104

•

Common security concerns like military capabilities and/or terror threats.

•

Efforts to gain better access to the US through Israeli channels.

•

Geopolitical shifts like, leadership changes, shifts in alliances (end of Cold War),
Middle East politics (Arab Spring), and Middle East conflict flare-ups.
It is important to re-emphasize that technology transfers may be framed in

different ways like developmental cooperation, technical assistance, technology
collaboration, joint ventures, intelligence sharing and other means of knowledge
transmission. Any of these, and a collection of other similar terms, could be considered as
the independent variable.
To best explore the particulars of Israel’s relationship to China past, present and
the future, the study considers the following: China’s country profile, challenges faced by
China, shared interests/areas of cooperation, and history of relations. Furthermore, the
probe will perform content analysis with the assistance of software NVivo, (as specified
below) and finally provide a summation and conclusions about the nature of Israel-China
ties. The country profile reviews China’s geography, recent history, political and
economic systems and foreign policy of relevance to Sino-Israeli ties. The section
considering China’s challenges reviews national vulnerabilities/issues (i.e. conflict,
national security and food production /agriculture). The history of Sino-Israeli relations
section features a sketch of watershed periods, based on interviews, literature and media
sources. The shared interests /areas of cooperation segment consider sectors, which have
offered Sino-Israeli partnership opportunities. The content analysis section examines the
validity of the hypothesis or causality between independent, dependent and intervening
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variables (detailed earlier). Here, mostly qualitative analysis methods are used with the
help of NVivo software. As illustrated in the previous chapter, this chapter draws on a
diverse inventory of primary and secondary sources like interviews, media reports,
scholarly literature, government, and NGO documentation. The final portion of this
chapter offers conclusions about the role of technology and knowledge transfers in SinoIsraeli relations.
The transfer of knowledge and/or technology in the context of this dissertation is
not meant to infer in any way that Israel is overall more sophisticated or advanced than
China. Both parties have much to learn from each other. However, the study underscores
the value of Israeli specialized know-how as a source of attraction (soft power) for Israel
in Sino-Israeli relations.

CHINA COUNTRY PROFILE (OVERVIEW)

The PRC has long held the distinction of the world’s most populous country and
the first to pass the billion people benchmark. Misika (2015) contends that despite
impressive leaps forward, China may also be viewed as the largest developing nation. In
terms of territory, China is the largest country in Asia and by most sources the third
largest in the world after Russia and Canada. However, the CIA World FactBook
describes the PRC as somewhat smaller than the US. In this case, China would drop a
notch in ranking to only the fourth largest country in the world in terms of area.
Regardless of how it is measured, China holds immense territories and shares borders
with over a dozen neighbors, some with which it has experienced disputes, most notably,
rivals like Russia and India.
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Much of the PRC has a rugged physical geography featuring expansive mountain
ranges, hills, plateaus and sizable stretches of arid and semi-arid areas. The high elevation
territories are in the west of the country, while lower lands and plains are in the eastern
regions. These inhospitable topographical settings impose constraints on agriculture and,
by extension, limitations in the critical business of food production. The vastness of the
country also makes China susceptible to regional variances in terms of economic
development. Strong growth is mostly experienced in eastern coastal regions where large
cities and economic zones exist. In contrast, rural areas in the interior towards the west
have witnessed much less progress and development.
Since the late 1970s, China has experienced significant socio-economic changes
as it transitioned to a new economic system known as a socialist market or mixed market
economy as labeled in the literature. The mixed market system denotes paradoxical
features, namely the integration of seemingly opposing economic and political principles,
one in which state and non-state enterprises operate side by side under communist rule.
Besides creating possibilities for the inclusion of private business players, the new
systemic arrangement also enabled greater operational autonomy for state run enterprises.
China’s move to a mixed model started after Mao’s successor Deng Xiaoping and other
leaders shied away from deeply trenched planned/centralized economic ideals. The wave
of changes targeted four distinct areas for modernization: industry, agriculture,
science/technology, and defense. The transformations brought about impressive growth
and also gave cause for the country’s leaders to explore more engagement with other
countries (Zhang, 2000). Brisk development produced a hunger to pursue new
technologies and know-how from the outside.
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As featured in chapter two, one of the main motivations behind initiating
technology transfers is the desire by the technology seeker to boost the pace of
development, which would otherwise not likely materialize organically. The technology
transfer can offset growth impeding technology gaps. Leong Chan and Tugrul U. Daim
(2011) call technology transfers “short cut” pathways for countries like China to fastforward their technological development capabilities. Generally, technology transfers
also stimulate a “two to tango” mechanism, which in turn opens opportunities to advance
bilateralism. Transfers are in themselves forms of partnerships thus creating foundations
on which to build broader relationships, with the aim of achieving optimal benefits for all
parties. In the case of Sino-Israeli relations, technology transfers have also produced
unintended detrimental consequences, which will be discussed in more detail later in this
chapter.
With economic reforms, the ruling communist party also abandoned the
agricultural commune system creating new realities in the country’s gigantic agrarian
sector. These changes, like those mentioned above, opened investment opportunities for
foreign interests. Xu (2015) points out the PRC’s fast economic growth made it an
influential player in the global economy. China has evolved into the world’s largest
exporter. Its economy went from being one of the poorest to one of the largest economies
in the world.
The PRC is a one party state, the largest of its kind and one of the few remaining
communist ruled countries. The Communist Party is China’s principal policy making
organ. The legislative branch or National People's Congress (NPC) is influential in
shaping national economic strategy and looks to elect officials, which conform to party
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decrees. The executive branch includes the positions of President and Premier. The
President is appointed by the NPC, and is the head of state. The Premier leads the
government, and is nominated by the President and confirmed by the NPC.
China is administered through provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities
yet despite the power of the Communist party, the central government's jurisdictions at
provincial and local government levels are limited. Local administrators are able to act
with relative latitude in many areas. The country is governed through what Xu (2015)
calls “regionally decentralized authoritarianism” (RDA). In essence, this means the
decentralization of rule on the regional level when it comes to administrative execution
and economic resource distribution, but centralized in terms of political power of which
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) plays a principal role. In other words, the central
government controls the personnel through the party, but sub-state governments manage
most of the economy with the clout to introduce, discuss, realize and oppose policies,
rules and laws. The PRC has been fashioned by this type of administration.
Provincial and local administration leeway to make decisions on its own independent of
the CCP enable the exercise of paradiplomacy. As mentioned in chapter 2, paradiplomacy
is a practice in which sub-states like provinces/states develop and sustain direct
relationships with other countries to advance their interests generally in non-political
issues like trade and joint developmental projects. Paradiplomacy is of significance in the
case of Israel’s direct technical relations with individual Chinese provinces. Chen (2014)
underscores the importance of sub-state level relations in Sino-Israeli ties and asserts the
trend will grow and add new dimensions to bilateral ties. Chinese scholar Pingan (2014),
who was personally involved in recommending Israeli solar power and agricultural
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technologies to Henan Province, asserts that some Chinese provinces have welcomed
opportunities for collaboration with Israel especially in areas like desert and water-saving
management.
McGregor, (2011) cautions that for all of China’s economic liberalization, the
state has retained tight reigns over personnel, information, and the military, the latter
known as the People's Liberation Army (PLA). He points out the primary mission of the
PLA is to protect the Communist Party and not necessarily the country. Hence, leaders in
Beijing place importance on party control of the military. McGregor’s assertion confirms
a widely held understanding by China observers that the survival of the Party is a
paramount priority. To maintain its survival, the Party looks to upholding political power
but also to create a measure of societal content by raising living standards. On this point
one could consider why the import of knowledge (technology transfer) can help advance
Communist Party goals.
Over the last few decades (from the 70s to the present), the PRC has become a
more prominent actor in the global community. China has become a pivotal player in
forums and organizations like the UN Security Council, the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). China’s amplified involvement
on the world stage meant more conversations with other countries about cooperation in
the form of joint ventures and increased technical ties.
The section above considered aspects of China’s geography, economic and
political systems that are pertinent in the context of China’s technical driven ties with
Israel.
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CHINA’S CHALLENGES

Elizabeth Economy (2005) echoes a telling account of China’s changed behaviors
in recent times. Economy reasons the PRC’s move away in recent decades from
concentrating mostly on domestic concerns to more external engagement reflects an
important evolution. The point is that focusing mostly on internal issues reflects a
behavior typical of developing countries (Economy 2005). However, a move in policies
towards international outreach is more suggestive of a regional and global player. Put
another way, these changes are perhaps a testament to China’s transformation from a
mostly developing country to a more global player. In any case, world player tendencies
and development country realities both play into Sino-Israeli dynamics in the context of
specialized knowledge and technology transfers as will be explored below.
International technology transfers can reveal possible associations between a
given country’s domestic concerns and its external engagements. In other words, attempts
by leaders to solve internal problems may entail international outreach involving
technical cooperation agreements with other nations. To consider such a proposition in
the case of the PRC, it is helpful to review some underlying challenges faced by China,
which prompted a need to seek fresh problem solving approaches from domestic and
foreign sources. This context promotes a supply and demand setting, opening soft power
opportunities for states able and willing to cooperate in sharing problem-solving skills.
This notion is valid in the case of large states like the United States and small ones like
Israel. Most important is that the technology-sender nation is perceived or recognized to
be capable of delivering durable ways to confront longstanding and growing problems.
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So what are China’s challenges which may be associated with the import of helpful
technologies?
As specified earlier, China’s vast geography comprises terrain containing large
swaths of rugged, arid and semi-arid landscapes. These physical realities debilitate
China’s ability to produce meaningful quantities of foodstuffs. Achieving ideal crop
output levels are further frustrated by population growth. It is no surprise therefore, that
the efficiency of food production was and continues to be a growing cause of concern in
Chinese policymaking circles. Worries about crop yields grew as the PRC experienced
major social and economic transformations in the 1970s and beyond (Zhang, 2000).
China’s hurried development pressed Beijing decision-makers to seek-out proven
techniques to keep up with the demands of progress. Veeck (2007) and Jin and Young
(2001) point out crucial issues in the PRC’s agriculture sector are not confined to just
food supply concerns, but also touch on socio-economic afflictions like income
stagnation (especially in grain-dependent areas). Dry land conditions are but one in a set
of problematic dynamics facing large numbers of subsistence farmers who endeavor to
produce desirable fruits, vegetables, meat, poultry, and grain. Other impeding factors
include management issues. Thus, more effective management coupled with new
technologies could assist in boosting farmer revenues and by extension alleviate poverty
and advance overall rural development. Veeck (2007) stresses that recent advances in
farming techniques in the PRC have improved the agriculture sector, which in turn raised
overall living conditions in less developed countryside regions. This illustration is
testament to the great significance of agriculture in the economic well-being of millions
of Chinese citizens. Misika (2015) also underscores the importance of improving
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agriculture as a way to elevate standards of living in rural areas and suggests a role for
foreign sources in that endeavor. Of course, it is important to note that challenges in
Chinese farming differ from region to region and are contingent on features such as the
type of crop cultivated, and ownership and management styles in place.
Overcoming water scarcity was an essential part of efforts to increase food
production potential in China. Olli Varis, Pertti Vakkilainen (2001) attribute the
country’s water woes to a combination of causes like: environmental issues, population
density, rapid urbanization and structural (institutional) flaws. Jiang (2009) concurs with
these assessments about the causes of water scarcity but argues that water management
(technology) is the most realistic way to minimize shortage problems because the other
issues cannot be modified. Arid climatic conditions in large parts of China highlight the
critical utility of water management (irrigation) technologies to improve water use
efficiency in agriculture. Jin and Young (2001) contend that proper irrigation is a vital
component in securing adequate food output levels noting grain yields are heavily
dependent on the availability of irrigated land.
Further testament of inadequate food production concerns in the PRC can be
sketched from China’s recent foreign land for farming acquisitions. Stone (2013)
contends the PRC’s procurement of agricultural land outside China is part of a wider
trend in which farmland changes hands from local to international interests. While the
land acquisition tendency has no direct bearing on Sino-Israeli dynamics it does provide
an indication about the urgency to increase agricultural production, which is a key
component in Sino-Israeli cooperation in past and present times. National security is the
other major dynamic driving bilateral relations with Israel.
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National security worries are not in themselves unusual for decision makers of
most countries. In the case of China, one could argue that military affairs are of primary
significance when considering a multitude of regional disputes involving the PRC. A
history of quarrels stretches along a timeline, which covers decades from earlier periods
in modern day China to present times. A political rift emerged between Beijing and
Moscow in the 1960s spurring border tensions. Besides frictions on the Soviet frontier,
China is party to a collection of territorial spats some of which have not been resolved.
Some of these disputes have created opportunities for Sino-Israeli military contacts.
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) asserts a wide-ranging roster of regional
issues involving the PRC. These include political differences with neighboring nuclear
rival India over territory in the Himalayas and nuclear proliferation issues. Also, China’s
southwestern Yunnan province has experienced smuggling border breaches from
Myanmar stemming from drug trafficking activities. China has laid claims to islands in
the South China Sea, but these claims have been challenged by Taiwan, Vietnam and
Japan. There are also territorial disagreements between China and North Korea over
border rivers such as the Yalu and Tumen. Furthermore, Beijing contends with domestic
unrest mostly in western regions of the country.
Teufel-Dreyer (2005) points out China’s susceptibility to minority separatism in
autonomous regions like Xinjiang, Tibet, and Inner Mongolia. After the September 11
attacks, groups associated with radical Islam became the center of anti-terror security
attention mostly in Xinjiang, where millions of ethnic Moslem Uyghurs reside. Sun
(2010) suggests groups with ties to international jihadist organizations have challenged
the legitimacy of Beijing’s authority in Xinjiang, and thus are seen as posing security
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threats in Western China. Smith (2009) asserts the 9/11 attacks drew the US and China
closer to cooperate on common counter-terrorism interests. Nevertheless, China’s
cooperation in combating terrorism also extends to other international partners, who in
the eyes of Beijing can deliver helpful combat knowledge and experiences. On that point,
Pingan (2014) notes China’s efforts to fight extremist groups go beyond security itself,
and extend to collaboration (international) in technology, intelligence and training
techniques.
The above passages have reviewed primarily areas of concern to the PRC’s
leadership (security and agriculture) and which appear to be factors in the initiation and
growth of ties between Israel and China. Agriculture and security associated technology
transfers offered Beijing extra ways to approach national priorities.

HISTORY OF SINO-ISRAELI RELATIONS

Trade, diplomatic and military sector interactions between China and Israel in the
last two decades suggest remarkable growth in bilateral ties. However, the path to formal
Sino-Israeli relations did not unfold swiftly or straightforwardly, but instead turned out to
be a very lengthy experience. The eventual formation of diplomatic relations between
Israel and China in 1992 came after a series of, on again, off again, clandestine behind
the scenes dynamics starting in the 1950s and lasting for dozens of years. Even as quiet
exchanges between the two countries took place, Chinese officials and state media
routinely continued to reference the Jewish State and its policies through tough, critical
language.
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The genesis of Sino-Israeli relations can be traced back numerous years prior to
the eventual opening of embassies in Tel Aviv and Beijing in 1992. The Chinese
Embassy is located in Tel Aviv because the PRC does not formally recognize Jerusalem
as Israel’s capital. The policy is not unusual, and mirrors those practiced by other
countries, which maintain diplomatic missions in Israel. Nevertheless, the policy is of a
symbolic nature as visiting Chinese officials conduct business in Jerusalem, the seat of
the Israeli government.
Many years of sporadic contacts between Israel and China proved
inconsequential. However, starting in the 1970s the PRC’s new leadership dropped
longstanding communist doctrines opening itself more to contacts with the outside world.
Increased openness in foreign policy meant more opportunities to seek external resources
with which to tackle some of the PRC’s most pressing issues. Chinese policymakers
looked to other countries in pursuit of specialized knowledge. Against this backdrop,
China and Israel began to renew contacts, which were previously dormant for many
years. Unlike past distant periods, the exchanges of the late 70s, while also covert, proved
to provide seeds for more productive interactions. The scale of Israel’s security and
developmental experiences are small in Chinese terms. Nevertheless, know-how in those
areas attracted notable attention among decision makers in Beijing. Sino-Israeli ties, has
generally flourished, but have also been plagued by contentious interactions. The
solidification of security ties between Beijing and Jerusalem in particular had at times
drawn critical scrutiny from Washington, producing awkward and hot-tempered moments
between the US and Israel, which still resonates in the present. Sino-Israeli relations
suffered setbacks, but as a whole were not permanently damaged because of any one
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specific issue. The section below considers milestones in bilateral relations. surveying
what has been written or said about the development of Israel’s ties with China. It draws
on information sourced from the literature, interviews, and media. Overall Sino-Israeli
relations can be chronologically noted by the following periods (see Figure 1).
Figure 1 Timeline Overall Sino-Israeli Relations

1949 PRC
Founding
to Early
1970s

1970s
Nixon Visit
China
Begins to
Open Up

1980s
Secret and
Non Secret
Sino-Israeli
Contacts

1992 Full
Diplomatic
Relations

After 1992

1949 – 1972 (BIRTH OF THE PRC TO CHINA OPENS UP)

In terms of size of territory, economic dimensions and population Israel and
China are situated at opposite ends. Yet despite such striking differences, the two nations
also exhibit some notable similarities and attributes. Israel and China share features in
terms of historical legacy and modern day challenges.

117

China and Israel were established just one year apart. Israel was created in 1948
and the PRC in 1949. The two countries both emerged after prolonged armed struggles.
China endured a civil war, while pre-state Israel experienced internal strife in the lead up
to statehood, and subsequent full-scale war with its neighbors upon declaration of
independence. Both China and Israel were established with the aims of fulfilling deeply
rooted doctrines, which were intertwined with their overall nationalistic ambitions. The
PRC was founded on the philosophies of Marxism-Leninism, while Israel was established
on Zionist principles. The primary goal of Zionism included the yearning to re-establish
Jewish sovereignty on land believed to be part of biblical ancient Israel. The goals of the
1949 Chinese revolution included the introduction of radical social and economic
reforms. In essence, the two movements worked to shape new societies. Early statehood
Israel had an economy mostly dominated by state owned enterprises. Hence, at one time
Israel’s economy featured socialist mechanisms before moving to a free market economy
as it is today. Adelman (2014) suggests that Israel’s socialist past was an advantage in
dealing with a mixed market communist country, which China became after reforms in
the 1970s. Furthermore, both Israel and China have deeply seated beliefs in which they
see themselves as ancient nations. The two nations also strive to maintain meaningful ties
with diaspora communities. China placed importance on relations with ethnic Chinese
communities worldwide as an aspect of its foreign affairs. Israel built an extensive
infrastructure dedicated to maintaining and expanding bonds with diaspora Jewish
communities. When future formal ties with Israel developed, the Chinese government
expressed interest in the Israeli model of outreach to the diaspora to as a way to connect
with Chinese communities around the world (Adelman, 2015).
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The two countries have had farming communes, albeit the Chinese model was
discontinued with the advent of sweeping land reforms in 1970s, while the Israeli model
(the Kibbutz) transformed into a more capitalist version of itself. Levin (2013) notes the
two countries both assert rights over territories on historical grounds. Israel cites ancient
Jewish heritage claims to the disputed West Bank. China, too, claims sovereignty over
Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang and parts of the South China Sea based on historical ties. In
seeking to expand its diplomatic network, Israel sought to highlight commonalities with
China wherever possible, and built on shared strategic interests.
Sino-Israeli interactions first took place only a year after the 1949 establishment
of the PRC. In 1950, Israel became the first Middle East country, and one of the few nonCommunist states, to recognize post revolution China. In the same year, initial secret
exchanges between the two countries occurred. In the decades that followed, China and
Israel fell in and out of contact with years passing between encounters. Zev Sufott,
Israel’s first Ambassador in Beijing neatly unpacks the milestones in Sino-Israeli
relations. Sufott (2000) and others trace a string of bilateral exchanges, which resemble
back and forth ping-pong like dynamics; one in which intentions to normalize relations
often changed directions falling prey to policy reversals, timing issues, missed
opportunities, Middle East conflict, and intervening diplomatic constraints. Ambassador
Sufott asserts various factors and historical episodes, hindered or stopped altogether any
movement toward full diplomatic relations.
Israel's foreign policies, like those of other countries, do not operate in isolation.
Put another way, the Jewish State’s approach toward China was also subject to competing
priorities, political pressures and interests in other regions. This was especially true
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during the Cold War in association with the 1950-1953 Korean conflict. China was allied
with North Korea while the US sided with the South Korea. Sobin (1991) contends that
the warming of Israeli relations with China, during the Korean War would have been in
direct opposition to US interests. Efforts to purse formal Sino-Israeli ties stalled after
Israel was inclined to join western condemnations of China’s Korea policy. Nonetheless,
shortly after the Korean War, a small Israeli trade delegation secretly traveled to Beijing,
but the visit did not advance relations as hoped. China had its own interests and priorities
in the Middle East, and consistently demonstrated unwavering support in favor of Israel’s
key adversaries. This was exemplified by China’s pro-Arab position in1955 during the
African-Asian Bandung conference, which adopted an anti-Israel resolution. Beijing’s
policy at the contentious conference again lowered expectations of advancing Sino-Israeli
ties (Shichor, 2014). Shortly afterward, in 1956, another obstruction in the way of
moving towards formal relations occurred when Israel, joined forces with Britain and
France to confront Egypt after it nationalized the Suez Canal. The nationalization of this
highly strategic waterway threatened British and French interests. During the crisis,
China again sided with the overall Arab World position further eliminating any prospects
for renewed Sino-Israeli exchanges. After the conflict, decades passed before hints of
progress towards bilateral contacts emerged again in the 1970s.

1972 (CHINA OPENS UP) – 1980S

The warming of relations between Beijing and Washington in the early1970s
somewhat offered to ease constraints on Israeli policy limitations towards communist
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China. In prior periods, American governments discouraged allies from diplomatically
engaging the Chinese. The opening of China to the world in the wake of President
Nixon’s historic 1972 visit set the stage for the US and other countries in the West to tap
into the massive Chinese market. In this context, Israel sought contacts with China, but
Beijing did not respond right away, taking years to trickle into meaningful bilateral
exchanges.
During this period (1970s) the PRC interacted with numerous other countries as it
pursued major modernization objectives. As new era Chinese polices solidified, so did
opportunities to re-start once forgotten Sino-Israeli dialogues. Western engagement in
China placed priority on selling finished goods and equipment. Western companies
seeking to enter the PRC generally resisted transferring core technologies, but some were
more comfortable helping with medium to low-tech knowledge (Wang and Zhou, 1999).
In contrast to western players, Israel’s interaction in China (while of a very small scale)
offered a platform from which Chinese decision makers could work toward, the goal of
building self-reliance in crucial sectors like agriculture, and some military-related
technology areas (Melman and Sinai, 1987). Put another way, the West tended to
primarily focus on the sale of a particular product, while the Israeli approach appeared to
emphasize sustainability, know-how, and training that could, in the longer term, be
learned and then adopted in China. This type of approach was an attractive alternative
and deemed helpful in advancing China’s technological capabilities (Chan and Daim,
2011). Over time, China increased interest in learning more about Israel’s developmental
and security experiences. In 1975, a Chinese delegation visited the Israeli Pavilion, at the
Paris Airshow (featuring mostly military hardware). The visit set the stage for further but
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quiet contacts later in the decade. Melman and Sinai (1987) reveal that an Israeli arms
industry delegation traveled to China in 1979.
Sino-Israeli meetings ultimately became more frequent but that did not happen
until the 1980s. Eventually the medley of unofficial meetings, which ensued, transitioned
into full formal ties (Chen, 2012).
1980S – 1992 (LEAD UP TO FORMAL TIES)

In the 1980s, agricultural cooperation started indirectly, but later transitioned to
direct contacts in the mid and late years of the decade. The increased Sino-Israeli
cooperation, while mostly private, came at a time showing hints of Chinese policy
modifications towards Israel. Sufott (2000) asserts the addition of the words 'since 1967'
to Beijing’s demand that Israel withdraw from territories it captured in the 1967 ArabIsraeli war as a condition for formal relations suggests a subtle policy shift which was
softer in tone towards the Jewish State. In essence, Chinese policymakers carefully
managed a foreign relations balancing act. On the one hand, mindful of China’s deeply
rooted Middle East interests in the Arab World while, on the other hand, conducting
secret talks with Israel as it sought to advance technical cooperation. Sobin (1991) points
out that discreet commercial links began in 1979, but ministerial level meetings only
became a reality in the mid-1980s. The first high-level ministerial level contact between
the two countries occurred when the Chinese and Israeli Ministers of Science met at a
1985 conference in the US. Israel’s distinctive experience and achievements in
agriculture technology, particularly in irrigation systems, were of special interest in the
PRC. Chinese decision makers looked for ways to better cope with arid conditions
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limiting food production thus giving cause for contacts with countries like Israel,
regardless of politics or even the absence of formal relations. Israel’s experience and
skillsets were suitable to help deal with deep developmental issues in China. Several
years before the start of diplomatic relations, a Chinese delegation reportedly secretly
traveled to Israel in 1985 to work out a deal on joint farming projects and other
cooperation opportunities in solar energy, robotics, and arms manufacturing (Sobin,
1991; Sufott, 1997). The sharing of agricultural technology served as a prime vehicle of
cooperation at a time when China faced the struggles of feeding a 1/4 of the world’s
population while possessing only 1/7 of the earth’s arable land (Sufott, 1997). It is also
important to note as Bruins and Bu (2006) point out, China has the largest agricultural
economy in the world, being both the largest food producer and food consumer. China’s
food needs are unmatched by any other country, including neighboring India.
On military ties, Harris (1999) posits that Beijing’s rift with Moscow created a
need for China to seek combat-tested experience against Soviet-made arms. Israel’s
combat record against Soviet-armed adversaries in the Arab-Israeli wars (1967, 1973 and
1982) was a source of attraction to Israel from policymakers in the PRC. Shichor (2014)
explains even in pre-diplomatic relations days China closely followed Israeli military
achievements. He points out every kind of clash Israel had with Syria and Lebanon was
recorded. Some of these were noted in Chinese publications covering military matters.
Shichor suggests that because the Middle East is like a huge laboratory for use of stateof-the-art military technologies this played a part in driving informal discrete ties with
Israel (in the 1980s) which offered valued knowledge in warfare, and was in turn
incorporated into China’s military modernization processes. Ultimately, the military
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relationship, like contacts in the agriculture sector, also played a role in inching Israel and
China closer together. In effect, China’s contacts with Israel at the time negated Beijing’s
long-standing close ties in the Arab World. Chunshan (2014) characterizes Sino-Israeli
military exchanges as a product of pragmatism. Later in 1980s the foreign ministers of
Israel and China met at the UN with a view to open opportunities for more exchanges.
Besides the prospects of technical ties, geo-political factors also drew China closer to
Israel. As a rising international player, China sought to play a notable role in IsraelPalestinian peace efforts. Closer relations with all parties in the conflict including Israel
would grant China more clout as a player in the peace process. China was also sensitive
to the thawing of Soviet-Israeli relations, which could compete with and aggravate
Beijing’s diplomatic efforts in the Middle East. A further tightening of Sino-Israeli ties
came when the Israeli Minister of Defense traveled to Beijing in 1991. The visit marked a
dramatic contrast to pervious distant periods dominated by discord and antagonism
between the two countries. Sobin (1991) sums up the transition in Sino-Israeli relations
eloquently, contending that Israel slowly went from being seen by Chinese leaders as an
inconsequential country to a potential partner and source of benefit, which could be
helpful in dealing advancing some of the PRC’s national troubles.
A tangible turning point in China-Israel pre-formal relations came with the mutual
opening of non-diplomatic missions in 1990: The Israel Academy of Sciences and
Humanities in Beijing and the Chinese tourist office in Tel Aviv. Over the history of
exchanges, technical cooperation emerged as a central theme in bilateral engagement
both before and after the opening of embassies in Tel-Aviv and Beijing. Technology
transfers were significant features in the buildup to formal Israel-China ties as the PRC
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grew into one of the world’s largest technology importers. At the same time, China’s rise
as a global economic power made it an attractive and sought after prospective partner for
many countries including Israel. In his memoir, former Israeli diplomat Sufott (1997)
describes the launch of Israel’s quiet, semi-official, pre-diplomatic presence in Mainland
China. His accounts reinforce the notion that technology and knowledge conversations
served as channels of dialogue on the path to forge future formal ties. Ambassador Sufott
asserts the opening of Israel’s scientific exchange office in Beijing was a distinct
precursor in the lead-up to open relations. Adelman (2014) concurs that steps to formal
ties revolved around scientific exchanges. Officially, the Israeli office was tasked with
mostly facilitating scientific and agricultural cooperation, but it was also doubling as a
venue for Sino-Israeli political contacts. The work of the office is notable because it
offers some verification of how non-political technical exchanges may positively impact
political processes, serving as way stations to wider bilateral cooperation and overall to
the normalization of relations. Sufott (1997) confirms Chinese policymakers took note of
Israel’s track record especially in military and development issues. Adelman (2014) notes
that the rise of Deng Xiaoping and the launch of China’s modernization efforts set into
motion policies which made once forbidden military contacts with Israel okay. In other
words, the necessity to modernize in China, overrode any policies which would typically
bar Chinese officials from talking and collaborating with Israel. The seemingly radical
shift in policy is reminiscent of a Chinese proverb associated with Deng Xiaoping
himself: “It doesn't matter if a cat is black or white, so long as it catches mice.” Sobin
(1991) also notes ties with Israel offered appealing arms options namely in the form of
relatively low-cost yet battle proven weaponry.
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1992 -2014 (FORMAL TIES AND BEYOND)

On 24 January 1992 Israel and China inaugurated full diplomatic relations.
The initial years of formal ties were marked by a visible exchange of dignitary visits and
the finalization of agreements covering science, technology and trade. Amplified open
Sino-Israeli exchanges endowed Beijing in a number of ways: to be a more significant
player in forthcoming Middle East peace efforts, to counter-balance Moscow’s power in
the region, and to have better relations with the West where it also sought technologies.
Israel-China formal relations grew to encase an array of cooperative and mutual interest
dimensions in areas of trade, technology, and strategic benefits. Cooperation in counterterrorism is a key example of strategic interests. Peng (2007) points out that when
China’s leadership stopped looking outward solely in terms of political polarity, it turned
instead to an emphasis on broader international cooperation. Mutual Sino-Israeli
objectives void of dogmatic political dynamics nudged Israel and China closer through
technology collaboration. Peng (2007) points out that China’s relationship with some of
America’s allies like South Korea, and Australia, made Washington nervous. The same
may be said of tighter ties between Israel and China. The closer Sino-Israeli relations
were not always seen with a favorable eye in Washington, where officials asserted that
some Israeli military technology transfers to the PRC included American made
components, which Israel was not authorized to re-export to third parties. To be clear, it
is not suggested in this dissertation that it is unreasonable for the US to express
objections to Israeli arms transfers to China. Some of Israel’s military technology
transfers were believed to include American made components. Unauthorized transfers
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by Israel of American technologies as part of finished military products would be in
violation of US export control regulations.
Adelman (2014) notes Israel’s uniqueness in technical ties with China. He
points out that Israelis were generally more willing to go to out of the way areas of
mainland China while most westerners working in similar sectors tended to operate in
more established major centers like Shanghai and other urban centers. As mentioned
above, huge areas of China are dry (deserts) or too cold (high elevation) for food
production. To cope with these challenges, China embarked on multiple collaborations
with Israel in agriculture. Examples include a series of joint ventures officially called
Sino-Israeli demonstration farms. The farms, which were designed to stimulate
sustainability were co-established and managed by MASHAV, Israel’s international
development agency. Each farm features different types of livestock or crops. Generally,
such joint ventures are venues where specialized Israeli agricultural methods are
implemented locally. In 1993, the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of
Agriculture of China introduced the China-Israel Agricultural Training Center. A joint
Sino-Israeli dairy farm was setup near Beijing in 2001. It introduced techniques in milk
production, and featured new computer-assisted herd feeding, health and fertility
management. An annual report by Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2012) describes
the facility as a center where thousands of Chinese farmers train. These demonstration
farms have also drawn interest from neighboring East Asian countries. MASHAV
maintains that farmers from Thailand, Vietnam, and Korea visited the facility to
experience how the farm works, what it can produce, and to explore the possibility of
applying some of the same agricultural techniques in their home countries.
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Another notable joint agro-project was the 2002 Sino-Israeli Demonstration and
Training Center for Agriculture, in the dry Xinjiang Uygur region of northwest China.
The center’s mission focused on overcoming farming struggles in arid areas. The project
involved the introduction of irrigation water-saving management methods. The system
aimed to maximize crop output with minimal water use. The overall purpose of the
project was to create a flagship model for China's dry lands agriculture and the
development of industrial crops. Industrial crops are non-food plants, which are raw
materials like cotton from which to produce finished products. In turn, increased
industrial crop output can help China reduce imports of similar products. While such
model farms have been established to help advance agriculture and foster government-togovernment cooperation, they also create public diplomacy opportunities. An Israeli
agricultural specialist stationed in China on behalf of MASHAV contends that local
farmers who associate their own success stories with Israeli techniques tend to become
goodwill ambassadors for Israel. It should be noted that MASHAV operates alumni clubs
in China (and other countries) known as Shalom clubs. Members are invited to attend
lectures, exchange ideas, and organize technical cooperation. These forums provide
MASHAV a platform to maintain personal ties with former trainees and organize
professional activities. As noted, over the years since the start of diplomatic ties in 1992,
Sino-Israeli cooperation in various sectors has helped move Israel and China towards
tighter ties.
On the political front, China’s stance on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has
somewhat changed from mostly one-sided condemnations of Israel to a more neutral
positions, thus softening its tone towards the Jewish State. Several sources suggest that
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during the 1990s and early 2000s, Israeli military exports to China swelled, making Israel
a major arms supplier in the Chinese market. However, cooperation in the military sector
was not maintained as Jerusalem faced intense opposition from Washington. Israel was
obliged to renege upon and terminate arms deals. There were two major examples of
disruptions in military cooperation between Israel and China. First, a blow to the flow of
military equipment came with the cancellation of the sale of Israeli Phalcon (Aircraft)
Airborne Early Warning systems in 2000. Another striking example of the halt of Israeli
arms to China happened when America requested that Israel stop the upgrade of (IAI)
Harpy Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) or drones. Harpy is an all-weather self-directed
weapon system that can counter hostile SAM (surface-to-air-missile) and radar sites. This
particular incident was especially embarrassing to Israel and created a setback in SinoIsraeli relations. China had bought the drones from Israel some years before (1990s) but
sent them to Israel for upgrades. Typically, this happens as part of an after sales
maintenance program. Under strong US pressure, Israel backed out and did not upgrade
the drones. Such vehement American objections to the stream of Israeli arms to China
presents an interesting reversal of a previous US policy. Sobin (1991) points out that
during the Cold War, Washington pushed in the opposite direction, encouraging Israel to
supply advanced military equipment to the PRC believing the move would force the
Soviets to transfer some of its most advanced weapons away from the European front to
their eastern border with China and thus diminish threats to the US and its NATO allies.
Both the Phalcon Airborne Early Warning systems and the Harpy UAV system
were considered critical warfare tools. The cancellations produced furious reactions in
Beijing, and created a credibility problem for Israel. It has raised doubts about whether
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Israel could honor military technology transfer commitments without America’s
approval. Opposition to Sino-Israeli military deals stem from US regulations aimed at
curbing technology transfers of American made components as parts of finished goods.
Shichor (2014) points out that the political turmoil following the failed deal forced Israel
to limit and then eliminate altogether military transfers to China in the early and mid
2000s. Adelman (2014) contends that the US forced Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak to
stop the transfer of weapons to China. Such restraints on Israeli military exports to the
PRC remain in place today. Shichor (2014) and Adelman (2014) suggest the real reasons
for Washington’s directive had to do more with concerns Israel could undercut America’s
armament share in other lucrative markets like Latin America by offering equally
effective yet lower cost military products.
Adelman (2014) adds the Phalcon cancellation issue was a very big deal because
it cut a lot of business for Israel. Furthermore, he asserts the arms trade gave Israel access
to high-ranking people in China, which was subsequently lost. Tiezzi (2014) suggests
there have been calls in Israel to restart the arms trade with the PRC, but US pressure
continues to block that possibility. However, Israel’s trade relations with China gradually
recovered and improved, but it was not an easy transition. Evron (2014) who traces
technology transfers between the two countries says Israeli-Chinese ties have moved
away from the military sector to instead focusing solely on civilian sectors. He notes the
wounds of the Phalcon and Harpy fiascos have had long lasting negative implications on
the nature of some Israeli exports to China. He points out that some Israeli companies,
fearful of retribution from the US, tend to self-regulate their dealings with China
especially if their products comprise of dual use civilian/military technologies. Dual use
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technologies are generally civilian technologies, which may also lend themselves to
military applications. Evron contends that some (Israeli) technology producers and
suppliers tend to take an over cautious track and stop selling their products to China
altogether. In retrospect, Chen (2014) acknowledges that while at one-point military
technologies used to be more important in the relationship, other technologies have
gained significance in the growth of bilateral ties. Tiezzi (2014) asserts China has grown
to become second only to the US as a source of joint hi-tech projects with Israel, and has
surpassed Europe as the leading source of hi-tech capital.
On this point there has been a continued and growing interest in China in various
specialized technologies from Israel like water desalination and ways to combat
desertification, but also overall in hi-tech fields. This notion is confirmed by the words of
former Chinese diplomats who were stationed in Israel. Former Ambassador Yonglong
(2006) depicts Sino-Israeli ties as a partnership of many opportunities in technology
fields. More recently, Ambassador Yanping (2012) in a telling opinion piece in a
prominent Israeli newspaper entitled “China’s Road to Prosperity” asserts her country’s
cooperation with Israel has been mutually beneficial on multiple levels and urged a step
up in scientific and technical ties. A convincing instance of intensified Sino-Israeli
technical relations in recent years came in the form of a 2012 agreement to set up
technology parks in Dangguan, a city in the southern Guangdong province. The projects
aimed to advance water treatment as well as electric car and biomedicine technologies.
Chen (2014) believes tech ties between the two countries are a “win-win”, arguing that
China benefits by accessing technologies it seeks, and by extension, the relationship with
Israel also provides Chinese interests a pathway to connect with the American Jewish
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Community. Israel mostly benefits from the relationship with China through market
access and sources of funding. Pingan (2014) expects specialized tech cooperation
growth to stay on track, and even suggests the convergence of Israeli patents (technology)
and Chinese resources could have the potential to produce future iconic business brands.
This assertion gains significance, when considering the PRC is the world’s largest
exporting country.
However, despite the growth of hi-tech ties, some sectors still suffer from export
limitations stemming from the aborted Sino-Israeli arms deal blocked by the US during
the 2000s. Shichor (2014) contends that when it comes to exports to China, Israel’s hitech industry can get bogged down by vague US regulations. He asserts that some
companies do not know what is or is not appropriate. It is important to note that even
seemingly “innocent” civilian technologies can fall under export limitations to China if
they are classified as dual use technologies. Of course, Shichor (2014) adds that some
Israeli companies try to find some ways to bypass these limits through other countries or
companies.
Another noteworthy aspect of knowledge sharing in Sino-Israel relations has
emerged through academia starting mostly in 2011. Academic exchanges between Israel
and China have been on the rise providing new avenues to advance bilateral dialogues.
One of the most active organizations promoting academic exchanges is an NGO called
Sino-Israel Global Network and Academic Leadership (SIGNAL). Carice Witte founded
the organization in 2011 to help foster bilateral ties through enhanced academic
interactions. SIGNAL has created a forum to promote the exchange of ideas between
Chinese and Israeli scholars on mutual bilateral concerns. The organization facilitates the
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hosting of Chinese delegations visiting Israel and setting up joint research endeavors.
SIGNAL is not an official Israeli government organ, but it enjoys support from Jewish
American organizations and its accomplishments are acknowledged by the Israeli
government. SIGNAL has privately helped to introduce Israel studies centers at major
Chinese Universities. Witte (2014) contends SIGNAL’s NGO status grants it more
latitude than official government bodies since some potential partners are often wary of
state sanctioned initiatives. Nevertheless, the organization’s independent dealings in
China also play a part in government-to-government partnerships. Witte (2014) suggests
the organization was established to fill a void in Sino-Israeli relations because
government dealings focused almost entirely on economic related issues.
A notable feature behind SIGNAL’s strategy is the premise that knowledge about
Israel made available to Chinese scholars could be passed along to key decision-makers
whom they may advise. Witte contends tapping elite scholars who help develop policy is
the most efficient pathway to leaders. Iber (2015) points out that joint academic
exchanges of recent times signal a growing cultural interest in Israel in the PRC.
Increasingly Judaica Centers are being established at various Chinese universities, and
joint institutes are beginning to appear there. In Israel, China studies and the study of the
Chinese language have become very popular especially after the opening of Confucius
Institutes at Tel Aviv University and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
Witte (2014) asserts that regional turmoil triggered by the 2011 Arab Spring has
been a factor in spurring intensified Chinese interest in Israel by way of academic
partnerships. The PRC is interested in advances in Israel’s hi-tech, but also tapping its
knowledge about the Middle East. Recently, the Israel Institute of Technology also called
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the Technion, teamed up with Shantou University (STU) in Guangdong Province to open
a new academic facility there. The joint venture marks a stepped up combination of
technical and academic cooperation involving Guangdong Province, Shantou
Municipality, the Technion, and STU. The project also makes the Technion the first
Israeli University to have a campus in China. It is important to note the Technion and
other Israeli institutions like Tel-Aviv University and Hebrew University achieved
notable rank positions in the Shanghai Academic Ranking of World Universities.
The upsurge in Chinese interest in Israel in recent years, together with SIGNAL’s
push to engage scholars in China has brought about the emergence of Israel Studies
programs, which did not exist before 2011. China’s Ministry of Education began to
recognize Israel as an area of study eligible for state funding. The establishment of Israel
Studies programs, largely at prominent institutions, signifies an official stamp of approval
and more importantly a shift away from previous periods when the study of Israel and
overtly open ties with Israel were generally not encouraged.
Closer academic ties have widened points of contact between the two countries
and perhaps indicate a more willingness to soften China’s approach with regard to
Israel’s political claims. SIGNAL has organized a number conferences and symposiums
for Chinese and Israeli academics in China and Israel. At the first ever China-Israel
Strategic Studies Conference in 2013 (organized in part by SIGNAL) near Tel-Aviv, the
keynote speaker, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi described Israel “as an ancient land
of the ancient Jewish people”. While symbolic, the statement perhaps suggests empathy
toward Israel’s biblical and core claims to territory. The remark underscores a glaring
departure from previous policy statements usually very critical of Israel. Furthermore, as
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Witte asserts, the appearance of a top Chinese official at the gathering speaks volumes
about the significance given to Sino-Israeli ties. Meanwhile, since 2011 China has been
increasing the flow of delegations to Israel, thus raising bilateral engagement. Witte
makes it clear that Israel’s skills are the big draw for China but acknowledges like Abadi
(2015) that generally nothing is expected of China with regard to foreign policy.
Furthermore, when considering the overall weight of Chinese energy and other interests
in the Middle East against those of Israel it is not surprising that some scholars altogether
discount the notion of political gain for Israel as a product of bilateral technical ties.
While Sino-Israeli relations have flourished in key sectors, China has politically
maintained a somewhat pro-Palestinian stance. This state of affairs is echoed by
Bitzinger (2014) and Shichor (2014) who do not give much currency to the notion that
technology relations have political punch in favor of Israel. However, Shichor adds that
technical ties do help develop trade relations but within limits. Adelman (2015) points out
that competing interests greatly limit Israel’s ability to influence Beijing. Pingan (2014)
nevertheless asserts that moving forward, China will maintain a more neutral and
unbiased attitude on Middle East affairs, and try to avoid direct involvement in the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict. An illustration of Beijing’s balanced tone surfaced when
Israeli and Palestinian leaders visited China just a week apart in 2013. The Chinese
President Xi Jinping made similar pledges to both Israeli and Palestinian leaders. First to
Palestinian Authority President Mahmud Abbas vowing support to the people of
Palestine, and then a week later, expressing support for the people of Israel to Prime
Minister Netanyahu. In doing so, the Chinese leader avoided taking sides, highlighting
more balanced policy statements with regard to the Palestinian – Israeli conflict.

135

However, Chinese statements at the United Nations in recent years about the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict do suggest a modification in tone from those statements made
in past decades. In 2012, Li Baodong, China's permanent representative to the UN, stated
“China hopes that all the relevant parties will resolve their disputes through political
negotiations on the basis of the relevant United Nations resolutions, the principle of land
for peace, the Arab Peace Initiative and the road map for peace in the Middle East, with a
view to establishing an independent State of Palestine, with Palestine and Israel living
peacefully side by side.” The statement dramatically differs in tone from a statement
made by Chinese Ambassador Li Luye, in 1985 in the same UN forum: “China’s stand on
the question is clear and consistent. It is again Israel’s policy of aggression and expansion
that has posed a grave threat to and seriously disrupted peace and security in the Middle
East, causing the prolongation of the agony of war and turmoil in the region.” Albeit, the
statements above represent but just a minuscule sample of China’s stand on the Middle
East and Israel over time. However, a side-by-side comparison of these statements
reveals a clear modification of China’s diplomatic tone in recent years. The language
used to characterize Israel in recent periods has softened and policy statements on the
conflict with the Palestinians are noticeably more balanced and devoid of rigid
descriptions about the role of the Jewish state in the conflict.
Have Beijing’s political positions on the Middle East not changed as some
suggest? Or has a softening of political policies taken place? The following section
evaluates China’s Israel policy over a span of more than two decades by drawing on data
trends and content analysis.

136

CONTENT ANALYSIS AND DATA TRENDS

Sino-Israeli bilateral relations have come a long way since launching formal ties
in 1992. Relations between China and Israel have blossomed through a combination of
government to government, NGO and commercial exchanges as technology and
knowledge have emerged as prominent components of country-to-country dialogues. In
contrast to the views referenced earlier doubting the prospects of political policy shifts as
a product of technical ties, Levin (2013) suggests an opposing view, which sees Israel as
quietly hopeful that sharing its experiences and technologies would help garner some
Chinese government support for the Jewish State in international arenas. Nevertheless,
whether with or without open political support, China’s willingness to do business in
itself was a particularly attractive prospect for Israel, especially against the backdrop of
successive efforts to de-legitimatize and isolate the Jewish state. The start of China’s
modernization campaign, in the 1970s, made room for flexible policies in foreign
relations and spelled new opportunities for countries seeking contacts with the PRC.
Overall, the dissertation seeks to evaluate the weight of Israel’s technical offerings as
tools of achieving diplomatic gains. In the context of this study, diplomacy broadly
defined constitutes advancing bilateral ties in three primary areas: trade, bilateral
exchanges and policy towards the Middle East as detailed in chapter two.
It is hoped that a combination of data trend charts and content analysis, which
follows, will help build a clearer systematic understanding about the mechanics of SinoIsraeli ties even if it partially confirms or refutes the dissertation hypothesis as described
in chapter 2.
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CONTENT ANALYSIS

Content analysis is mostly focused on the qualitative summative method, which
considers word occurrences, significance, positioning and interplay of words or concepts
in statements made by Chinese officials. It is important to note that qualitative content
analysis rests on subjective choices of the researcher with regard to data labeling,
classification, and other data filtering. Furthermore, research strategies are guided by
researcher interest, literature content, expert conversations and trial and error limitations.
Thus, the analysis here constitutes forms of researcher (personal) assessments in
determining possible links between study variables: independent (technology transfers),
dependent (robust relations comprised of trade, bilateral exchanges and policies towards
Israel) and at times the impact of intervening variables (Middle East conflict flare-ups,
economic and political factors).
An assessment of technical ties and bilateral exchanges in Sino-Israeli relations will
draw on a review of tens of thousands of media pieces (articles) and official government
sources. Interpretations about variances in China’s policies towards Israel/Middle East
will be based on Chinese statements at the UN over the study period (1989-2014).
Since the dissertation mostly draws on a significant quantity of textual data, the
study also utilizes (NVivo) software to implement content analysis. The software is used
to perform specified text searches and create coding filters, which involves but is not
limited to the search of keywords (terms), defining timeframes or range of dates, and
country names. NVivo offers users multiple methods to achieve any given research goal.
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Particular methods were used in consultation with a committee member who is familiar
with the software. What follows are descriptions of the NVivo based techniques used.

DATA TRENDS

The study draws on a number of quantitative (mostly economic trends) data as part
of its examination of Sino-Israeli ties. Namely, an evaluation of trade/economic based
Comtrade data. Comtrade is the UN organ which tracks country-to-country commerce as
reported by member states themselves. Also considered below are data trends about
bilateral exchanges in the form of number of official visits and treaties. To better
understand the significance of the numbers, the datasets are visualized below in the form
of tables and graph charts.

DATA START DATES

Please note that data collected and used for the purpose of content analysis does
not include all time periods identified in the narrative above. This is the case for two
main reasons. First, the analysis portion of the study does not cover the entire historical
narrative of Sino-Israeli relations. Second, data availability was limited. The declared
analysis portion of the study period starts only from the end of the1980s just before
diplomatic relations started in 1992. However, reliable official data on trade is only
available from 1995 onwards, while official bilateral exchanges data becomes available
from the early 1990’s when relations became formalized and less secretive. Though UN
data in the form speeches and statements documenting county political positions go back
decades, the study period begins at the end of the 1980s. Therefore, UN political data is
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collected from that time. While the start date of all data types is not uniform due to
availability limitations, there is adequate overlapping or concurrent periods of data for the
purpose of assessing possible covariance of trends.

CHINA’S POLITICAL APPROACH TOWARDS ISRAEL/MIDDLE EAST (CONTENT ANALYSIS)

The dissertation examines statements made at the UN by Chinese representatives
on Israeli-Palestinian conflict-specific issues. It is important to note that UN voting
patterns can not and should not be taken as full testimonies in accurately describing
Israel’s diplomatic achievements. Certainly, the nature of votes in the world body
pertaining to Israel and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict say something about attitudes
toward the Jewish State but offer only a partial picture of Israeli relations with nation
partners like China. More importantly, given Israel’s record of quiet or backdoor
diplomacy, what may matter more goes beyond the number of votes at the UN for or
against the Jewish State. It is the moderated rhetoric and the “behind the scenes”
dynamics which are contributing factors in the building and maintaining of resilient
bilateral relations. Diplomatic gains may be tacit in the form of quiet joint collaborations.
As Callick (2012) notes, Israel has gained ground in gradually building relationships with
Asian countries, even as a trend of hostile votes against it in international arenas persist.
The purpose of this analysis is to assess how China’s policy on the Middle East
has evolved. In particular, it looks to see if policy statements are more accommodating of
Israel given growing technical cooperation over the study period. To do this, names of
Chinese UN ambassadors who served during the study range of years (1989-2014) were
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identified. Then, ambassador name-specific searches were conducted within the UN
Information System on the Question of Palestine (UNISPAL) database. This is the forum,
which features debates on the Israel-Palestinian conflict. The searches are purposed to
isolate all documents, which contain names of Chinese ambassadors but which may also
include remarks and speeches of representatives from other countries. The contents of
retrieved resultant documents were loaded into NVivo and further filtered (coded) to
isolate speeches by Chinese representatives from remarks of other diplomats also
participating in the same debate. Next, the isolated Chinese diplomat-specific texts were
classified by year. The classification permits observations of possible variance in Middle
East policy from year to year. Then, through NVivo, a word frequency query was
launched to determine the 1000 most common words used in debates about the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict from 1989-2014 for full list see Appendix 1. The word
frequency results were reviewed and further narrowed down by identifying a limited
number of terms routinely used to describe Israeli policies in the context of the conflict
with the Palestinians. The word selections were based on the researcher’s personal
assessments, which drew on the scholarly literature, media reports, interview
conversations, and overall first hand familiarity with conflict contexts (while working as
TV news producer in the region). Next, these word choices were coded as either
“negative” or “positive” with regard to Israeli actions/policies in the conflict. For
example, the expression “negotiations” was considered positive since it does not single
out Israel for criticism, and is generally used in the framework of advancing a resolution
to the conflict. A word like “aggression” is typically used to critically describe Israeli
military actions, therefore it would be coded as negative. The words selected in the
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positive category are peace, coexistence, parties, constructive, process, and
negotiations. The use of the word “parties” in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict generally infers positive connotations. This is the case because the usage of the
term refers to the actions of both sides in the dispute. Thus, the use of the word “parties”
projects a neutral stance which avoids the singling out or any particular side for criticism,
namely Israel. On that point, the usage of the term “parties” overall tends to be in the
framework of balanced statements which do not single out Israel but address the
wrongdoings of all “parties”. In doing so, the use of the word suggests both sides are
accountable in the conflict and must do their part in advancing dialogue and peaceful
resolution. The use of the term mitigates-criticism of Israel hence, a positive factor in the
realm of Israeli diplomacy.
The words selected in the negative category are occupied, abuse, rights,
activities, brutal and aggression. The use of the word “activities” has negative
connotation (when referring to Israel) in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Typically, in UN debates on the conflict the term is used in referencing the actions of a
single side in the hostilities, specifically those of Israel. Two forms of “activities” are
often objects of criticism toward Israel. One being Israeli military “activities” in
Palestinians territories. Military “activities” could be in the form of raids, roadblocks and
area closures all of which are considered by most UN member states as sources of
friction and counterproductive in the pursuit of peace. The second form of usage of the
word “activities” is often associated with Israel’s settlement “activities” which is a major
source of criticism of Israeli policies. Settlement “activities” are expressed in reference to
the expansion of existing Jewish settlements or the construction of new ones. Settlement
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“activity” has been considered by both opponents and friends of Israel as obstacles to
achieving peace. The use of the term typically indicates criticism of Israel hence a
negative factor, in the realm of Israeli diplomacy. See Appendix 2 for actual verbatim
examples of how each (selected) word is used either in positive and negative contexts in
comments made by Chinese envoys at the UN.
The sample words were cross-tabulated as part of a matrix. Three matrices were
produced. The first matrix features positive category words cross-referenced against
ambassador statements categorized by year dates. The second matrix features negative
category words cross-referenced against ambassador speeches categorized by year dates.
The third matrix displays a side-by-side comparison of aggregate frequency sums of
negative words vs. aggregate frequency sum of positive category words. Matrix results
are visualized in the form of 3D bar graphs as shown below. In this way, the selected
words whether projecting positive or negative notions can be observed for variance over
the span of the study period on a year-by-year basis.

POSITIVE WORDS

Figure 2 below displays the frequency use of positive words: peace, co-existence,
parties, constructive, process and negotiations. These words are typically used to express
softer attitudes towards Israel in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Table 1
(also below) offers a word frequency table displaying precise frequency numbers of
positive terms.
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Figure 2 - China Ambassador Positive Word Frequencies 1989 – 2014
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Table 1 - China Ambassador Positive Word Frequencies 1989 – 2014

The positive words generally infer steps to peacemaking implying a more
evenhanded approach towards all sides in the conflict. In figure 2, the word “peace” is
more prevalent in usage in the last decade. The words parties, constructive, process and
negotiations all follow the same patterns. The increase in usage of the word “peace”
perhaps most signifies a more conciliatory and less one-sided approach towards the
conflict. For example, this was the case in 2009 and 2014, when intense battles between
Israel and Hamas in Gaza erupted and raged for weeks, lending the need to use “peace”
in UN debates at higher frequencies. The expression “Peace” is directed at both parties
rather than solely at Israel alone. In that sense, it suggests a more equalized even handed
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approach. There was also, an increase in the frequency usage of the word “parties” also
most notably in 2009 and 2014.

NEGATIVE WORDS

Figure 3 below displays the frequency use of negative words: occupied, abuse,
rights, activities, aggression and brutal. These words are typically used to express critical
attitudes towards Israel in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Table 2 (also
below) offers a word frequency table displaying precise frequency numbers of terms.

Figure 3 China Ambassador Negative Word Frequencies 1989- 2014
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Table -2 - China Ambassador Negative Word Frequencies 1989-2014
A : OCCUPIED B : ABUSE C : RIGHTS D : ACTIVITIES E : AGGRESSION F : BRUTAL

1989 luye
1990 Li Daoyu
1991 Li Daoyu
1994 Li Zhaoxing
1995 Li Zhaoxing
1996 Qin Huasun
1997 Qin Huasun
1998 Qin Huasun
1999 Qin Huasun
2000 Wang Yingfan
2001 Wang Yingfan
2002 Wang Yingfan
2003 Wang
Guangya
2004 Wang
Guangya
2006 li Zhaoxing
2006 Wang
Guangya
2008 Zhang Yesui
2009 Zhang Yesui
2010 Baodong
2010 Zhang Yesui
2011 Baodong
2013 Baodong
2014 Jieyi
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The word “occupied” in figure 3 is often used to direct criticism towards Israel.
Israeli governments tend to reject the term “occupied” territories to describe the status of
lands it seized in the Arab-Israeli 1967 Six-Day War. The term “occupied” seems to be
used in equal proportions by Chinese representatives in the distant past and in more
recent years. However, a spike in the frequency usage of the word “occupied” is most
notable in 2009. This upsurge is likely due to debates generated by the new major round
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of fighting in 2009 between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. Battles started in late December
2008, but spilled into January 2009 before a ceasefire was reached. At that time, the
extent of damage and casualties emerged prompting charged deliberations. The same
overall word frequency pattern is echoed in 2014, albeit to a lesser extent, when the next
Israel-Gaza war unfolded. This suggests a less critical approach by China in 2014 at a
time when the Sino-Israeli relationship has shown signs of cooperation strengthening as
political instability spreads across the Middle East following the Arab Spring.
Figure 4 below shows a side-by-side comparison of the total sum of positive and negative
category word frequencies. For a word frequency table displaying precise frequency
numbers of terms see Appendix 3.
Figure 4 - China Ambassador Negative Vs. Positive Word Frequencies 1989 - 2014
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Figure 4 shows the frequency of both negative and positive category words has
increased in more recent times. However, interestingly, positive category word usage has
grown significantly more than usage of negative category words. Put differently, this
further enforces a suggestion of an overall trend of more balanced language by Chinese
representatives at the UN about the Palestinian conflict. However, this tendency does not
necessarily translate into actual policy shifts in the form of UN votes in support of Israel,
but does suggest willingness to abstain from harsh public criticism of the Jewish State.
As illustrated earlier, technology cooperation plays a significant role in
stimulating Sino-Israeli ties. The section below explores if the terms technology and
cooperation are dominant in conversations about relations between the two countries.
This was accomplished through an NVivo assisted analysis of tens of thousands of media
reports, each of which simultaneously referenced China and Israel in the period between
1989 and 2014. The captured media (press) textual data was classified (coded) by year of
publication. The classification was done to standardize time units of analysis like UN
speeches data and trade data, which are also sorted on year-by-year basis. The results of
the analysis are visualized in figure 5 below. For a word frequency table displaying
precise frequency numbers of terms see Appendix 4.
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Figure 5 - Israel-China Technology Word Frequencies 1988 – 2014

Figure 5 above shows the word frequencies “Israeli’, “technology” and
“cooperation”. The chart shows similar growth patterns from year to year for all 3 words.
As the word frequency of one term grows so does the usage of the other two words. This
pattern suggests a covariance between the terms “Israeli” and “technology” and “Israeli”
and “cooperation”. In other words, the more Israel is referenced in stories which include
text about China the more technology and cooperation are part of the conversation.
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TRADE – ISRAELI EXPORTS TO CHINA (DATA TRENDS)

Israeli exports to China are important outputs of Israeli diplomacy broadly
defined. Israel-China trade figures used here are sourced from Comtrade. Comtrade is the
UN trade-tracking organization used by individual UN member states themselves to
report on their own international commerce. Table 3 below shows Trade volumes in
yearly increments. Increased trade or export volumes from Israel to China is a central
indictor of robust ties between two states. The figures considered below are limited to
export flows from Israel. This approach is adopted since the focus of the dissertation
pertains to gains for Israel. Comtrade statistics cover 1995-2014; therefore, they do not
concur with full expanse of the study period (1989-2014) yet overlap enough to be
meaningful in gauging the vigor of bilateral ties. What follows are trade figures in table
form (table -3) and below in chart form (figure 6).
Table - 3
Year
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

UN Comtrade Trade – figures as reported by Israel

Trade Flow
Export
Export
Export
Export
Export
Export
Export
Export
Export
Export
Export
Export
Export
Export

Reporter
Israel
Israel
Israel
Israel
Israel
Israel
Israel
Israel
Israel
Israel
Israel
Israel
Israel
Israel

Partner
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
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Trade Value (US$)
84546000
82715000
71307000
129593000
190434000
261585000
349575000
426538000
612588000
786971000
747983000
958661000
1040682000
1293392000

2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014

Export
Export
Export
Export
Export
Export

Israel
Israel
Israel
Israel
Israel
Israel

China
China
China
China
China
China

1044572000
2046856000
2718198000
2758007000
2886195000
2792891000

Millions

Figure 6 - Israel Exports to China 1995-2014
$4,500.00
$4,000.00
$3,500.00
$3,000.00
$2,500.00
$2,000.00
$1,500.00
$1,000.00
$500.00
$0.00

Source: Comtrade (United Nations)

Figure 6 above generally demonstrates a strong growth in Israeli exports to China.
Growth is slow in the early years of formal relations but dramatically picks up pace in
more recent years. This upward trend indicates a tightening of ties, and contrasts previous
decades dominated by covert and/or informal interactions and the absence of formal
trade.
There are also noticeable dips in otherwise significant export growth in the years
1997, 2005 and 2009. It is unclear why there was a minor drop in 1997. However, an
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International Monetary Fund (IMF) report points to, an overall downturn in the global
economy in 1996, which it attributes to a financial slowdown in Asia. Also, in the
previous year China and US were at odds over large-scale Chinese military exercises in
the strait of Taiwan, and this may have curtailed Israeli exports. It should be noted that
Israeli foreign relations might be informally pegged to forms of quiet political directives
from Washington. In 2005, Israeli exports decreased, at that time Sino-Israeli relations
experienced tensions and political fallout as Israel was forced by the US to cancel a
crucial arms agreement with China. While exports figures displayed in the chart above do
not include armaments, the aborted deal with China may have negatively impacted the
flow of technologies, which are civilian in nature but which could be converted for
military applications. These are known as dual use technologies. The significant drop in
Israeli exports in 2009 seen in the chart above is likely associated with the worldwide
recession, which began the previous year and produced an overall international trade
slowdown.
One should take into account that actual trade volumes are likely significantly
higher than Comtrade numbers indicate. This is the case because Comtrade statistics are
based solely on member state reporting which exclude military commodities. Typically,
arms technology transfer flows and volumes are a sensitive matter for most states and
hence handled discreetly. International military sector deals have been notoriously
clandestine undertakings as part of secret partnerships. The Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) is a think tank devoted to the study of conflict,
armaments, arms control and disarmament. Interestingly, SIPRI has a presence in
Beijing. Through its website the research center points to an overall lack of transparency
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by states in the reporting of arms imports and exports. SIPRI specifically names China
and Israel as countries, which have never published reports on their international arms
transactions. Furthermore, SIPRI also points out that reporting on United Nations
Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) by member states has been consistently low.
However, the institute published independent statistics about Israeli military exports to
China. The following chart (figure 7) below was generated based on SIPRI assessments.
The chart begins in 1990 because this is the first year data was available Israeli military
transfers to China.

Figure 7 - Israeli Arms Transfers to China 1990-2014 (in millions of US dollars)

$350

$28 $28 $28 $28 $28 $28 $28 $28 $38 $38 $28 $28

Source: SIPRI
The chart clearly shows an abrupt end to Israeli military exports to China after
2001. This reflects Israel’s change of policy on arms transfers to China in the wake of
staunch US opposition. Since military transactions are typically shrouded in secrecy, it is
highly possible that SIPRI numbers do not tell the full story. In other words, actual
military exports could be even higher and extend beyond the years SIPRI data suggests.
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SINO-ISRAELI EXCHANGES

Another metric to gauge bilateral ties is mutual exchanges. Exchanges for the
purpose of this study are comprised of two components: mutual visits and bilateral
treaties. Visits are only considered here provided they are official state sanctioned events.
A list of visits was compiled based on information publically available on official Israeli
and Chinese Government on-line portals and publications. Exchange visits can be at any
government level, like national, provincial, or municipal, or of other kinds, like academic
exchanges. Only exchange visits officially publicized either by Chinese or Israeli
government sources are considered. Furthermore, a visit exchange event is considered a
single occurrence regardless of how many meeting encounters take place. For example, if
an official met just one or more counterparts on a single visit, the exchange would still be
registered as a singular event. The second component of the exchange metric is the
number of bilateral agreements. The mutual exchanges metric quantity is determined by
adding the number of exchange visits plus the number of treaties on an annual basis. See
Appendix 4 for complete list of exchanges (visits and treaties). Figure 8, below displays
number of exchanges.
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Figure 8 – Israel-China Number of Exchanges (Visits and Treaties) 1991 -2014

Sources: Ministry of Foreign Affairs People’s Republic of China and Israel Ministry of
Foreign Affairs
Figure 8 shows there have been up and down fluctuations in the number of
exchanges from year to year, but overall there has been a rise in the number of exchanges
since the start of formal relations in 1992. A surge in the number of exchanges happened
in the years immediately following establishment of relations. The chart also shows
significant drops in the number of exchanges during and after 2000. At this time, the US
forced Israel into cancelling the Phalcon Airborne Early Warning System to China. As
mentioned earlier, the cancellation damaged Israel's credibility in the eyes of China’s
policymakers. In 2005 another arms agreement between China and Israel was cancelled
under US pressure -- this time the upgrade of Israeli made drones. In 2007, the number of
exchanges surged coinciding with Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s visit to Beijing in a bid

156

to repair and boost bilateral ties by resetting the trajectory of the relationship from
military to civilian centered technology transfers.

TECHNOLOGY FACTOR (INDEPENDENT VARIABLE)

BEFORE D IPLOMATIC RELATIONS TIMELINE

As we have seen in the sections above, overall Sino-Israeli ties have generally
grown by way of expanded trade and bilateral exchanges. Also noted, is a trend of softer
diplomatic tone by Chinese representatives in the UN. Namely, a more balanced stance
on issues concerning the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Furthermore, analysis of media
materials over the last few decades revealed that as ties between Israel and China
strengthened, the frequency of the word “technology” in news coverage also rose. The
positive covariance between the growth of bilateral ties and the use of technology at the
very least implies technology is a principal topic in conversations about Israel – China
ties. Nevertheless, how does this relate to the main research question of this study?
To further explore the suggestion of a possible tie in, however loose, between
technology transfers and the strength of Sino-Israeli relations, the study considers a series
of timelines, which illustrate how technology and knowledge sharing occurrences are key
milestones in the advancement of Sino-Israeli ties. Figure 9 below shows how early
contacts between the two countries primarily revolved around technology issues. For
example, as noted earlier, in 1975 at a time when China began to open itself to the
outside world, it also conveyed interest in the Israeli Pavilion at the Paris Airshow which
featured mostly military hardware. The Chinese delegation visit to the pavilion set the
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stage for a string of future contacts in the form of quiet military and technology centered
cooperation dialogues.
Figure 9 – Narrative Timeline 1975-1979
1975 Chinese Delegation Visits
Israeli Pavillion at Paris
Airshow

Secret Sino-Israeli Military Meetings
Late 70s Increased Chinese Interest
in Israel’s Developmental and
Security Experiences
Late 70s Israeli Arms
Industry Delegation in
China

1979 Discreet Israel China Commercial
Links Begin

In the following decade and the years leading to full formal ties (see Figure 10),
contacts between the two countries rose to a new level. It is interesting to note that the
first face-to-face high-level encounter between officials from Israel and China was
distinctively technology related. In 1985, the Science Ministers of the two countries
met at a conference in the US. Such informal contacts were perhaps stepping stones
leading to a series of technical meetings in the mid to late 80s and beyond. The secret
visit of a Chinese delegation to Israel in 1985 to discuss joint venture prospects is one
example.
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Figure 10 – Narrative Timeline 1985-1987

1985 first Sino -Israeli Ministerial
Meeting (Science Ministers)

Mid 80s Indirect Cooperation in Agriculture
1985 Chinese Delegation in Israel
for Joint Technology Projects
(Agriculture and Robotics )
Mid 80s China Seeks Israeli Batttle
Experience Against Soviet-Made
Arms.
1987 China Imports Israeli Technologies

1987 Israeli Government Company (Copeco )
established and foster commercial with China
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The opening of The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities Office in Beijing
just ahead of the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1992 is another example (see
Figure 11).

Figure 11 – Narrative Timeline 1991-1992

1991The Israel Academy of
Sciences and Humanities Office
Opens in Beijing

1991 Chinese Tourist Office
Opens inTel Aviv

1992 Embassies Open in Tel
Aviv and Beijing Full Diplomatic
Relations

AFTER START OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

Following the establishment of full diplomatic ties in 1992, Sino-Israel technical
cooperation flourished. During the first decade of formal ties from the early 90s into the
early 2000s military and agricultural ties swelled. During this time span the increase of
military technology transfers propelled Israel into becoming a significant armaments
supplier to the PRC. The period also marks the introduction of visible larger scale
cooperation in agriculture. In 1993, just a year after the start of formal ties the first Sino-
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Israeli demonstration farm went into operation (see timeline figure 12 below). As a full
working farm, it features local adaptations based on the Israeli agricultural experience.

Figure 12 – Narrative Timeline 1992-2000
1992 Embassies Open in Tel Aviv
and Beijing Full Diplomatic
Relations

1993 Chinese-Israeli Agriculture Training Center
1990s (mid and late 90’s) sale
of Israeli Harpy drones to
China

Israel was China’s second largest
source of military aviation
technology in 1990s

1996 Sino Israel Demonstration farm Beijing

Early 2000s, States forced
Israel to give up two
important military deals,
military technology had
been the main Israeli
export

2000 Phalco Military Plane Deal Cancel

Moving forward into the middle of the 1990s the Jewish State increased transfers of
aviation specific military technology to the PRC. During this period official trade
statistics (UN/Comtrade) became available as shown in figure 13 below.
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Figure 13 – Israel Exports to China 1995-2000

Trade Value ($US Millions)

300
250
200
150
100
50
0
1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

So while Israeli transfers activities increase generally, volumes of Israeli commercial
exports to China too echo a clear upward trend.
Also, bilateral exchanges in the way of number of treaties and visits largely
showed an upturn during the initial honeymoon period of diplomatic relations (see figure
14 below). While levels of exchanges fluctuated in the mid 1990s they did so at higher
activity levels when compared to levels at the start of formal ties. However, a downturn
trend unfolds towards the year 2000--a time of crisis as Israel backed out of the Phalcon
early warning surveillance arms deal.
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Figure 14 – Israel-China Number of Exchanges (Visits and Treaties) 1991 - 2000

7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1991199219931994199519961997199819992000

Furthermore, in the same time span we see in figure 15 below an overall increase
of balanced language usage by Chinese representatives during UN debates on the Israeli Palestinian conflict. The chart illustrates a higher frequency of positive terms vs. negative
terms as defined earlier. While the language used is not devoid of criticism towards
Israel. it occurred at lower tones and generally avoided exclusively singling Israel out for
direct blame in conflict actions.
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Figure 15 - China Ambassador Negative vs. Positive Word Frequencies 1991 - 2000

Nevertheless, Israeli military technology transfers to China began to slow after the
early 2000s as American objections to weapon flows to the PRC hardened. As the
movement of armaments declined, cooperation in agriculture tended to pick up as new
Sino-Israeli demo farms begin to operate in 2001and 2003 (see figure 16 below)
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Figure 16 – Narrative Timeline 2000-2003

Until Early 2000s, Military
Technology Was Main Israeli
Export
2001 Sino-Israeli Diary Demonstration Farm
Near Beijing Opens
Early &Mid 2000s US Obliged Israel
to Dial back and Terminate Deals
2002 Sino-Israeli
Demonstration and
Training Center for
Agriculture in Xinjiang
Uygur Autonomous

2003 Israel Suspends Military Export
Contacts with China

Conversely, during this period Israeli commercial exports to China demonstrate
impressive gains as exhibited in figure 17 below.
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Figure 17 – Israel Exports to China 2000-2003
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There was also a temporary surge in bilateral exchanges in 2002 as shown in
Figure 18 below.
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Figure 18 – Israel-China Number of Exchanges (Visits and Treaties) 2000 - 2003
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Furthermore, in the same period between 2001and 2003 language usage
tendencies by Chinese officials at the UN shown in figure 19 below continue to support a
more balanced stance on the Israeli - Palestinian conflict. Note a higher frequency of
positive terms than negative terms in the chart below.
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Figure 19 - China Ambassador Negative vs. Positive Word Frequencies 2000 - 2003

In the mid-2000s Israel’s cancellation of the planned upgrade of Harpy drones for
the PRC introduced tensions into bilateral relations. This happened as American pressure
to halt Israeli military exports to China mounted as displayed in figure 20 below. In 2011,
the outbreak of the Arab Spring spread worrisome political and military instability across
the Middle East, putting Chinese interests at risks. The unrest spurred re-assessment in
Beijing about its ties in the region and with Israel. By this time in 2011, tensions between
China and Israel over cancelled arms deals have subsided, and Chinese policy makers
sought to learn whatever possible about the changing dynamics in the region and
considered ties with Israel to be of significance in this endeavor.
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Figure 20 – Narrative Timeline 2005 - 2011

2005 Harpy Drone Crisis
2005 US Pressures Israel to Kill Arms Dealings
with China

2011 Arab Spring Triggers
Instability Across the Middle
East
2011 China Seeks Israel’s knowledge about the
Middle East

2011 Sino-Israel Global Network &
Academic Leadership (SIGNAL) Begins

The cancellations of arms sales to China at the request of the US generated
resentment in Beijing triggering a waning of relations. During this time Israeli
commercial exports generally rise but as figure 21 below also shows there was a slight
trade slowdown coinciding with a height of friction between Israel and China in 2005.
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Figure 21 – Israel Exports to China Trade 2004 - 2011
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In 2006, a year after the Harpy arms crisis, bilateral exchanges dipped but
rebounded in 2007, see figure 22 below. The jump in 2007 exchanges is not entirely
surprising considering 2 years passed since the Harpy crisis and as the political fallout
settled, a heightened need for high-level meetings emerged to mend trouble spots and
promote new directions in the relationship. In 2007, Israeli Prime Minister Olmert
traveled to China. On the occasion of his visit, the Prime Minister announced the
establishment of the China-Israel National Fund for Investment in hi-tech R&D. The
initiative is further testimony to the transformation in technical ties between the two
countries from armaments to civilian centered technologies. Bilateral exchanges

170

experience a rise in 2011 with the onset of the Arab Spring and with it mounting
uncertainty for Chinese interests in the Middle East. Also in 2011 is the notable first visit
of the Chief of the Chinese Military to Israel. General Chen Bingde’s visit to discuss
defense cooperation was not necessarily in contradiction with a change in Israeli policy
about the cessation of technology transfers to the Chinese military. Defense cooperation
also entails non-technology (hardware) transfers like intelligence sharing.

Figure 22 – Israel-China Number of Exchanges (Visits and Treaties) 2004 - 2011
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Furthermore, in the same period from 2004 to 2011 the frequency of positive
terms (softer on Israel) heavily outweigh the frequency of negative terms in China’s
language at the UN regarding debates on the Israeli - Palestinian conflict. As illustrated in
figure 23 below this suggests a decreased emphasis by China solely on Israel’s faults in
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the dispute with the Palestinians. This trend is even maintained (but to a lesser extent) in
2006 in the immediate aftermath of the Harpy deal withdrawal the number of both
positive and negative words used remain steady but at lower levels than in later years.

Figure 23 - China Ambassador Negative vs. Positive Word Frequencies 2004 - 2011

Beyond 2011, China’s renewed interest in Israel reinforces bi-lateral ties in the
form of joint academic and non - technology ventures see figure 24 below. In 2012 the
cornerstone was laid for Sino-Israeli Technology Park planned in Dongguan, South
China. In 2013 The Israel Institute of Technology (Technion) opens the first Israeli
University Campus (The Guangdong Technion-Israel Institute of Technology (GTIIT) in
Shantou, in the Guangdong province of southeastern China.) The new university is a
result of collaboration between the Technion and Shantou University.
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Figure 24 – Narrative Timeline 2011 to 2014

2011 Israel Studies at Chinese
Universities

2011 China’s Ministry of Education recognizes Israel as
an Area of Study Eligible for State Funding.

2012 Sino-Israeli Technology Parks in
Dongguan,South China

2013 First Ever China-Israel Strategic Studies
Conference in Israel Keynote Speaker Chinese Foreigin
Minister

2013 Israel Institute of Technology
(Technion) and Shantou University
joint Technical and Academic
Venture in Guangdong Province

2014

During this period from 2012- 2014 Israeli exports to the PRC demonstrate a
steady upward as show in figure 25.
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Export Value in Millions

Figure 25 – Israel Exports to China Trade 2012 - 2014
$2,900

$2,850

$2,800

$2,750

$2,700

$2,650
2012

2013

2014

The number of bilateral exchanges in this time frame is significantly higher in
comparison to previous periods in Sino-Israel relations as shown by figure 26-- a
testament to the increased technical cooperation.
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Figure 26 – Israel-China Number of Exchanges (Visits and Treaties) 2012 - 2014
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Furthermore, in the same period we see in figure 27 below that overall China’s
language at the UN with regard to the Israeli - Palestinian conflict maintains a higher
frequency of positive terms (softer on Israel) than negative terms. As mentioned, this
trend takes place at the same time as an increase in technical collaboration. There were no
Chinese UN Ambassador statements found (within the defined negative and positive
word criteria) in 2012, hence the year is not represented in figure 27.
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Figure 27 - China Ambassador Negative vs. Positive Word Frequencies 2013 - 2014

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The chapter considered how China’s history, geography, political and economic
systems, and national vulnerabilities tie into the development and growth of Sino-Israeli
relations. In doing so, it explored historical milestones in Sino-Israeli relations drawing
on a host of primary and secondary sources. Through a string of expert interviews, review
of the literature, examination of UN documents, and an examination of media reports
spanning decades. The chapter outlined the mostly sluggish and secretive progress
towards full diplomatic relations, but also sketched the ebb and flow of bilateral ties after
the exchange of embassies in 1992.
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After the death of Chairman Mao and the rise of new leadership in the 1970s, the
PRC embarked on far-reaching political and economic reforms. China’s new leaders
shied away from orthodox communist principles while pushing to modernize key sectors
like agriculture, military and science/technology. In the process, a gradual shift from a
centralized to a mixed market economy was introduced. The changes aimed to help
advance the country’s competitiveness in the emerging global economy and boost
standards of living. As the PRC’s development accelerated, policymakers in Beijing
sought ways to improve China’s technological capabilities and grapple with on-going
challenges like how to boost food production and modernize an aging military. To that
end, China opened itself to wider international engagement, and decision makers in
Beijing began to look outward to the international community for new technologies and
techniques. At the same time, Israeli leaders strove to establish new contacts beyond
traditional allies in the West, and turned eastwards to Asia.
Israel’s ongoing campaign to minimize its political isolation coupled with Chinese
interest in Israeli experiences and technologies in specialized areas like agriculture and
military affairs created a pathway to bring the two countries closer. Technical
cooperation became a cornerstone of covert contacts, which eventually transformed into
open dialogue and then advancing to full formal ties. Since the opening of embassies in
Beijing and Tel Aviv, there has been significant growth in terms of bilateral exchanges,
trade and cooperation in important sectors. However, hiccups in Sino-Israeli relations in
the form of political tussles stemming from aborted arms deals created doubt in China
about Israel’s ability to keep future commitments without Washington’s approval.
Overall, long-term relations were not harmed as exports in military hardware were cut
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and civilian commerce increased. Israel is a relatively small trading partner for China.
However, China offers Israel access to huge markets and a sea of capital for Israeli hitech firms and institutions. Israel has not significantly impacted the PRC’s support for the
Palestinian cause in international arenas like the UN, but enjoys strong broad cooperation
with China independent of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. China’s United Nations voting
records of the last few decades confirm a general pro-Palestinian stance. Some scholars
maintain there has been little or no change in China’s official political policy towards
Israel despite growing technical ties. However, there have been subtle but noticeable
changes in terms of diplomatic rhetoric about the Palestinian Israeli conflict. Namely,
more moderate tones expressed by Chinese representatives at the UN. In more recent
years, the PRC appears to be less vocal in outright condemnation of Israel and instead
express more middle-of-the-road balanced statements. Generally, China, supports Israel’s
right to defend itself but with reservations or at times expressing opposition to excessive
violence.
As demonstrated above, technology has played a central role in all stages of SinoIsraeli relations. The chapter sought to investigate a possible link between technical
cooperation in the form of technology transfers as factors in bolstering Sino-Israeli
diplomatic ties broadly defined (trade, exchanges & policy towards Israel and the Middle
East).
As mentioned, technical ties have generally not produced outright official policy
changes in the case of Sino-Israeli relations with regard to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
However, it would be difficult to deny that technical engagement with China has not
produced tangible worthy gains for Israel. On the contrary, data trends and NVivo
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assisted content analysis infer that technology transfer engagements have helped create
settings which promote bilateral dialogue, collaboration, increasing commerce as well as
more moderated rhetoric towards Israel.
Also, it was postulated at the start of this chapter that specified intervening
variables could perhaps foster or impede the vitality of connections between the
independent (technology transfer) and dependent variables (trade, exchanges and policies
towards Israeli Palestinian conflict). What follows is a synopsis of how the intervening
variables played a role Sino-Israeli relations:

•

Technology transfer addresses priorities. The PRC has sought ways to boost
agricultural/food output while combatting water scarcity and desertification.
These issues have spurred Chinese interest in the Israeli agricultural experience
producing a myriad of contacts and collaborations with Israel

•

Security/military/terror threats. Here too China looked to Israel’s experience in
intelligence sharing, experience fighting Soviet armaments and accessing
advanced military hardware.

•

Access to the US through Israeli channels. There is no evidence suggesting this
intervening factor is a significant variable on the political plane in Sino-Israeli
relations. However, ties with Israel may have helped boost Beijing’s access to
influential leaders in the American Jewish Business Community.

•

Geo-Political Shifts. This refers to issues like the change of Chinese leadership
after the death of Chairman Mao, border tensions with the Soviet Union, Cold
War dynamics, Middle East interests, the overall Arab-Israeli conflict, the Israeli-
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Palestinian conflict, and Arab Spring. All of these have either hindered ties or
opened opportunities for contacts between China and Israel. For example, the
1956 Sinai War froze any potential progress towards formal ties. On the other
hand, concerns about upheavals in the Middle East in the wake of the Arab Spring
uprisings prompted China to look for ways to reduce risk and diversify its
interests in the region through the rejuvenation of ties with Israel.

Technology and knowledge ties have been central drivers in Sino-Israeli relations.
The Israeli experience in security and agriculture was crucial in helping to open bilateral
contact opportunities. In that sense, it can be argued that Israeli technology offerings
were and are sources of attraction to Israel in the context of Nye’s soft power.
The next chapter examines the impact of technical ties in the case of Israel’s
relationship with China’s neighbor and principal nuclear rival, India.
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APPENDIX 1
1000 most frequently used words in debates on Israeli-Palestinian conflict at UN
Word

Count

Peace
Middle
Israel
Palestinian
China
International
Palestine
Security
Council
Community
Israeli
Process
Situation
Parties

490
347
308
287
280
267
266
224
222
188
188
159
158
150

Question
People
Chinese
Efforts
Concerned
Talks
Humanitarian
United
Nations
Conflict
Violence
Settlement
Political
General
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147
144
140
125
123
104
102
99
97
92
90
82
79
76

Resolution
Support
Occupied
Resolutions
Region
Secretary
Government
Relevant
Civilians
Negotiations
Continue
Solution
Issue
Rights

76
72
71
70
69
64
62
62
61
59
58
58
54
54

Sides
Achieve
Possible
Territories
Early
Spoke
Including
Promote
Comprehensive
Force
State
Lasting
Countries
States
Jerusalem
Thank
Lebanon
Military
President
Order
Basis
Casualties
National
Syria
Always
Independent
Action
Since
Stability
Development
Assistance
Create
Measures
Principle
Conditions
Necessary
Actions
Concern
Current
Innocent
Meeting
Delegation
Representative
Towards
Adopted
Exercise
Recent
Resumption
Supports
Immediately
Mutual
Cause
Ceasefire
Draft

53
52
52
52
51
51
50
47
46
46
46
45
44
44
43
43
42
42
42
41
40
39
39
39
38
38
37
37
37
36
35
35
35
35
34
34
33
31
31
31
31
30
30
30
29
29
29
29
29
28
28
27
27
27

However
Interests
Promoting
Right
Activities
Deeply
Initiative
Restraint
Statement
Civilian
Dialogue
Forward
Human
Legitimate
Serious
Settlements
Syrian
Territory
Among
Palestinians
Progress
Resume
Today
Achieving
Authorities
Briefing
Month
Strip
Tension
Express
Present
Violent
Constructive
Crisis
Critical
Effective
Fully
Implement
Interpretation
Particular
Peaceful
Positive
Welcome
Avoid
Convention
Escalation
Negotiation
Quartet
Responsibility
Taken
World
Already
Believe
Geneva
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27
27
27
27
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26
26
26
26
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
24
24
24
24
24
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22
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
19
19
19

Issues
Members
Minister
Occupation
Provide
Sovereignty
Special
Cease
Common
Conducive
Effort
Ensure
Hopes
Immediate
Important
Maintain
Maintaining
Reasonable
Recently
Respect
Statements
Trust
Years
Blockade
Bring
Caused
Continued
Developments
Foreign
Grave
Greater
Remains
Respond
Tensions
Achievement
Affairs
Authority
Conference
Convening
Listened
Proposal
Reconstruction
Regional
Still
Active
Adopt
Arafat
Committed
Condemn
Continues
Cycle
Establish
Favour
Great

19
19
19
19
19
19
19
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
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17
17
17
17
17
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17
17
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15

Implementation
Large
Peoples
Practical
Ready
Regard
Remain
Report
Safety
Seriously
Supported
Together
Appeal
Country
Differences
Difficult
Establishment
First
Following
Fundamental
Ground
Means
Observer
Resolve
Yingfan
Actively
Approach
Attacks
Border
Coexistence
Conflicts
Effectively
Juncture
Lebanese
Living
Number
Permanent
Relations
Strongly
Suffering
Welcomes
Withdraw
Yesui
Zhang
Achieved
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Aimed
Based
Basic
Borders
Building
Calls
Consideration
Contribute
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Cooperation
Crossings
Economic
Especially
Heavy
Importance
League
Mediation
Mission
Ongoing
Prevent
Property
Return
Separation
Settle
Steps
Troops
Abide
Agencies
Assembly
Attention
Closely
Concerns
Consultations
Debate
Easing
Egypt
Emergency
Entire
Guarantee
Integrity
Major
Opportunity
Party
Point
Reconciliation
Refrain
Residents
Status
Strengthen
Suicide
Territorial
Therefore
Vicious
Brought
Completely
Confrontation
Construction
Disputes
Envoy
Favourable
Finding
Forces
Israelis
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Jieyi
Jordan
Leaders
Meetings
Obstacles
Particularly
Place
Presidency
Proposed
Reach
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Southern
Sympathy
Urgency
Access
Armed
Become
Capital
Carefully
Carry
Change
Charter
Circumstances
Confidence
Consensus
Consider
Demonstrate
Difficulties
Existence
Expresses
Firmly
Fourth
Given
History
Honour
Implemented
Independence
Jewish
Normal
Oppose
Outbreak
Pointed
Position
Principles
Problem
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Regret
Relief
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Result
Results
Solidarity
Struggle
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Terrorism
Unacceptable
Unremitting
Agreements
Alleviate
Ambassador
Another
Appreciation
Attentively
Bombings
Build
Causing
Children
Clashes
Condemns
Consistent
Cooperate
Currently
Deadlock
December
Demonstrated
Deterioration
Escalate
Essential
Establishing
Excessive
Facilitate
Faith
Hatred
Incidents
Instead
Lives
Manner
Occupying
Opposes
Plight
Presence
Realization
Reason
Recommendations
Reflects
Representatives
Restore
Settling
Spirit
Stage
Strictly
Taking
Targeted
Thanks
Threat
Three
Understanding
Unity

9
9
9
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8

Urgent
Whole
Wishes
Without
Annan
Appeals
Assumption
Atrocities
Break
Carried
Commitments
Consistently
Contribution
Decision
Demands
Diplomatic
Direct
Ending
Enhance
Extremely
Future
Hostilities
Huasun
Impasse
Intensify
Interest
Making
Materials
Might
Movement
Needs
Obligations
Operation
Overall
Population
Positively
Presidential
Problems
Profound
Promoted
Proposals
Reality
Regrettably
Resuming
Scale
Sincerely
Solve
Strive
Strong
Submitted
Summit
Tense
Undermine
Various
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8
8
8
8
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7

Violation
Vision
Advance
Aggravate
Aligned
Allow
Along
Attitude
Baodong
Bears
Behalf
Bound
Chairman
Comply
Condemnation
Continuing
Crucial
Dangerous
Decided
Demand
Deteriorate
Direction
Engage
Enjoy
Events
Excellency
Factions
Follow
Freeze
Improve
Internal
Invasion
Jinping
Liberation
Massive
Matter
Momentum
Nowhere
Obstacle
Offices
Option
Organization
Organs
Outstanding
Personal
Primary
Priority
Remained
Represent
Represents
Resolutely
Respective
Resulted
Resulting

7
7
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6

Secondly
Seeking
Seize
Sensitive
Sincere
Sovereign
Successful
Suppression
Thirdly
Tireless
Track
Ultimate
Urges
Urging
Victims
Violate
Within
Women
Words
Worked
Yesterday
Adhere
Appreciate
Appreciates
Appropriate
Arduous
Areas
Aspiration
Assume
Atmosphere
Auspices
Believed
Bloody
Called
Causes
Challenge
Choice
Clear
Clearly
Close
Commitment
Complicated
Concerted
Congratulate
Connection
Coordination
Correct
Course
Created
Decades
Demonstrates
Deputy
Earnest
Eased

6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

Expressed
February
Final
Fourthly
Frequent
Gravely
Greatly
Group
Guangya
Highly
Houses
Impartial
Imperative
Indignation
Initiatives
Intensified
Joint
Leader
Leading
Maintained
March
Meanwhile
Moment
Nation
Opposed
Outset
Overcome
Participation
Pascoe
Points
Policy
Power
Press
Proper
Provided
Realistic
Recognize
Regrettable
Reiterate
Repeatedly
Request
Require
Resistance
Resolving
Respected
Response
Responsibilities
Restored
Restrictions
Second
Sense
September
Session
Several
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5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

Severe
Shoulder
Spite
Success
Suffered
Supplies
Table
Third
Transition
Trend
Viable
Vigorously
Violated
Violations
Volatile
Willing
Worried
Acceptable
Accordance
Address
Advancing
Agreement
Annex
Aspirations
Attaches
Balanced
Blind
Bloodshed
Brutal
Cherish
Communiqué
Concluded
Condemned
Condolences
Consequences
Consolidate
Constitutes
Contrary
Conventions
Convinced
Courage
Deployment
Despite
Destruction
Determination
Detrimental
Dignified
Earnestly
Easily
Emphasized
Engaged
Ensuring
Equally
Escalating

5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

Established
Every
Exacerbate
Expand
Extend
Extensive
Families
Founding
Framework
Freedom
Fulfill
Functions
Helping
House
Hussein
Increasingly
Influence
Instability
Interim
Investigations
Jenin
Latest
Launched
Launching
Leads
Losses
Maintenance
Mandate
Maximum
Million
Negotiated
Nevertheless
Norms
Observers
Occasions
Opening
Opposition
Outcome
Playing
Pragmatic
Presiding
Proactive
Proceed
Prolonged
Prompt
Protect
Provisions
Pushing
Questions
Rather
Received
Recognized
Refugee
Related

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

Relative
Relaunching
Release
Renounce
Repeated
Restart
Restarting
Rockets
Saddened
Safeguard
Series
Shared
Shown
Stalled
Stand
Stood
Strategic
Subject
Suffer
Swift
Tracks
Unanimously
Unfettered
Using
Utmost
Views
Voted
Weeks
Withdrawal
Witnessed
Working
Accept
Accord
Adopting
Adoption
Affected
Agenda
Aggravated
Aggression
Algeria
Applicability
April
Assist
Assistant
Attacked
Beginning
Belief
Benefit
Bigger
Breakthrough
Bringing
Camps
Capacity
Century
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4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

Cessation
Chamber
Choices
Cities
Collective
Complex
Comprehensively
Concrete
Conduct
Confronted
Congratulations
Consultation
Contacts
Continuation
Contributions
Convened
Coordinator
Coudcil
Counter
Countering
Damage
Daoyu
Death
Deaths
Declaration
Delay
Deliver
Delivery
Demanding
Demolition
Demonstrating
Deserve
Desire
Disengagement
Dispatch
Document
Donors
Durable
Either
Elapsed
Eliminate
Encourage
Endorsed
Enormous
Environment
Equal
Erroneous
Escalated
Ethnic
Eventually
Exacerbation
Exert
Exist
Expansion

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

Expectations
Expeditiously
Expressing
Expression
Extreme
Facilitating
Failure
Feltman
Fifthly
Finally
Flexible
Focus
Forms
Found
Friendly
Gravity
Grief
Halted
Hardship
Heart
Historical
Holding
Hostility
Hotspot
Illegal
Importantly
Inalienable
Include
Included
Inclusive
Increase
Internationally
Introduced
Involved
January
Justice
Killed
Killing
Killings
Lands
Majority
Marked
Member
Message
Months
Moral
Moreover
Negative
Neighbor

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

Nepal
Object
Objectives
Obstructions
Occurred
October
Operations
Opinion
Organizations
Partners
Patience
Persist
Persons
Played
Players
Please
Policies
Practices
Preside
Pressing
Prime
Prisoners
Promptly
Protracted
Providing
Realized
Recognition
Reduce
Refused
Reiterating
Religious
Remove
Repressive
Requires
Returning
Rigid
River
Rocket
Round
Satisfactory
Separately
Serry
Setback
Setbacks
Settled
Sharm
Sheikh
Shocked
Shoulders
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3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

Shows
Siege
Signal
Significance
Smoothly
Solutions
Source
Specific
Stalemate
Statehood
Stopped
Strengthened
Strict
Stronger
Subjected
Supporting
Sustained
Synergy
Terrorist
Throughout
Tinian
Tranquility
Twelfth
Unconditionally
Unfortunately
Union
Unresolved
Uphold
Uprising
Violating
Visit
Visited
Whereby
Worse
Wounded
Yugoslavia
Zhaoxing
Abbas
Abuse
Accomplishment
Account
Accountable
Acquire
Activity
Addresses
Advancement
Advocated
Aggressive
Agree

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

APPENDIX 2
Verbatim samples positive and negative word category entries.

Positive Category
“Peace”
Ambassador Liu Jieyi at UN (2014)
“Meanwhile, the legitimate security concerns of Israel should be addressed. Peace and
security should be enjoyed and maintained by both Palestine and Israel”
“Palestine and Israel live next to each other as neighbors. Peace between them will
therefore require goodwill from both sides.”
“Coexistence”
Ambassador Li Zhaoxing at UN (1995)
The Declaration of Principles signed by the PLO and Israel at the end of 1993 marked a
breakthrough in the Middle East peace process. It was an important step towards a
comprehensive and just peace in the Middle East and towards harmonious coexistence
between the Arab and Jewish nations. It has paved the way for a final, comprehensive,
just and lasting settlement of the conflict between Palestine and Israel.
“Parties”
Ambassador Zhang Yesui at UN (2009)
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“Israelis should enjoy equal rights to survival and personal security. We oppose any
violence against civilians and urge the parties concerned to comply with international
humanitarian law and human rights conventions.”
“Constructive”
Ambassador Li Baodong at UN (2011)
“China supports all efforts aimed at facilitating the Middle East peace process and will
continue to play a positive and constructive role in promoting the achievement of a
comprehensive, lasting and just peace in the Middle East.”
“Process”
Ambassador Zhang Yesui at UN (2009)
“We call on the international community to make vigorous efforts for the peace process,
push for a just and equitable settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian issue and work towards
real and enduring peace in the area.”
“Negotiations”
Ambassador Li Baodong at UN (2010)
“China maintains, as always, that political negotiations are the only way to solve the
Middle East question. We support negotiations between Palestine and Israel so that they
can live side by side in peace as two States.”
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Negative Categories
“Occupied”
Ambassador Mr. Li Baodong at UN (2010)
“The humanitarian situation in the occupied Palestinian territory, and the Gaza Strip in
particular, remains grim. Israel’s blockade has inflicted great suffering on more than 1
million residents of Gaza, whose rights to life and development have been gravely
violated”
“Abuse”
Ambassador Liu Jieyi at UN (2014)
“In spite of repeated calls by the international community, Israel has continued with its
large-scale aerial bombardment against Gaza and has launched a ground invasion into
Gaza, resulting in heavy civilian casualties, including women and children. China is
deeply concerned and grief-stricken at this development. China condemns all abuse of
force, whatever the excuse.”
“Rights”
Ambassador Wang Yingfan at UN (2002)
“Such acts have also seriously violated the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people
and have led to a grave humanitarian situation”
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Activities
Ambassador Li Baodong at UN (2013)
“China has consistently rejected Israel’s settlement activities in the occupied Palestinian
territories, including East Jerusalem and the West Bank.”
“Brutal”
Ambassador Wang Yingfan at UN (2002)
“Such acts of violence must be condemned. However, to the world’s great dismay, the
humanitarian tragedy caused by the Israeli army’s brutal military attacks continue”
“Aggression”
Ambassador Li Luye at UN (1987)
“The Israeli government should change its erroneous policy and go along with the trend
of historical development and demonstrate the necessary political will to convene an
international conference aimed at achieved a just and lasting of the middle east question
including the issue which is at its heart, the question of Palestine. Continued
intransigence and an obstinate clinging to its stand of aggression and occupation will
lead no where”
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APPENDIX 3
AGGREGATE WORD FREQUENCY COUNTS IN NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE
CATEGORIES BY CHINESE AMBASSADORS AT UN

UN Ambassadors
1989 luye
1990 Li Daoyu
1991 Li Daoyu
1994 Li Zhaoxing
1995 Li Zhaoxing
1996 Qin Huasun
1997 Qin Huasun
1998 Qin Huasun
1999 Qin Huasun
2000 Wang Yingfan
2001 Wang Yingfan
2002 Wang Yingfan
2003 Wang Guangya
2004 Wang Guangya
2006 li Zhaoxing
2006 Wang Guangya
2008 Zhang Yesui
2009 Zhang Yesui
2010 Li Baodong
2010 Zhang Yesui
2011 Li Baodong 2011
2013 Li Baodong 2013
2014 Liu Jieyi

A:
POSITIVE
3

B:
NEGATIVE
8

16

13

2

2

12

4

27

1

31

0

41

1

9

0

16

2

37

4

47

2

48

13

20

2

8

0

26

0

27

0

12

2

169

45

63

11

20

1

36

3

27

6

163

13
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APPENDIX 4
WORD FREQUENCY ISRAELI/TECHNOLOGY/COOPERATION

1 : 1988
2 : 1989
3 : 1990
4 : 1991
5 : 1992
6 : 1993
7 : 1994
8 : 1995
9 : 1996
10 : 1997
11 : 1998
12 : 1999
13 : 2000
14 : 2001
15 : 2002
16 : 2003
17 : 2004
18 : 2005
19 : 2006
20 : 2007
21 : 2008
22 : 2009
23 : 2010
24 : 2011
25 : 2012
26 : 2013
27 : 2014

A : ISRAELI

B : TECHNOLOGY

C : COOPERATION

1083

264

77

703

280

51

956

315

95

973

409

77

1628

887

100

1085

459

90

1106

417

92

1046

618

89

1543

410

139

1537

521

121

1900

1015

179

1454

865

112

3521

1793

325

3365

1040

336

3502

1182

242

2800

857

249

3760

1189

247

4288

1690

645

10847

3784

3013

6317

2178

1703

7439

2373

1180

7751

2273

1749

9502

3836

2072

7961

3433

2754

10889

3271

2235

9169

3796

2417

13387

3909

2986

APPENDIX 5 OFFICIAL (STATE SANCTIONED) EXCHANGES (VISITS AND TREATIES)
Sources: (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs People’s
Republic of China, Embassy People’s Republic of China in Israel, Embassy of the State
of Israel in China
2014 Visits
Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Ming Meets with Israeli Delegation of Young Diplomats
Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Yesui Meets Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Hanegbi
Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Ming Meets with Former Prime Minister Barak of Israel
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China's Special Envoy on the Middle East Issue Wu Sike Visits Israel
Liu Yandong Meets President Peres and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
Xi Jinping Meets President Shimon Peres of Israel,
Wang Yi Meets with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel
1. 7 Total Visits in 2014

2013
Zhao Yong, Deputy-Secretary of CPC Hebei Provincial Committee visits Israel
Delegation of Chengdu City visited Israel.
Delegation of Shandong Province People's Congress visits Israel
Delegation of Xinhua News Agency Meets with Israeli President Peres
Chinese Communist Party official Liu Qibao visits Israel
Delegation of China Society of Administrative Reform visits Israel
Mr. Zhaluo Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, visits Israel
Wang Yi Holds Talks with FM Liberman of Israel and PM Netanyahu
2.
3. 8 Total Visits in 2013
2012
Chen Zongxing, Vice-Chairman of Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
visits Israel
Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of China's National People's Congress Visits
Israel
Delegation of City of Yiyang headed by its mayor, Mr. Hu Zhongxiong visit Israel
Mr. Chen Xiaodong, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Mrs. Ruth Kahanoff, Israeli
Foreign Ministry held a new round of annual institutional consultations between the two
foreign ministries.
Delegation of Shanghai Municipal People's Congress Standing Committee headed by its
Chairman Mr. Liu Yungeng visited Israel.
Signing Memorandum of Understanding on Exchanges and Cooperation for between the
city of Shanghai and the city of Haifa
China's Special Envoy to the Middle East Mr. Wu Sike Meets with Israeli FM Avigdor
Lieberman and PM Netanyahu's Special Envoy Yitzhak Molcho
Chinese President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao exchanged congratulatory messages
with their Israeli counterparts Shimon Peres and Benjamin Netanyahu on the 20th
anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations
Bilateral Video Conference for Celebrating the 20th Anniversary of Sino-Israeli
Diplomatic Relations.
China's Middle East Envoy Wu Sike Meets Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Ayalon
Vice President Xi Jinping meets Israeli Foreign Minister Lieberman
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi Holds Meets Israeli Foreign Minister Lieberman
Chinese, Israeli Leaders Exchange Congratulatory Messages on 20th Anniversary of
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Diplomatic Ties
4. 12 Total Visits in 2012
2011
Guizhou Provincial Delegation visit Israel.
Fujian Provincial Delegation, visited Israel.
Delegation prominent Chinese academic leaders and officials visit Israel
Chinese chief of staff General Chen Bingde Israel Visit
Chinese Middle East Envoy Wu Sike met Israeli Intelligence Minister Meridor
5 Total in 2011 Visits + 1 AGREEMENT
2010
Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin and
Vice Foreign Minister Zhai Jun Meets with Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Ayalon
State Councilor Dai Bingguo Holds Talks with Israeli Vice Prime Minister and Minister
for Strategic Affairs Ya'alon
2 Total Visits in 2010 + 1 Treaty
2009
Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai Jun and Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei meet with
Israel's Foreign Ministry Director-General Gal
Vice Foreign Minister Wang Guangya Meets with Delegation of Israeli Knesset
China's Mideast Envoy Meets with Peres
Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai Jun Meets with a Delegation of Israeli Young Diplomats
Israeli President Peres, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, Foreign Minister Lieberman
meet Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi
5 Total Visits in 2009

2008
Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Liu Jieyi Meets with Head of the Center for Political
Research of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel
Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai Jun Meets with Colette Avital, Deputy Speaker
of the Knesset of Israel
Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister He Yafei Meets with Deputy Director General for
Strategic Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel
Israeli Minister of trade Eli Yishai in China
4 Total Visits in 2008
2007
Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi Meets with Israeli Prime Minister Olmert
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Premier Wen Jiabao and Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi Meet with Israeli Deputy Prime
Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Tzipi Livni
Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai Jun Meets with Israeli National Security Council
Chairman Mizrahi and Israeli Deputy Speaker of the Knesset Whbee
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi Meets with Director General of Israeli Foreign Ministry
(2007-06-26)
Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai Jun Holds Talks with Director General of Israeli
Foreign Ministry
Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao Meet with Israeli Prime Minister
5 Total Visits in 2007
+ 1 Treaty

2006
Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai Jun in Israel (2006-12-07)
1 Total Visit in 2006
2005
Li Zhaoxing Meets with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and the Foreign Ministers of
the United Kingdom, France, Israel and Other Countries (2005-09-21)
Israeli President Katsav Meets with Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing (2005-06-22)
2 Total Visits in 2005
2004
Tang Jiaxuan meets with with Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Israeli President and Prime Minister 1 Total Visit in 2004
2003

Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and President Hu Jintao Meets Visiting Israeli President
Moshe Katsav
1 Total Visit in 2003 + 1 Treaty
2002
Vice Premier Qian Qichen Met with Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Sharansky
Foreign Minister Tang Jianxuan and His Israeli Counterpart Talk by Phone
Vice-Premier Qian Qichen, Premier Zhu Rongji, Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan
Met with Israeli Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister (2002-03-26)
3 Total Visits in 2002
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2001
Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan had a phone conversation with Israeli Foreign Minister
1 Total conversation in 2001 + 1 Treaty
2000
President Jiang Zemin in Israel 2000
1 Total Visit in 2000+ 2 Treaties
1999
Defense Minister of China, Chi Haotian in Israel meets Prime Minister Ehud Barak,
Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Defense Minister Chi Haotian
Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Li Peng
Israeli President Weizman visits China
4 Total Visit in 1999 + 1 Treaties
1998
Israeli Minister of Defense Mordechai in China
Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu in China
2 Total in 1998 + 1 Treaty

1997
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen (twice, the second time as Vice Premier and Foreign
Minister)
Chinese Vice Premier Li Lanqing in Israel
Israeli Vice Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Levy in China
3 Total in 1997+ 1 Treaty
1996
Chinese State Minister of National Science and Technology Commission Song Jian in
Israel
1 Total Visit +3 Treaties

1995
Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Wu Yi in Israel
1 Total Visit in 1995+ 3 Treaties
1994
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Micha Harish in China
Vice Premier Zou Jiahua, in Israel
2 Total Visits in 1994+ 2 Treaties
1993
Foreign Minister Peres in China
Prime Minister Rabin in China
2 Total Visits in 1993 + 4 Treaties
1992
President Herzog in China
Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Shi Guangsheng visited
Israel
Israeli Foreign Minister of Israel David Levy visits China
Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen in Israel
4 Total Visits in 1992 + 1 Treaties
1991
Israeli Defense Minister of Israel Moshe Arens in China
Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Yang Fuchang visits Israel
2 Total Visits in 1991
SINO –ISRAELI BILATERAL TREATIES (YEAR BY YEAR)
1992 Trade
1993 Air transport, Cultural, Health, Education (Joint Farm and Agriculture Training
setup)
1994 Post, Tourism
1995 Financial evasion, protecting investment, technology and science
1996 Medical, Post, Technical Cooperation
1997 Maritime
1998 Customs
1999 MASHAV technical training
2000 Education, Industrial development
2001 MASHAV Training
2002 no treaties
2003 Agriculture, Phytosanitary
2004 no treaties
2005 no treaties
2006 no treaties
2007 no treaties
2008 Industrial Development
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2009 no treaties
2010 Technology and Innovation
2011 Industrial Research
2012 no treaties
2013 no treaties
2014 no treaties
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CHAPTER V ISRAEL IN INDIA

INTRODUCTION
The massive markets and growing clout of China and India no doubt offer
substantial caches of diplomatic and bilateral opportunities. For several decades Israel has
strived to reap the benefits offered by expanding contacts in East and South Asia.
Overall, the Jewish State’s push to formalize diplomatic relationships in the region has
been slow in achieving tangible outcomes. India’s early ties to Israel were dogged by a
series of secretive, drawn-out and irregular contacts. In effect, mimicking much of the
antics encountered in Sino-Israeli relations. Formal and informal links with India offered
Israel the prospects of building new important partnerships. Closer ties could translate
into strategic collaboration and importantly much sought after access to an increasingly
influential player in the international community.
Though, Israel maintained varied degrees of ties with India decades before the
start of full diplomatic relations in1992, interactions were largely inconsequential and
void of meaningful growth. India’s tendency to limit grander associations with Israel was
guided by a combination of noteworthy factors. Domestic politics, Middle East dynamics,
and geopolitical considerations dictated by the Cold War as well as other issues all played
roles in holding back movement towards full formal relations. Yet, once full ties became
a reality, Indo-Israeli relations experienced impressive growth. The pathway to robust
relations came about only after decades of painfully slow stop-and-go progress that was
marred by a string of setbacks along the way. This chapter traces the significance of
knowledge and technology sharing as notable features in bringing India and Israel closer
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together despite political obstacles and efforts by Israel’s adversaries to confine the
Jewish State’s international reach.
Israel has managed to establish and then nurture a significant number of bilateral
ties in Asia but at pointedly different levels as mentioned in the previous chapter. Israel’s
interactions with India have been at remarkable levels when compared with others in the
region like tiny neighboring Nepal. Israel has even cultivated expanded economic and
military ties with unlikely partners like majority Muslim former Soviet Republics
Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan. Most significant by far in terms of economic and strategic
value are the relations, Israel achieved ties with China and India which cover wideranging forms of cooperation. The seeds of Israeli ties with these two regional powers
were sown several years before the establishment of full formal relations.
Vast physical dimensions, diverse geography, demographics and a huge populace
make India vulnerable to an array of challenges. Some of the most persistent challenges
have been in the realm of food production, national defense, and overall developmental
issues. India, like China, was compelled to take steps in overcoming these types of
pressing issues. Indian policymakers sought ways, to boost standards of living, bolster
national defense capabilities, and elevate the country’s international standing. In an effort
to reach such goals, international technology transfers offered new tools with which to
tackle deep-rooted domestic ails while enhancing the country’s competitiveness in the
global economy. However, access and use of technology does not operate in isolation and
is usually dependent on a variety of political, social and economic components.
Significant transformations in India facilitated new pathways by which to pursue helpful
problem solving technologies from outside the country.
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The convergence of two principle interests helped to steer Israel and India toward
each other. First, India’s desire to find ways to alleviate domestic challenges, and second,
Israel’s diplomatic ambitions seeking to achieve productive relationships in South Asia.
India’s interests encouraged Indian leaders to consider and seek the kinds of knowledge
Israel was selling to the world. For Israel, it created opportunities to highlight how its
experience could be of benefit in approaching problems India was up against. The
prospects of expanded relations for Israel and helpful technologies for India inched the
two sides to closer dealings (initially in secret).
The sections below consider the efficiency of technology transfers as tools with
which to jump start dormant Indian-Israeli relations. To facilitate the probe of possible
associations between technology transfers and the robustness of bilateral relations, the
study considers independent, dependent, and intervening variables. The independent
variable represents technology transfers to India (as forms of attraction) in favor of Israel.
The dependent variable represents diplomacy. Diplomacy broadly defined for the purpose
of this study is the robustness of bilateral relations between Israel and India. Robustness,
as was the case in Sino-Israeli relations, is based on three categories. Each of which are
dependent variables:

1. Trade volumes
2. Indo-Israeli exchanges like visiting delegations and treaties
3. India’s policies towards Israel/ Middle East based on statements made during
official UN speeches
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Intervening variables represent factors, which may influence cause and affect outcomes
between the independent and dependent variables (variables and methodology mirror
China case analysis) They include:
•

Technology that addresses national priorities in India. For example, crop growing
techniques, which can raise the levels of food and human security.

•

Common security concerns like military capabilities and/or terror threats.

•

Efforts to better gain access to the US through Israeli channels.

•

Geopolitical shifts like: leadership changes, shifts in alliances (end of Cold War),
Middle East politics (Arab Spring), Middle East conflict flare-ups.

As mentioned previously, it is important to note that technology transfers may be
labeled differently depending on the actual transaction. For example, transfers could
include: arms transfers, military weapon sales, developmental cooperation, technical
assistance, technology collaborations, joint ventures, intelligence sharing and other forms
of sharing know-how. Any of these, and a host of other possible similar terms, could be
considered independent variables for the purpose of this study.
To best explore the particulars of Israel’s relationship with India (past and
present) the chapter will be structured in the following manner: A country profile section
of India will survey India’s geography, challenges, modern history, political/economic
systems and foreign policy of relevance to Indian-Israeli relations. A portion on India’s
challenges will review notable national vulnerabilities (i.e. conflict, national security and
food production /agriculture). A history of the Indian-Israeli relationship section will
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feature a sketch of similarities between the two countries and historical breakpoint
periods. A shared interests /areas of cooperation segment will consider different sectors,
which have given rise to Indian-Israeli collaboration. A data trends and content analyses
section will aim to examine the validity of the hypothesis of the dissertation exploring
possible covariance between the independent and dependent variables (detailed earlier).
This section mostly involves qualitative analysis methodologies using NVivo software.
This chapter too draws on a diverse inventory of primary and secondary sources like
interviews, media reports, scholarly literature, government and NGO documentation as
illustrated in the previous chapter. The final portion of this chapter will offer conclusions
about the role of technology and knowledge transfers in Indo-Israeli relations.
The transfer of knowledge and/or technology in the context of this dissertation is
not meant to infer in any way that the technology sender (Israel) is overall more
sophisticated or advanced than the receiver (India). Both parties have much to learn from
each other. However, the study underscores the value of Israeli specialized know-how as
a boon of attraction (soft power) in favor of Israel in relations with India.
To be clear, this study is also not suggesting that knowledge transfer programs in
themselves guarantee diplomatic sway in the case of Indian-Israeli relations. Instead, the
dissertation argues that technology and other intellectual capital transfers are factors,
which can promote country-to-country engagement. In doing so, transfers of technology
can and often do open opportunities for Israel to achieve gains in bilateral relations.
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INDIA COUNTRY PROFILE (OVERVIEW)

India is the second largest Asian country in terms of territory, and the second
most populous in the world. It shares borders with main rivals Pakistan, China and other
neighbors like Bhutan, Burma and Bangladesh. India’s physical geography is varied
featuring a multitude of landscapes such as rugged mountains, valleys, plains, and
islands. The country has several topographically distinctive regions: Himalayan
mountainous region, the Indo-Gangetic Plain, Peninsular Plateau, Coastal Plains, Thar
Desert and off shore Islands. The country’s climatic and physical features are important
aspects of India’s regional position. These facets of India are factors that have direct
bearings on the country’s capabilities and constraints in areas of national defense, and
agro-economics, which are also important features in ties with Israel.
The tall Himalayas mountain range in the northern part of the country provides a
natural physical barrier between India and neighboring countries, but most notably the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Pakistan. India has clashed with China and
Pakistan in territorial wars over parts of the mountainous area. The border region remains
a tender topic of contention.
The Gangetic plain in the north and east holds major rivers systems (Ganges,
Indus and Brahmaputra). This part of the country is where most of India’s large scale
farming is situated. The Peninsular Plateau region, which spreads across southern India,
contains several terrain types like plateaus, valleys, and hills. On India’s coast are vast
plains, which are seated along the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea. The coastal
regions are of national and regional significance in terms of population, food production
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and international trade. First, the coastal areas are home to large population
concentrations. Second, the coast is where important seaports like Mumbai which are
gateways to the significant import and export business. Finally, the coastal areas also
produce commercial quantities of food staples like rice and sugarcane. In northwest India,
the remote, vast and arid Thar Desert provides a natural border buffer with major rival
Pakistan. The Thar Desert was the site of India’s first and controversial nuclear weapons
explosion test site in 1974. India also controls a string of islands in the Indian Ocean.
India became independent in 1947, when Britain ended its rule over the Indian
subcontinent, and separated the territory into two countries: India, with a Hindu majority,
and Pakistan, with a Muslim majority. The split triggered civil strife and mass migration
leading to a refugee crisis. The partition set the stage for Indian and Pakistani cross
border tensions and several major conflicts in 1947, 1965, 1971 and 1999 especially over
the highly contested Kashmir region, a territory located at the top of the Indian subcontinent. The Kashmir conflict remains unresolved in present times. In 1971, the two
countries also waged war as New Delhi supported forces fighting to breakaway from
Pakistan to form what is now Bangladesh. Adding weight to the Indian-Pakistani rivalry,
and producing mounting international concerns is the fact both nations possess nuclear
weapons. India also clashed with China on the Tibet border in the late 1950s. A few
years later in 1962, China captured mountain passes along India’s northeastern frontier
producing border altercations. A ceasefire was later declared, but some boundary issues
linger. India has also experienced territorial disputes with other neighbors like
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Bhutan.
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In the first few decades after independence (50s and 60s), as Corbridge (2009) points
out, a large proportion of the Indian populace resided in rural areas and the majority of
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) rested on agricultural production. Challenged by
swelling population growth in the early 1960s, India struggled to produce sufficient
amounts of foodstuffs. Protracted poverty and bouts of famine touched the lives of
millions of Indian citizens.
In response to these serious problems, India’s decision makers sought to come up
with ways to curb food shortages, alleviate poverty, and, importantly, generate job
growth. To produce more food, better farming practices in terms of fertilizers and
irrigation were pursued and introduced as part of India’s so called Green Revolution. The
Green Revolution achieved higher crop yields through improved technological means.
However, beyond agriculture, India also introduced significant economic and political
reforms to stimulate productivity in the national economy.
In 1991, the Indian government started to steer the economy to a system, which
favors a larger private sector driven by market forces. The idea was to make India more
attractive to foreign investment, which the country needed. The transformation to a more
market based economy also entailed a major reorganization of the public sector.
Economic liberalization coupled with the gradual globalization of India’s economy
created more public awareness and debate about the country’s foreign dealings. This
meant that what India did with other countries (like Israel) became more of a concern to
citizens who realized international agreements could have direct bearing on their lives.
Today, India enjoys one of the world’s fastest growing economies, and as
Corbridge (2009) suggests, the country is on a track to likely become the third largest
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economy in the world after the US and China in the coming decades. Some of India’s
largest sectors include food production, textiles, and computer software. India’s main
agricultural output comprises wheat, cotton, rice, sugarcane, dairy, tea products, and
livestock, all of which demand much attention in the way of applying irrigation
management technologies.
India is famously known as the largest parliamentary democracy in the world.
Executive and legislative bodies administer the country. The government comprises a
chief of state and a head of government. There are two lawmaking bodies: The Council of
States also called Rajya Sabha, and the People's Assembly known as Lok Sabha. India is
a federation of 29 states and 7 union territories. Since gaining independence in 1947,
India has maintained formal ties with most countries. It also played a leading role in the
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) (more on this later in the chapter). India’s individual
states and NAM membership each have a role in the dynamics of Indian-Israeli relations

INDIA’S CHALLENGES

Like China, India too has achieved substantial economic development in the last
few decades, and yet continues to grapple with a host of persistent problems. Despite
undergoing significant changes and overall progress India, has experienced major social,
environmental, food security and national security issues. Amarasinghe, Malik and
Sharma (2010) point out environmental constraints have threatened India’s agricultural
output capacity. The country has suffered from an assortment of environmental issues,
which impaired its capacity to produce food. The culprits include soil erosion,

212

overgrazing, desertification, and water pollution from raw sewage and agricultural
pesticides. On top of these troubles, a growing demand for water for non-farming uses
has further frustrated the availability of adequate amounts of potable water in some parts
of India. Hence, water use and its distribution have been two of the key challenges for
Indian policymakers to overcome. India has sought to improve water usage efficiency
especially in agriculture. Effective irrigation is one of the most workable ways to ease
water waste. Irrigation by flooding, a system used in India, mostly proved inefficient in
delivering ideal amounts of water to critical plant areas (roots). As described in an earlier
chapter 4, drip irrigation delivers the means to use less water while still enabling an
increase in crop outputs. Farmers in many areas of India rely on monsoon rains for crop
water. Advanced water management (drip irrigation) not only saves water, but also helps
farmers reduce the dependency on seasonal conditions, and allows the seeding of crops
irrespective of rain (monsoon) dispositions. Higher crop outputs enhance food security
and help raise revenues not only for large farming enterprises but small farms as well.
Thus, effective water management can be a key tool in mitigating malnutrition and
poverty, which have plagued rural India. Amarasinghe, Malik and Sharma (2010) echo a
linkage between water usage efficiency troubles and agricultural technology deficiencies
in India. They argue the absence of technological means has played a role limiting the
ability to increase food production. As mentioned in the previous chapter, some plants in
particular require large amounts of water to grow. This is the case in the cultivation of
critical crop types like grains, which are high water consumers. The most common food
grains are wheat, corn and rice, which are also principal sources of protein. However,
corn unlike other grains, can also be used for non-consumption industrial purposes. Grain
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foods are important in terms of providing nutrition, but also as sources of revenues in
India’s large agrarian sector.
Another major challenge for India is National Security. Nuclear-armed India has
one of the largest militaries in the world. Given the history of conflict in the region,
India’s armed forces must be prepared to respond to threats along her borders posed by
neighbors like Pakistan and a rising China. Karim (2015) explains some border issues
between India and China have lingered for decades. India unilaterally determined the
border with Tibet in 1950, but the move has not been recognized by China. The IndoSino 1962 War has left a legacy of claims and counter claims over the legitimacy of the
border between them. However, the mostly quiet border has been maintained through
agreements. Final status terms of a settlement are pending and there have been episodes
of heightened tensions over some disputed territories. Karim (2015) suggests a history of
cross-border incursions have pressed India to attain the technological military means to
secure equivalence along border fronts. As Kumar (2014) points out, in addition to
challenges associated with dispute issues, India’s border with China is technically
difficult to demark because of harsh terrain conditions. Also, India and Pakistan have
fought several border wars (more on these conflicts later in the chapter). Besides external
threats, India suffers from complex domestic security pressures. Overall, these issues
make India a market for military surveillance technologies that can help to monitor
expansive areas like rugged topographic settings and thousands of miles of coastlines.
India's economic and political ascension in global rankings prompted leaders in
New Delhi to also be wary of dangers posed by mounting maritime threats and defense
vulnerabilities. Besides dealing with complex tactical territorial disputes, India’s military
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leaders must contend with securing thousands of miles of open coastlines. Importantly,
they must also ensure a free flow of traffic through vital ocean shipping lanes. Pant
(2009) rightly asserts India's economic growth largely rests on the unhindered passage of
cargo ships through the Indian Ocean. Disruption of shipping lanes is a major concern.
Interruption of maritime traffic, including the transportation of energy sources, could
severely impact economic and social structures, and would put India’s stability at risk.
Interference of ocean vessel traffic through pivotal passageways like the Strait of
Hormuz, the Gulf of Aden, the Suez Canal, and the Strait of Malacca would be damaging
not only to India but other countries as well. Ocean routes are lifelines for India’s
developmental prosperity. Also, un-protected shores offer opportunities for sea-based
infiltration by non-state actors like international crime and terrorist groups. In 2008,
scores of people were killed and injured in Mumbai after terrorists launched an attack
from the sea. The tragic events unfolded over the course of multiple days and paralyzed
much of the city. The attack was extensively covered by the international media but also
played heavily in the Israeli press. It was also a point of interest in Israel’s counterterrorism community. Israeli citizens were among the dead as a Jewish Center was also
one of the targets of the attack. It was alleged the perpetrators came from Pakistani
territory but the point was they did not penetrate India over land but by sea. Rath (2014)
asserts the terror raid revealed a devastating breakdown in internal security. The tragedy
created a tremendous public uproar and stirred doubt about the effectiveness of India’s
internal security structure. The tragedy underscored the importance of refreshing India’s
security toolkit.
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A HISTORY OF ISRAELI-INDO RELATIONS (LEAD UP TO FORMAL TIES)

Indian relations with Israel have to some degree echoed the trajectory of SinoIsraeli relations. India, like China, has maintained contacts and assorted technical ties
with Israel in the years before establishing full formal ties with the Jewish State. There is
one noteworthy difference between early Indian and Chinese relationships with Israel.
India recognized Israel in 1950, and permitted the opening of an Israeli consulate in
Bombay (now Mumbai). No such representation was offered to Israel in the case of early
relations with China. Nevertheless, the pace of development to full relations between
India and Israel, like Sino-Israeli relations, was also was slow and prolonged taking over
4 decades before developing into full diplomatic relations in1992.
The path to comprehensive bilateral ties was jarring, unsettled by episodes of
antagonism on the part of India towards Israel. India’s approach towards Israel was
generally indifferent for a host of reasons, but in large part to maintain and promote a
favorable standing for itself in the Arab World. A stronger stature for India in the Middle
East meant a better position from which to garner Arab political support especially in the
context of India’s deep, bitter rivalry with Pakistan. Furthermore, India, like many other
countries, simply understood an irrefutable reality. The potential payback of good
relations with 22 Arab countries overshadowed any benefits from ties with Israel. After
all, the Jewish State was not endowed with valuable natural resources, such as petroleum.
Israel could not provide work for large numbers of Indian expatriates or large scale trade
prospects offered by the wider (other than Israel) Middle East. These and other
explanations deterred movements toward closer ties with Israel. Indian-Israeli relations
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also did not advance in a linear fashion, instead unfolding through a series of seemingly
gains and retractions. Overall, during a prolonged period, New Delhi repeatedly rebuffed
Israeli suggestions of upgrading relations. Although there were occasional signs of
improvement in relations from time to time, no significant advancement in elevating ties
took place for decades. The subsequent finalizing of full diplomatic ties came only after a
sluggishly paced sequence of quiet Indian-Israeli encounters. Meetings took place in a
variety of venues in the US, Europe, and Asia. Despite contacts between the two
countries, public statements by Indian officials were not generally friendly towards Israel.
Furthermore, media organizations in India sustained hostile views about the Jewish State.
The section below considers milestones in the Indian-Israeli narrative as
technical ties intertwine with overall bilateral relations. It surveys what has been written
or said about the development of Israel’s ties with India. It draws on information sourced
from the literature, research interviews and media reports. Indian-Israeli relations can be
chronologically demarcated by the following periods (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1 Timeline Overall India-Israel Relations

1947 India
Gains
Independence

1948 Israel
Gains
Independence

1950 India
Recognizes
Israel

1950s to
1980s israeli
Consulate in
India and
Informal
Contacts

1980s Secret
and Non
Secret IndianIsraeli
Contacts

1992 Full
Diplomatic
Relations

Post 1992

1947 – MID 1980S CONTACTS WITHOUT FULL FORMAL RELATIONS

India and Israel are clearly very different in terms of population size,
demographics, and physical dimensions, but they also share some noteworthy historical
similarities. Both countries were created less than a year apart. India gained independence
in August 1947, while Israel became a state in May 1948. Statehood came for both Israel
and India after the conclusion of British rule. Furthermore, both countries emerged out of
armed struggles, experiencing much bloodshed and migration of refugees. They are both
parliamentary democracies that see themselves as modern states, which are linked to
ancient civilizations. In 2003, Indian National Security Advisor, Brajesh Mishra,
addressed the American Jewish Committee in Washington underscoring democratic
similarities between the US, Israel and India. In a bid to mount a connection with the
American Jewish community he emphasized India is one of only a few countries with no
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history of anti-Semitism. Just a year before in 2002 Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari
Vajpayee met with representatives of major Jewish organizations met with Prime
Minister while in New York for meetings at the UN.
India and Israel both have large devoted diasporas in the US, where Jewish and
Indian-American groups have been collaborating on common interests. In 2003 the US
Indian Political Action Committee (USINPAC) along with the American Jewish
Committee, and the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) held the first
joint forum on Jewish-Indian relations in Washington. The gathering included
involvement by a mix of political activists, US lawmakers, Israeli and Indian diplomats.
Kamdar (2007) notes Indian American political activists have looked to the pro-Israel
organizations and Jewish groups as successful lobby models, which have clenched results
on Capitol Hill and affected US foreign policy.
Kumar (2014) points out that if you look a map from Israel to India you’ll find
there are the only two countries that can claim to be liberal democracies. Israel and India
boast free presses, vibrant civil societies, and political environments where government
policies are openly criticized, in domestic politics. Importantly, aspects of India’s
domestic political debates directly set the tone of ties to Israel as will be noted later in the
chapter.
The beginnings of Indian-Israeli relations can be traced back dozens of years
before the exchange of embassies in New Delhi and Tel Aviv became a reality in 1992.
India’s embassy is positioned in Tel Aviv even though Jerusalem is the actual seat of the
Israeli Government. India does not formally recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. This
diplomatic policy with regard to Jerusalem is the norm, and is not unusual. All other
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countries, which maintain formal missions in Israel including the US, Israel’s staunchest
ally have placed their embassies in or near Tel Aviv.
Initial contacts between India and Israel came as early as 1948 when Indian and
Israeli officials met in the US. Kumaraswamy (2010) points out that even in the absence
of deep ties and India’s refusal to fully recognize Israel, India sought and received Israeli
technical assistance in agriculture following meetings between Israeli and Indian
representatives in 1949. Additionally, India’s leaders also quietly sent Indian agricultural
specialists to Israel to observe farming techniques. There were also some high-level
contacts between the 2 countries. While visiting the US in 1950, India’s founding Prime
Minister Nehru made time for a conversation with one of Israel’s top diplomats in
America. In the same year, two years after the establishment of the State of Israel, a
reluctant India ultimately recognized the Jewish State. In 1950, India also agreed to allow
an Israeli presence in the form of an immigration office, which later turned into a
consulate in what was then Bombay (currently Mumbai). However, despite the
diplomatic gesture allowing the Israeli presence, the Indian government severely
constrained the scope of the mission’s operations. Geographic limitations were imposed
on the consulate’s outreach efforts, restricting where it could operate. The limitation,
positioned Israeli diplomats in awkward situations, and created frictions with Indian
officials. Nevertheless, Israeli consulate envoys could engage high-ranking Indian
officials. Restrictions on consulate operations would be eased in 1989. The change in
policy was perhaps a precursor of significant progress in relations to come just three
years later with the start of full ties in 1992. In 1951, India’s Prime Minister Nehru met
with a senior Israeli diplomat. In the meeting, pledges were made by the Indian leader to
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forge formal ties with Israel. A year later in 1952, Israeli diplomat, Walter Eytan, also
had talks with senior Indian figures, and even Prime Minister Nehru. Overall, though, as
Kumaraswamy (2010) emphasizes officials in New Delhi systematically turned away
Israeli suggestions of advancing towards full ties. Despite contacts in early and later
(1948-mid 1980s) periods, the two countries simply failed to produce measurable
developments in bilateral relations. Years of diplomatic stagnation have been attributed to
a number of general concerns on the Indian side. These include India’s deep and strong
ties to the Arab world, but also being responsive to the sensitivities of large domestic
Muslim communities (Kumaraswamy, 2010). However, there were also distinct events,
which inhibited closer ties, like the outbreak of the 1956 Suez War. The crisis came
about after Egyptian President Nasser nationalized the strategic canal prompting Israel,
Britain and France to team up and take military action against Egypt in the Sinai
Peninsula. The Sinai was captured but was returned to Egypt as part of a cease-fire
agreement. Seeking to maintain important ties in the Middle East, India sided with Egypt
stepping in line with Pan Arab positions. In doing so, India distanced itself from Israel,
thus dashing prospects of better ties with the Jewish State at that time. As mentioned in
the previous chapter, the Suez crisis was also a source of diplomatic tensions inhibiting
progress in advancing Sino-Israeli relations. Overall, political pressure from the Arab
World on India squashed prospects of improved ties with Israel.
In 1961, another hindrance to closer links between the two countries came about
when India became a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). New
Delhi’s leading role in NAM politically positioned India at odds with the notion of open
relations with Israel. NAM is an international forum of countries that oppose being

221

formally identified as an ally of any particular country or power. Created in 1961, the
organization assembled a substantial membership roster of states, which are also active
members of the United Nations. India’s first Prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru was one of
the founding fathers, along with other leaders including Egypt’s President Nasser. The
movement gained significance mostly during the Cold War. A close review of NAM’s
history suggests the name of the organization was somewhat of a misnomer since some
member states did build alliances. Furthermore, historically, most NAM member
countries traditionally identified with the Arab World and the Palestinian cause. Hence,
NAM members routinely joined efforts to challenge Israel in international forums.
Bitzinger (2014) and Panda (2016) assert India was essentially demarcated by traditional
“Third World” and Non-Aligned Movement-inspired sympathies for the Palestinian
cause. Besides foreign factors, domestic politics played a defining role in shaping the
strength and openness of relations with Israel. It is not surprising though that the prospect
of relations with Israel was controversial in Indian politics. Since independence, India’s
political system has been dominated by two prominent parities: Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP) and Congress Party. Generally, the BJP has mostly held pro-Israel positions. In
contrast, the Congress Party has traditionally followed a more pro-Arab stance. Dhume
(2014) contends the Congress Party’s pro-Palestinian position stems from its reign as a
ruling party in a liberal democracy. As such, it was obliged to be sensitive to the
sentiments and concerns of the electorate, which includes India’s large Muslim
community.
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LARGE MUSLIM MINORITY
Millions of India’s Muslim citizens tend to identify with the Palestinian
cause. Many in the community view Israel as responsible for the plight of Muslim
sacred sites, especially in Jerusalem. In the 1967 Six-Day Arab-Israeli War, Israel
took control of Arab East Jerusalem including the ancient Old City. The Old City
bears spiritual significance to all three Abrahamic Faiths. However, Islam’s third
holiest shrine and Judaism’s most sacred place of worship are positioned in an
overlapping space. The site is a point of contention between Jewish and Muslim
claims, which extend far beyond the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Even the name of
the site is conflict-ridden. The area is known in the Muslim World by its Arabic
name “Haram al-Sharif” (meaning the Noble Sanctuary). In the Jewish faith, the site
is referred to by the Hebrew name “Har ha-Bayit” meaning Temple Mount. It should
be mentioned that while Israel controls the Old City, the Jordanian-based Jerusalem
Islamic Waqf is mandated to oversee Islamic religious structures. Besides the
religious controversy, Israel’s control of all of Jerusalem poses a problem for the
Muslim community in India and others supporting the Palestinian cause. The
Palestinians see parts of Jerusalem as the capital of a future Palestinian State.
Nevertheless, Kumar (2014) and Inbar (2014) point out Islam in South Asia is
generally less staunchly practiced and more moderate than in the Middle East.
Kumar (2014) asserts you will still have pro-Palestinian protests in South Asia
(India), but the nature of hostility against Israel is less forceful than in the Arab
World. In Pakistan, and even in India, only a tiny minority actively take part in
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protests against Israel, and it is much more about politics than anything else. As
Kumaraswamy (2010) notes, most Muslims in India are more likely tuned in to dayto-day needs than foreign policy issues, whatever they may be. Nevertheless, against
this background, many Indian policymakers felt compelled to offer support for the
Palestinian cause.
When it came to the Cold War, Israel and India were on opposing sides. As a
major military client of Moscow, New Delhi adhered to pro-Soviet positions, while Israel
was identified as a western aligned country. The end of the Cold War offered a political
environment for less resistance on the part of India to expand ties with Israel and the
opportunity to fill a void created by the fall of the Soviet Union as will be further detailed
below.
On the regional level, India vied for Arab support in its conflict with Pakistan.
Closer and open ties with Israel would put in peril Indian efforts to gain vital wide
Middle Eastern political support vis-a-vis Pakistan. Yet, despite a generally detached
stance towards expanding relations with Israel, Indian leaders like (Prime Minister
Nehru) sought Israeli input in matters of agriculture, military and intelligence. Inbar
(2004) points out the early encounters between Israel and India involved some limited
military contacts, which were exemplified by Israeli assistance in India’s confrontation
with China in 1962 and Pakistan in 1965 and 1971. In the years between those conflicts
there were notable high-level talks between officials of both countries. Indian Foreign
Minister Dinesh Singh and Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban met in 1969. There were
also a number of quiet exchanges in the period before the maturing of full relations.
Indian officials also traveled to Israel to closely view the workings of Israeli agriculture.
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Israeli scientists and senior officials like Defense Minister Moshe Dayan in 1977 went to
India. Kumar (2014) points to a backdrop of forms of technical cooperation in the 60s
and 70s as a factor in creating contact opportunities between the two countries even
though the relationship between them was cold. Despite a history of high-level contacts
with Israel, India backed a 1975 controversial UN resolution introduced by Arab and
Islamic members, which equated Zionism with racism. Zionism is the ideological
foundation on which the Jewish State was created. In essence, support for the resolution
questions the very legitimacy of the Jewish State. (India eventually retracted its position.)
The stagnant state of affairs of zero movement towards more comprehensive political ties
between Israel and India generally showed no signs of abating until the late 80s a few
years before full bilateral ties were finally formed in 1992.
MID 1980S – 1992

During the 1980s, India begins to show a willingness to openly engage Israel
when Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi met
at the UN in 1985. Kumaraswamy (2010) suggests the encounter itself was significant
because it likely set, precedent as the first meeting between the Israeli and Indian Prime
Ministers. Kumar (2014) asserts agricultural technology played a major role in IndianIsraeli contacts in the late 80s. Technical cooperation was a major facilitator of
communications, but in the broader context, there were other undercurrents which
affected ties between the two countries. Still, no meaningful policy changes in relations
occurred for some time. However, a turn of events in the Middle East in part created a
political environment, which helped India edge closer to open ties with the Jewish State.
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For decades India’s pro-Palestinian stance was well received in the Arab World.
However, that policy proved problematic during the 1991 Gulf War. At that time, India
expressed support for the Palestinian position in the conflict against the strong objections
of influential Arab Gulf States. The Palestinian leadership expressed support with the
Iraqi President when he sent forces to invade Kuwait. By extension New Delhi’s, support
of the Palestinian position in the war was seen by Gulf States as support for their nemesis
Saddam Hussein. In the aftermath, strains in relations with Gulf States over India’s
initial position in the war prompted New Delhi to reassess its policies in the region. The
reevaluation of policies toward the Middle East triggered a new diplomatic approach,
which created a pathway for Indian policymakers to separate support for the Palestinian
cause from other interests in the Middle East. This change was extended to India’s Israel
policy.
The policy shift was just one of the factors which helped ease India’s longtime
constrained Israel policy. Essentially, India began to de-link the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict from its overall approach toward Israel. In doing so, it demonstrated a notable
policy shift (Singh, 2012). In 1991, India also made a dramatic policy reversal when it
decided to withdraw its original support for the controversial UN resolution, which
equated Zionism with racism.
Another factor in nudging India towards broader ties with Israel came after the
collapse of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was India’s primary arms supplier. Soviet
armaments were the backbone of the Indian military. The end of the Cold War meant
India lost military support from Moscow. This new situation created a need for New
Delhi to find new partnerships. Inbar (2009) asserts India’s move to normalize relations

226

with Israel was as part of a broader post-Cold War strategy to help India develop new ties
with major international actors like the United States, while at the same time accessing
advanced technologies available from Israel to enhance national security. Israel’s battle
experience was of special interest to India in the face of regional security challenges from
neighboring countries (specifically a nuclear-armed Pakistan and a powerful China).
Kumar (2014) points out the quiet history of Israeli arms supplies to India during
conflicts in the 1960s against China and Pakistan created a tacit understanding that
India’s Armed Forces could learn more from the Israeli defense strategy and system once
full relations were established. On that point, India also sought to make its own weapons
and looked to other countries, like Israel, which it saw as having built a successful
military industry.
Mounting Indian disappointment about a lack of reciprocal political support from
the Arab World in the lingering rivalry with Pakistan also chipped away resistance
towards a softer policy towards Israel. Despite New Delhi’s consistent and ardent
backing of the Palestinian cause, India felt Arab states did not demonstrate ample support
for its claims against Pakistan over Kashmir. Kumar (2014) portrays the existence of a
very strong pro-Arab lobby in India’s capital in the 60s and 70s, characterizing New
Delhi’s relationship with Arab countries as very significant. Similarly, changes in India’s
domestic politics, namely the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP, Hindu Nationalist),
which favored normalization with Israel, contributed to the prospects of closer relations.
As we have seen, the decades leading to formal ties were dotted with generally
limited and infrequent encounters between Israeli and Indian officials, which did not
visibly advance ties between the two countries. However, some of these contacts
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provided some evidence about the significance of technical cooperation in the areas of
military and agriculture in helping to establish common ground and laying the
foundations for formal ties once conditions were ripe. Changes in India’s foreign policy
in the early 1990s created wider prospects for India to look outward and reach out for
more technical collaborations to help grapple with major chronic challenges. New Delhi
increasingly looked to the West to access and utilize new problem solving technologies.
In this setting, Israel already had a history of collaborations with India making way for
reviving once dormant ties. Unlike interactions of earlier periods, the exchanges of the
early 90s produced tangible progress towards expanding ties and ultimately establishing
full formal diplomatic relations.

1992 FULL FORMAL RELATIONS AND BEYOND

Indian-Israeli ties have generally flourished since formal ties were established.
Furthermore, security ties between New Delhi and Jerusalem were not met with forms of
fierce objections from Washington, as was the case in Sino-Israeli relations.
Nevertheless, full diplomatic relations did not put to rest internal political opposition in
India, which questioned the merits of the relationship with Israel. That being said,
Bitzinger (2014) suggests India’s NAM association was less of a negating factor in
relations with Israel as might have been back in the 1970s and 1980s, when Zionism was
deemed akin to Nazism.
India’s move towards closer formal relations with Israel meant it now had other
policy options in the Middle East, which do not necessarily automatically conform to
Arab World positions, as was the case for decades. Put another way, an alliance with
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Israel offered India some leverage in its dealings with other countries in the Middle East,
which it did not have before. Prior to diplomatic relations with Israel, India could not
play the “Israel Card”, signifying its traditional pro-Arab World stance could no longer
be taken for granted. Relations with Israel gave more weight to India’s positions on
Middle East issues at the UN.
It is important to note that while the scale of Israel’s specialized sectors like
military and agriculture are tiny by Indian standards, the level usefulness of the Israeli
experience in those industries was ample to attract substantial interest in New Delhi’s
policy-making circles. Kumar (2014) contends Indian-Israeli relations can be compared
to the mechanism of a dam. The metaphor goes like this: efforts to forge ties were held
back much like a dam blocks the flow of water, but once the dam was opened a strong
stream ensued. So while progress toward full relations was slow and at times at a stand
still, collaboration between Israel and India took off at an accelerated pace once the
embassies opened. MASHAV, the development agency that organized advanced training
for Indian farm experts since the early 1950s, stepped up its cooperation activities in
numerous areas covering vocations in areas of agriculture, community development,
public health, technology, and education (Ben Meir, 2011).
The establishment of diplomatic relations brought about several joint ventures in
agriculture involving the delivery of technology as well as consultation. The first visit by
an Israeli President to India in 1996 was marked by noteworthy agricultural
collaboration. During the trip, the Indo-Israel Research and Development Farm was
launched as part of the Indian Agriculture Research Institute (IARI) in New Delhi. The
farm would demonstrate Israeli farming techniques in seeking to develop different
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cultivation methods for use in India’s various climates. Other joint demo-farms would be
opened as bilateral relations matured.
Indian-Israeli dealings in the defense sector also progressed. Although Madan
(2016) suggests that Israel was not a major defense supplier to India in the early 1990s,
India’s limited dealings with Israel in the first decade of full formal ties would grow
beyond traditional cooperation sectors and branch out to other more specialized
collaborations in the form of joint ventures, naval cooperation, counter-terrorism and
military training exercise and even space technology. It is believed thousands of Indian
military personnel have trained in Israel in anti terror tactics. In 2008, India launched an
Israeli satellite into orbit. The use of Indian venues to launch Israeli satellites is
significant in terms of technical capabilities. Given Israel’s location and political
constraints in the Middle East, it can only launch satellites westward over the
Mediterranean Sea. Interestingly, a launch westward curtails Israel’s ability to ideally
position a spy satellite to monitor central Asia and particularly Iran. Iran has openly
threatened to destroy the Jewish State.
In 1999, India and Pakistan were at war once again in the Kargil which is part of
Kashmir mostly along the Line of Control (LOC) or border area. It was a border battle
fought in exceptionally difficult to maneuver, high altitude, mountainous terrain. The
Kargil conflict proved to be a turning point in defense relations between Israel and India.
Israel was one of a few countries to offer India military support. The Israelis provided the
Indian military with various warfare tools like ammunition and night vision instruments.
At that time international sanctions (including on arms shipments) were in place on India.
The arms embargo came after India carried out nuclear tests in the Thar Desert despite
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international protests. Israel’s Kargil involvement in favor of India ushered a new level of
weapons dealings between the two countries. Blarel (2015) contends the Kargil crisis
exposed weaknesses and gaps in India’s intelligence gathering and military capabilities.
The deficiencies highlighted India’s need to be able to more efficiently carry out
surveillance and reconnaissance missions covering stretches of vast territory. India made
an attempt to develop its own aerial surveillance systems, but the outcome did not meet
operational expectations for successfully monitoring border areas. The situation prompted
India’s attention to seek other options like Israeli border sensors, drones and the Phalcon
AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System). After the Kargil crisis, overall
bilateral relations leaped forward. Just a year later, in 2000, two top Indian officials,
Home Minister, L.K. Advani and External Affairs Minister, Jaswant Singh, traveled to
Israel. India became a regular consumer of Israeli surveillance technologies. After the
crisis, but especially from the mid 2000s, Israel became one of India’s top military
suppliers. However, since military dealings are largely secretive, it is unknown by public
accounts if Israel in particular is the second or third largest weapons supplier to India.
Indian-Israeli relations took some time to mature but nevertheless ties between the
two countries have continued to be a source of poignant debate. On one side of the
political aisle, proponents of tighter ties relations with Israel touted the idea that closer
relations would be of benefit to India’s national interests as it strived to cope with
tenacious and emerging domestic and external threats. Dhume (2014) points out that
during a 2012 Indian election campaign, a candidate was quoted as promising to making
an area suffering from water scarcity to “bloom like an Israeli desert”. On the other side
of the political aisle, opponents of tighter ties with Israel argue cozy relations with the
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Jewish State amount to a de-facto abandonment of support for the Palestinian cause.
Madan (2016) correctly points out that while India’s relationship with Israel advanced,
the level of ties between the two countries was highly susceptible to which political party
led the Indian government. Different governments practiced different Israel policies,
marked by varied levels of openness. While full formal ties with Israel began under the
Congress Party which ruled from 1985 to 1998, ties became closer and more open during
the rule of the BJP led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) between 1998 and 2004.
Interestingly, technology cooperation continued to progress regardless of political
changes in New Delhi. However, Dhume (2014) notes that when the Congress Party
returned to power in 2004, Indian-Israeli relations were handled more discreetly.
Furthermore, India renewed support for the Palestinian cause. In addition, while senior
level government exchanges diminished in volume, other aspects of bilateral relations in
trade, defense and intelligence cooperation continued. The Indian based think tank,
Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, suggests that throughout the 2000s India
obtained billons of dollars worth of Israeli military equipment. Israel did not deliver large
weapons like aircraft or ships; instead it initially focused on upgrading India’s Russian
made fighter jets, missiles and tanks. Shukla (2010) contends the experience gained in
India gave Israel the knowledge needed to further market its upgrading services wherever
Soviet equipment existed worldwide. This helped Israel brand itself as a leader in the
weapons modernization market.
In 2006, an Agricultural Cooperation Agreement was signed between Israel and
India. The agreement was implemented with the participation of MASHAV. The deal
called for the establishment of multiple joint model farms where an array of innovative
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agricultural practices would be demonstrated. The farms are known as Centres of
Excellence in Agriculture. Majumder (2012) notes the prime purpose of the Centres of
Excellence is to expose Indian farmers to Israeli agricultural techniques and technologies.
Initially, as part of the setup of the Centres, Israeli trainers would train local trainers who
would then train others. This practice is part of what MASHAV calls its focus on
building human capacity, which it asserts is the optimal way to achieve the greatest
impact and sustainable growth. In 2008, the Israel-Indian Agriculture Cooperation
Agreement finalized plans to set up projects in several Indian States like Punjab, Gujarat,
Maharashtra, Karnataka, Uttar Pradesh (UP) and West Bengal. Centres typically
showcase Israeli based nursery and fruit cultivating technologies, which are adapted for
Indian conditions by local experts. The Centres also provide access to courses on how
farmers can boost their incomes. Hafeez (2009) describes joint agricultural projects, such
as the Centres, as engaging farmers through learning about groundbreaking techniques.
The demonstration farms also involve the introduction of new crop types like novel
strains of citrus, olives, dates, pomegranates and guava. In 2011, the agreement was
further widened to promote more visits by farming specialists and classes for farmers.
Transfers of knowledge include the demonstration of technologies which advance ways
to best utilize poor quality water for irrigation, water management and polyhouse
farming. Polyhouses are climate-controlled structures, mostly used for the growing of
vegetables, flowers and fruit. This method sidesteps growing crops traditionally in an
open field. A sizeable number of farmers in the vegetable growing areas surrounding
New Delhi have adopted Israel’s polyhouse farming method. The technique helps
significantly boost yields but also allows farmers to grow new strains of vegetables like
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cherry tomatoes and others. The Indo-Israeli Centre of Excellence for Vegetables has
become a vehicle of change in cultivation practices in India. One of the more notable of
these joint demonstration farms was established in the north central Indian State of
Haryana. The farm demonstrates a range of technologies in horticulture providing
training and showcasing agricultural achievements. The Centres aim to help fight low
productivity and lack of resources, which have been obstacles especially in small farms.
Feller (2012) points out agricultural development is a national concern in India for 3
primary reasons: 1) farming is a source of employment for the majority of the rural
population, 2) agriculture generates a sizable part of the country’s GDP and 3) a
developed sector can help curb food security threats.
The Indo-Israeli relationship rests on exchanges on multiple levels.
Beyond cooperation on national levels, cooperation on subnational state levels, is also
significant. However, each level copes with different concerns and constraints. On that
point, bilateral cooperation in agriculture regularly extends to paradiplomacy
partnerships. Paradiplomacy engagements entail forms of cooperation between national
and sub-national state actors. In paradiplomacy sub states generally seek foreign
government partners to solve specific local problems and overall to improve standards of
living through infrastructure upgrades, better food security, and other developmental
improvement projects. Sub State leaders are typically less worried about diplomatic
intricacies and more focused on overcoming local issues. In the realm of Indian-Israeli
ties, Israel has sealed agreements with several Indian state governments to set up
Agricultural Centres of Excellence. Abadi (2015) postulates that regardless of politics
what Israel has to offer in technology is attractive on the sub-state level. Indian states are
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pragmatic and care less about Mideast politics. Kumar (2014) and Madan (2016) contend
that after formal ties were established in 1992 Israel aggressively instructed its diplomats
to visit various Indian states and meet with local officials and chiefs of states. There have
also been an unusually high number of Indian state leaders visiting Israel. Shichor (2014)
notes Israel has real relationships with individual states as governors of states interact
directly with Israel often because of what it can offer in terms of proven useful problem
solving technologies. Israel’s paradiplomacy relationships were fostered to produce
mutual benefits, but formed mostly around two notable specializations which Israel can
offer in the agriculture sector: irrigation and horticulture. Kumar (2014) contends that
when you engage at these paradiplomacy levels you are afforded positive public opinion
opportunities. Local farming achievement accounts in association with Indian-Israel
demonstration farms injects positive news about Israel-- something that was rare in
previous periods when mostly negative images about the Jewish State were more
prevalent in Indian society. The introduction of Israeli agricultural technology in arid
areas of India created opportunities for non-conflict neutral news about Israel to reach
Indian media. In that context, it helped soften perception of Israel, which was more
associated with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Madan (2016) contends that agriculture
cooperation provides a public relations platform for Israel in individual Indian states.
Furthermore, Kumaraswamy (2014) notes that farming cooperation offers the most
benefit to the largest amount of people. Essentially, technological cooperation in
agriculture showed that there were tangible benefits to the relationship between the two
countries, especially in impoverished rural areas. In fact, in 2009, published conclusions
of an Israel government commissioned international public opinion suggested that India
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is the most pro-Israel country compared to other influential countries. The study also
examined Israel's public stature in several countries like Canada, the US, Britain, France,
China, and Russia. The study did not directly make a connection between pubic opinion
conclusions and Israeli technology transfers. However, it did imply that perceptions of
Israel’s technological achievements could, in part, be contributing factors in boosting a
favorable view of Israel. Study participants were asked to rate Israel before and after
watching videos about the country, which featured among other things Israeli
technological innovations. Inbar (2014) expresses reservations about the findings that
India is the most pro-Israel country in Asia. Nevertheless, the report perhaps points to a
rise in more positive or moderate public opinion positions about Israel among Indian
citizens. Seethi (2014) notes that for more than six decades, India created an image of
Israel as an adversary given the consistent support extended to the Palestinian movement.
He also points out that the nature and context of the support changed considerably over
several years, and it is important for Israel to be in a close relationship with India to
remove fearful perceptions about the Jewish State.
As noted, Israel-Indian paradiplomacy typically involves development
cooperation like farming. On the national level, cooperation is more centered on issues
like national defense, counter-terrorism and space/scientific cooperation. At the that
(federal) level, the strength of the India-Israel relationship rests on interactions through
several branches of government. For example, India’s Ministry of Agriculture and
Cooperation and its Ministry of Defense manage bilateral working relationships with
their Israeli counterparts. Kumaraswamy (2010) asserts India and Israel do not portray
their relationship as an alliance, but instead a friendship. Regardless of how the
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relationship is branded, it is difficult to deny the significant role the military and
agriculture sectors in bilateral interactions both before and after normalization of
relations. Kumar (2014) contends Israel was very aggressive in efforts to make inroads
into Indian public opinion. At the same time India looked for technical solutions. These
two interests appear to converge and translate into extensive cooperation in farming,
national defense issues, and other areas.

INDIA-ISRAEL SHARED AND CONVERGING OF INTERESTS

No doubt India and Israel have a wide scope of mutual interests, and the base of
cooperation in various sectors has been expanding over the years. When it comes to
defense cooperation, Withington (2001) contends each country has something the other
needs. India seeks to upgrade its military, while Israel looks to secure a part in a big
lucrative market. Israel’s military equipment is battle proven offering India an array of
supply sources, but equally important a way to lower reliance on other weapons suppliers
like post-Cold War Russia. Furthermore, Indian-Israeli military cooperation gained
special significance in lieu of Washington’s arms sanctions imposed on New Delhi after
the series of Indian underground nuclear tests. Withington (2001) suggests India’s move
to formalizing relations with Israeli was in part motivated by the wish to increase
cooperation in the security sector.
With the start of full formal relations in 1992, India and Israel began a partnership
in aerospace, which came after an Israeli industry delegation visited India. In the
following years, multiple military equipment deals were signed. For example, in 1995
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when Israeli avionics and surveillance systems were used to upgrade the performance of
aging Soviet era jets, the deal marked India's first major military technology transfer from
Israel. Also, in 1995, Israel and India agreed over the sale of Harpy Reconnaissance
Drones (like those sold to China but later stopped under US pressure). Later, India also
sought Israeli Barak naval defense missiles. Barak anti-missile defense systems are
designed for warships.
A scandal associated with the acquisition of the Barak system ensued starting in
2001, involving an investigation and arrest of senior Indian officials over bribery
allegations. Eventually, the case was closed due to insufficient evidence without
damaging Indian-Israeli relations. Other notable military transactions include the 2004
sale to India of Phalcon Airborne Warning and Control Aircraft (AWACS). As
mentioned in the previous chapter, Israel cancelled the sale of the Phalcon system to
China. Abadi (2015) notes that India received Israeli equipment, which the US opposed
transferring to China. In other words, India received what China did not obtain from
Israel. India also got unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), surveillance radars and small
weapons like sniper and assault rifles.
Israel and India have also collaborated extensively in counter terrorism. In 1994,
India expressed interest in Israeli surveillance technologies, which can track human
movement and could be used on the Indian-Pakistan Kashmiri frontier. In 2000 the Indian
Home Minister Advani visited Israel and looked at the workings of monitoring systems
deployed on the Israeli-Lebanese border. The two countries also set up the India-Israel
Joint Working Group (JWG) on Counter Terrorism. This is a bilateral forum in which
both sides meet regularly to discuss counter terrorism measures on regional and global
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levels. Discussions tend to cover state sponsored terrorism and the prevention of transfer
of weapons to terrorists. India has routinely suggested Pakistan has had a hand in
supporting radical Islamic groups. Israel made similar accusations about Iran’s relations
with Palestinian organizations like HAMAS, which Israel and the US label a terrorist
group.
The exact start date of the JWG forum is unclear, but both Israeli and Indian
foreign affairs sources characterize the 2013 gathering as the 8th annual meeting. The
buildup and growth of Israel-India military ties has been an open secret. Nevertheless,
both governments have mostly kept a lid on defense cooperation keeping it hidden from
public view. Chong (2014) contends that military issues associated with Israel have been
kept off the public agenda because a sizable minority can stir up political turmoil about
getting too close to Israel. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, India has been hesitant about
displaying open military ties with Israel in part because of objections in India's large
Muslim community and also by overall worries of harm to India’s interests in the wider
Middle East. When considering military dealings, Inbar (2014) suggests an important
distinction when it comes to transparency between military and civilian sectors dealings.
Civilian technology transactions generally operate in an open market, while the transfer
of military technology usually takes place in a closed, (concealed) market out of the
public eye. Kumaraswamy (2014) notes the military is the number one sector of
cooperation in sheer terms of dollars. In contrast, agricultural cooperation yields the most
in terms of number of beneficiaries.
Military cooperation is one of the most contentious aspects of Indian-Israeli
relations but also a matter of mutual country-to-country trust. India had concerns about
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Israeli involvement in Chinese defense projects. In turn, Israel had concerns about India’s
close ties with Iran, which could pose possible risks of technology forwarding.
Technology forwarding is the passing of technology to a third party, which can be
authorized or unauthorized by the technology producer. Furthermore, with the export of
defense technologies, Israel had to be mindful of American concerns about arms transfers
to India especially since Washington viewed New Delhi with concern after its 1998
nuclear tests.

2014 MODI AND ISRAEL

Cooperation between India and Israel dramatically strengthened and were made
more visible in 2014 after the election of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. When
Modi visited Israel several years before as Chief Minister of the State of Gujarat he
openly talked about Israel as a success story and model to be followed. In the months
following the start of his term as Prime Minister, Israel increased the quantity of weapons
and defense items transferred to India. In 2014, India was the largest buyer of Israeli
military equipment. Dhume (2014) asserts increased openness in Indian-Israeli relations
by the Modi government perhaps suggests a strategic partnership with Israel carries more
weight for India than solidarity for the Palestinian cause. A seemingly subtle shift in
policy may be evidenced by India’s abstention on a pivotal vote at the UN aimed at
denouncing Israel for its 2014 military operation in Gaza. India expressed concern over
civilian deaths in the Gaza Strip but also blamed HAMAS rocket fire into Israel calling it
a provocation. The abstention could be seen as a diplomatic victory for Israel when
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compared to past resolutions. For example, India voted previously at the UN to condemn
the building of Israel’s security or separation wall in the disputed West Bank territory.

SOFTER ISRAEL POLICY?
Kumaraswamy (2014), Kumar (2014) and Gilboa (2014) describe India’s foreign
policy towards the Middle East as a dichotomy, which is seemingly contradictory. While
India broadened economic, military and scientific ties with Israel it for the most part
simultaneously maintained pro-Palestinian policy positions on key Israeli-Palestinian
conflict points of contention such as Israeli settlements, borders, and refugees. India’s
voting record on the Middle East at the United Nations has not dramatically changed
even after the establishment of formal relations with Israel. In 2012 India supported the
Palestinian bid at the UN for observer state status in opposition to Israeli objections.
Furthermore, Indian officials even expressed support for designating East Jerusalem as
the capital of a proposed State of Palestine. That notion is something the leaders of Israel
have repeatedly vowed they would never agree to as mentioned previously. However,
there are some subtle signs of change of India’s policies at the UN even before Modi
entered office in 2014.
In 1985 (seven years before full formal ties), Natarajan Krishnan, India’s
Ambassador to the UN, in a speech to the General Assembly, characterized Israel as a
perpetrator of “acts of repression and terror, denial of fundamental rights and various
violations of human rights.” He added, “Israel is seeking to bring about permanent
geopolitical and demographic changes in the region at the expense of the Palestinians and
this must be prevented”. No doubt these are punitive statements. However, in 2012 (two
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decades after formal ties were established) Hardeep Singh Puri the Indian Ambassador to
the U. N. maintained a somewhat critical yet moderated tone towards Israel stating, “the
situation in the occupied Palestinian territories has been deteriorating due to settlement
activities in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Those activities are creating new realities
on the ground and threaten the very premise of a two-state solution”. He also added, “our
Prime Minister, Mr. Manmohan Singh, reiterated India’s unwavering support for the
Palestinian people’s struggle for a sovereign, independent, viable and united State of
Palestine, with East Jerusalem as its capital, living within secure and internationally
recognized borders, side by side and at peace with Israel, as endorsed in the Arab Peace
Initiative, the Quartet road map and relevant Security Council resolutions”. The statement
suggests that India, like China, remains highly critical toward Israel but in a moderated
voice. The tone might not sound the friendliest to the ears of Israeli policymakers, but can
be considered moderate when compared to statements in pre-full formal ties times like
the one above. The statement about the Jewish State is not exclusively critical, and it also
accounts for Israel’s right to exist in the framework of peaceful side-by-side existence.
India’s pro-Palestinian stance has been an understandably delicate issue in Indian-Israeli
dialogues since the start of full diplomatic relations in 1992. Yeager (2004), points out
India has also looked to avoid sponsoring anti-Israeli UN resolutions since forging formal
relations in 1992 even as it continues to support the Palestinian cause at the UN. Have
India’s political positions on the Middle East gone unchanged or has a softening of
political policies taken place? Buttressing the above analysis, the following section
evaluates India’s Israel policy over a span of more than two decades by drawing on a
combination of data trends and content analysis.
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CONTENT ANALYSIS AND DATA TRENDS

Israel's ties with India, like those developed with other Asian nations including
China, have made significant strides after more than two decades of full diplomatic
relations. Bilateral ties have grown through a myriad of government to government,
NGO, and commercial exchanges as technology and knowledge based collaborations
have emerged as major features in the narrative of Indian-Israeli relations.
In the previous (China) chapter, several scholars interviewed for this
dissertation expressed doubt that Israel's technology ties are somehow determinants in
shaping the policies of other countries towards the Jewish State. The speakers notably
spoke in general terms but implied that Israel’s technical cooperation operations bear
little or negligible consequence in the policies of countries towards the Middle East and
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular.
Given India’s general interests in the Middle East, some scholars are skeptical
that Israel has outright achieved political gains as a consequence of technical ties. Inbar
(2014) discounts the prospects of political gains given Indian-Israeli technical
collaborations, asserting that it is simply a matter of business, and has nothing to do with
politics. Inbar, however, concedes that India, like China, would not be attracted to Israel
if Israel had nothing of value to offer. Gilboa (2014) agrees with the notion that there is
no direct translation from the technology transfers to political dividends since strategic
cooperation does not extend to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but adds gains can be
achieved in terms of trade. Gilboa (2014) also revealed that while on an academic
research trip to India, his hosts stressed that what India says about the Palestinians in
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international arenas is really not important, what India buys from Israel and what Israel
and India do together is more important. Panda (2015) also throws in a measure of doubt
regarding whether technical ties with India yield forms of soft power for Israel.
However, Indian-Israeli ties like Sino-Israeli relations reveal evidence
suggesting that technical ties, while not perfectly correlated, do offer viable opportunities
to promote bilateral relations, and by extension, open pathways to wider understandings
between partner countries even on controversial political issues. Said differently, nonpolitical technical cooperation may help to create settings, which promote forms of
diplomatic accommodations like softer language towards Israel in international arenas.
Seethi (2014) adds to the chorus of voices who downplay the idea that technical ties have
directly affected New Delhi’s Middle East policy, also acknowledges India has made
moves to balance relations in the region in response to emerging Middle East realities.
Pant (2016) posits India has veered toward being more even handed in its approach to the
Israel-Palestinian issue. Kumaraswamy (2014) reluctantly leaves the door open to the
possibility of minor policy adjustments by India like the softening of diplomatic language
toward Israeli policies in international arenas. Bitzinger (2015) suggests technology ties
may soften Indian policies towards Israel in the context of the Palestinian Israeli conflict,
although only to a limited extent. Bitzinger affirms that India is still committed to the
Palestinian cause, but questions what that support actually means in more recent times
(after 2014). In doing so, he suggests that India’s support for the Palestinians is somewhat
murky, not as defined or solid given as it was in past periods, and has perhaps de-facto
diminished in nature. Abadi (2015) generally agrees that technology based relations do
not have any pull on India’s Israel policy, yet points out a decrease in anti-Israel
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sentiments in India during the 2014 Gaza War. Regardless of the magnitude of gains for
Israel, Israeli policymakers generally regard any diplomatic gains as gains. This notion of
achievements was implied in a conversation with an official at the Israel Ministry of
Foreign Affairs in Jerusalem. India's eventual receptiveness to advance relations to full
formal ties was in itself an achievement. As outlined earlier, India's loss of Soviet
support after the Cold War, coupled with economic liberalization and political reforms
created openings for new directions in New Delhi’s foreign policies. All of these factors
worked to advance expanded engagements with Israel, which were limited before 1992.
Below, the chapter next considers the weight of Israel’s technology transfers in assessing
trade, bilateral exchanges and policy towards the Middle East using data trends and
content analysis.

CONTENT ANALYSIS

The content analysis below emulates the methods used in the previous chapter.
This chapter also utilized the qualitative summative method, which considers word
occurrences, significance, positioning and interplay of words or concepts in statements
made by Indian officials. It is important to reiterate that the qualitative content analysis is
based on subjective researcher choices with regards to data labeling, classification, and
other data filtering. Furthermore, research strategies are guided by researcher interests,
literature content, and insights gained from conversations with experts. The strategies
used are a product of trial and error efforts which are mindful of the study’s overall
research constraints.
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An assessment of technical ties and bilateral exchanges in Indian-Israeli relations
draws on a review of tens of thousands of articles and government sources.
Interpretations about variations in India’s policies towards Israel/Middle East are based
on official Indian statements at the UN over the study period (1989-2014). Since the
dissertation draws on a significant quantity of textual data, NVivo content analysis
software is utilized to preform the analysis. NVivo is used here in the same manner it was
utilized in the previous chapter. Three chart categories are displayed below: Trade,
Bilateral Exchanges, and UN Ambassador Positive/Negative Words.

DATA TRENDS

The study also makes use of selected quantitative (mostly economic statistics)
data as part of its examination of Indian-Israeli ties. It will evaluate trade/economic
based Comtrade data. Also considered are data figures about bilateral exchanges in the
form of number of official visits and treaties. To better understand the significance of the
numbers, the datasets are visualized in the form of tables and graph charts as was also
done in the previous China case chapter.

DATA START DATES

Please note, like in the previous chapter data collected and used for the purpose of
analysis does not include all time periods identified in the full narrative of Indian-Israeli
relations described above. This is the case for two main reasons. First, the analysis
portion of study is not intended to cover the entire historical narrative of ties between
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Israel and India. The declared analysis portion of the study period starts from 1989, a few
years before full diplomatic relations started in 1992. Second, data availability was
restricted. Reliable official data on trade is only documented from 1995 onward, while
official bilateral exchanges data become available from the early 1990’s at the time when
relations became formalized and less secretive. Though UN data in the form speeches and
statements documenting country political positions go back decades, the study period
begins at the end of the 1980s. Therefore, UN political textual data is collected from that
time onward. Hence, the start dates of the data types utilized here are not the same
because of availability limitations. However, despite this constraint the data groups do
represent adequate overlapping time periods to enable a reasonable capability to assess
covariance of variable trends.
INDIA’S POLITICAL APPROACH TOWARDS ISRAEL/MIDDLE EAST (CONTENT ANALYSIS)

The dissertation examines statements made at the UN by Indian representatives
on Israeli-Palestinian conflict specific issues. As explained fully in the previous chapter,
UN voting patterns should not be taken as complete testimonies to assess Israel’s
diplomatic achievements. It is the toned-down rhetoric and the “behind the scenes”
dynamics which likely most matter in the making of durable bilateral relations.
The purpose of the content analysis is to assess how India’s policy on the Middle
East has changed over the past few decades. In particular, it seeks to determine if policy
statements are more accommodative of Israel given growing technical cooperation. As a
first step, the names of Indian UN ambassadors who served during the study range of
years (1989-2014) were identified. Then, ambassador name-specific searches were
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conducted within the UN Information System on the Question of Palestine (UNISPAL)
database. As mentioned earlier, this is the forum, which features debates on the IsraelPalestinian conflict. While the search results of ambassador name queries capture
documents, which contain Indian ambassador statements they also include speeches made
by representatives of other countries. This content was further filtered (coded) to isolate
speeches by Indian representatives from those of other diplomats participating in the
same debate session. Next, the isolated Indian diplomat-specific texts were classified by
year dates. The classification by year dates enables the tracking of possible changes in
India's Middle East policy on an annual basis.
Then, with the assistance of NVivo software, a word frequency query was
launched to determine the 1000 most common words used in debates about the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict from 1989-2014 see full list (Appendix 1). The word
frequency results were reviewed for guidance to select a number of terms routinely used
to describe Israeli policies in the context of the conflict with the Palestinians. The word
selections were based on the researcher’s personal assessments, which drew on the
scholarly literature, media reports, interview conversations, and overall first hand
familiarity with conflict contexts (while working as TV news producer in the conflict
region). The list of the 1000 most common words generated by NVivo in the case of
Indian diplomat speeches is similar to the list generated by their Chinese counterparts.
However, this list is not an exact duplication. Therefore, the pool of 1000 words in the
case of Indian diplomats is not an exact copy of the pool of 1000 words drawn from
speeches of Chinese representatives.
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Selected word choices were coded as either “negative” or “positive” with regard
to Israeli actions/policies in the conflict with the Palestinians. For example,
“negotiations” was considered positive since it doesn’t single out Israel for criticism and
generally used in the framework of promoting conflict resolution. However, a word like
“aggression” is typically used to criticize Israel’s military operations and therefore would
be coded as negative. The words selected in the positive category are peace, coexistence,
parties, achievements, solution, and negotiations. The words selected in the negative
category are occupied, rights, activities, settlements, military and aggression. See
Appendix 2 for actual verbatim examples of how each (selected) word is used either in
positive and negative contexts in comments made by Indian envoys at the UN.
The selected sample words were cross tabulated as part of a matrix. In all, three
matrices were produced. The first matrix features positive category words crossreferenced against Indian ambassador statements categorized by year dates. The second
matrix features negative category words cross-referenced against Indian ambassador
speeches categorized by year dates. The third matrix displays a side-by-side comparison
of aggregate frequency sums of negative words vs. aggregate frequency sum of positive
category words. Matrix results are visualized in the form of 3D bar graphs as shown
below. In this way, the selected words whether projecting positive or negative notions
can be observed for variance over the span of the study period on a year-to-year basis.

POSITIVE WORDS

Figure 2 displays the frequency use of positive words: peace, co-existence,
parties, achievement, solution and negotiations. These words typically allude to softer

249

attitudes towards Israel in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Table 1, also
below, offers a word frequency table displaying precise numbers of positive words.

Figure 2 - India Ambassador Positive Word Frequencies 1989 - 2014
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Table 1 – India Ambassador Positive Word Frequencies 1989 - 2014

The positive words generally suggest steps towards peacemaking and in doing so
imply a more balanced approach towards all sides in the conflict. In Figure 2, the word
“peace” is more predominant in usage in the last decade, which was also the case with
China. Other words like parties, negotiations, and solution follow similar trends. There
are also distinct spikes in word frequencies of the featured words, especially during major
events like conflict escalations (for example, Gaza wars of 2009 and 2014) or peace
initiatives (for example, peace efforts in the mid-1990s). However, the frequencies of
these terms are lower in years between such major events. It is important to note an
obvious yet necessary point: the word frequency counts are based solely on Indian
statements. Low frequency count does not necessarily imply Indian diplomats were less
present during sessions. In fact, Indian representatives may have been present in debates
but for whatever reason did not necessarily make remarks. Passive participation could
possibly imply a form of abstention on behalf India (Gilboa, 2014). An abstention, by
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extension, can reduce diplomatic pressure on Israel. Nevertheless, an overall upward
trend of positive word usage is noticeable in Figure 2.
The increase in the frequency of the word “peace” appearing, feasibly suggests a
more restrained approach towards the conflict by India, and arguably avoids the
perception of leaning in favor of one particular side. The 2014 Gaza War exemplifies
this possibility as Israel and HAMAS (the group which rules the coastal strip) took to the
battlefield. Efforts and calls to stop the fighting produced more frequent use of the term
“peace”. The term is an all-embracing concept usually directed at all conflict parties
rather than merely laying blame for the violence on one particular side, namely Israel. As
mentioned earlier, historically India has been routinely critical of Israel at the UN. Trends
shown in Figure 2 suggests a more evenhanded approach during some distinct periods.

NEGATIVE WORDS

Figure 3 shows the frequency use of negative words: occupied, rights, activities,
settlements, aggression and military. These words are typically used to express rigid
attitudes towards Israel in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Table 2, also
below, offers a word frequency table displaying precise numbers of negative words.

252

Figure 3 - India Ambassador Negative Word Frequencies 1989 - 2014

Table 2 - India Ambassador Negative Word Frequencies 1989 - 2014
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Critics of Israeli policies regularly use the word “occupied”. Usually usage of
“occupied” signifies a strong challenge to the Jewish State’s claims over lands it seized in
the 1967 Six-Day War. As shown in Figure 3, the term “occupied” seems to have been
used in equivalent proportions by Indian representatives both in the distant past, prior to
full ties with Israel, as well as in more recent years. As suggested earlier, India has, to
some degree, remained pro-Palestinian. Yet the frequency usage of the word “occupied”,
and other negative category words did not increase in 2009 as would be expected with the
onset of a new round of fighting in Gaza during that year. The UNISPAL debates
generated by the 2009 flare-up between Israel and HAMAS in Gaza did not increase
rhetoric on the part of India, but did in the case of China as shown in the previous
chapter. The fighting started in late December 2008, but extended to January 2009 before
a ceasefire was reached. In the immediate aftermath, as the extent of damage and
casualties emerged, charged deliberation took place at the UN. The same overall word
frequency pattern is repeated in 2014, albeit to a lesser extent, when another Israel-Gaza
war unfolded. This suggests a less critical approach by India in 2014 when the IndianIsraeli relationship had shown signs of stronger bilateral cooperation. At this time,
political uncertainty persisted across the Middle East in the wake of the Arab Spring,
which started in 2011. The political instability tended to foster a more balanced policy
vis-à-vis the region with India shying away from being too over critical about Israel. The
2014 election of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi may have contributed a
moderating tone since he had already developed close ties with Israel as leader of the BJP
and as former Chief Minister of Gujarat as part of paradiplomacy initiatives.
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The following Figure 4 shows a side-by-side comparison of the total sum of
positive and negative category word frequencies. For a word frequency table displaying
precise frequency numbers of terms see Appendix 3.

Figure 4 - India Ambassador Negative Vs. Positive Word Frequencies 1989 - 2014

Figure 4 shows a side-by-side comparison of the total sum of positive and
negative category word frequencies. The frequency of both negative and positive
category words has increased in more recent years. Interestingly, however, here too, as
was the case in the previous China chapter, positive category word usage has grown
significantly more than usage of negative category words. Put differently, this suggests an
overall trend of greater balanced language usage by Indian representatives at the UN
about the conflict. This does not necessarily translate into actual policy shifts in the form
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of UN votes in support of Israel, but does suggest willingness to abstain from harsh
criticism of the Jewish State.
As demonstrated throughout the chapter, technology based collaboration has
emerged as a significant factor in Indian-Israeli ties. The section below explores whether
the terms technology and cooperation are dominant in conversations about relations
between the two countries. This was accomplished through an NVivo assisted analysis of
tens of thousands of media reports, each of which simultaneously referenced India and
Israel during the period between 1989 and 2014. Press textual data has been classified
(coded) by year of publication. The classification was done to standardize time units of
analysis like UN speeches data and trade data, which are also sorted on a year-by-year
basis. The results of the analysis are visualized in Figure 5 as follows. For a word
frequency table displaying precise numbers of terms see Appendix 4.
Figure 5 - Israel-India Technology Word Frequencies 1988 – 2014

256

Figure 5 above shows the word frequencies “Israeli’, “technology” and
“cooperation”. The chart shows similar growth patterns from year to year for all 3 words.
As the word frequency of one term grows, so does the usage of the other two words. This
pattern implies a covariance between the terms “Israeli” and “technology” and “Israeli”
and “cooperation”. In other words, the more Israel is referenced in stories, which include
text, or stories about India and its relationship with the Jewish State, the more technology
and cooperation are part of the conversation.
TRADE – ISRAELI EXPORTS TO INDIA (DATA TRENDS)
Israeli exports to India are important components of Israel’s diplomatic efforts
broadly defined. Israel-India trade figures utilized here are sourced from Comtrade as in
the pervious chapter. Comtrade is the UN trade-tracking organization in which individual
UN member states self report on their trade with other members.
Annual trade or export volumes, from Israel to India are a central indicator of robust
ties between the two countries. The trade figures considered below are limited to export
flows from Israel. This approach is adopted since the focus of the dissertation pertains to
gains for Israel. Comtrade statistics cover only the period 1995-2014; therefore, they do
not correspond to the full expanse of the study period (1989-2014), yet they overlap
enough to be meaningful measures of the scale of bilateral ties. What follows are trade
figures in table form (Table 3) and below in chart form (Figure 6).
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Table 3

UN Comtrade Trade – Figures as Reported by Israel

Year

Trade Flow

Reporter

Partner

Trade Value (US$)

1995

Export

Israel

India

$314,499,008.00

1996

Export

Israel

India

$315,743,000.00

1997

Export

Israel

India

$364,817,000.00

1998

Export

Israel

India

$334,476,992.00

1999

Export

Israel

India

$536,244,000.00

2000

Export

Israel

India

$556,936,000.00

2001
2002

Export
Export

Israel
Israel

India
India

$473,430,000.00
$613,829,000.00

2003

Export

Israel

India

$717,936,000.00

2004

Export

Israel

India

$1,037,793,000.00

2005

Export

Israel

India

$1,222,754,000.00

2006

Export

Israel

India

$1,289,329,000.00

2007

Export

Israel

India

$1,613,630,000.00

2008

Export

Israel

India

$2,361,225,000.00

2009

Export

Israel

India

$1,810,744,000.00

2010

Export

Israel

India

$2,890,155,000.00

2011

Export

Israel

India

$3,036,385,000.00

2012

Export

Israel

India

$2,460,832,000.00

2013

Export

Israel

India

$2,237,992,000.00

2014

Export

Israel

India

$2,202,593,000.00
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Figure 6 - Israel Exports to India 1995-2014
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Source: Comtrade (United Nations)
Figure 6 (generated from Comtrade figures) generally demonstrates strong
growth in Israeli exports to India. Growth is slow in the early years of formal relations
but accelerates in more recent years. This pattern was also indicative in the case of SinoIsraeli relations. The upward trend suggests a dramatic tightening of ties and contrasts
with previous decades dominated by informal quiet interactions in the absence of full
formal relations.
There are also noticeable dips, in particular in 1998, 2001, 2009, 2011 and 2013
but otherwise export trends demonstrate noteworthy gains. It is not fully clear why
slowdowns occurred in those years. However, a financial crisis in Asia most notably in
1997 affected countries in the Far East like South Korea and Thailand and may have also
spilled over into the economies of South Asia in 1998 and thus also impacted economic
engagement with India. Also an International Monetary Fund (IMF) report points to
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overall difficulties in the global economy in 1996, which it attributes to a financial
slowdown in Asia.
In 2001, Israeli exports slightly decreased but picked up the next year. While
exports figures displayed in the chart above do not include military products, the aborted
defense deal with China (detailed in the previous chapter) may have indirectly adversely
impacted the flow of consumer goods, which may be considered by the US and
international treaties as dual use technologies. Such products are intended for commercial
use but encase technologies, which can also be utilized for military purposes. These
commodities may be in the form or hardware, software or even a chemical. This
backdrop may have curtailed the range of Israeli goods for export even to India. Israeli
companies, unsure if their products could be considered dual use by the US, tended to be
more cautious about what to export for fear of being perceived as non-compliant with
Washington’s policies. As a consequence of non-compliance, Israeli companies (whether
private or public entities) run the risk of being barred from the lucrative US market. The
significant decline in Israeli exports in 2009 seen in the chart above is also likely
associated with the worldwide recession, which began the previous year (2008) and
produced an overall international trade slowdown.
It should be noted that actual volumes of Israeli exports to India (like in the case of
China) are in reality significantly higher than Comtrade data suggest. This scenario is
realistic because Comtrade indicators are based on country self-reporting. This kind of
reporting allows the reporting country (Israel) to omit information about the transfer of
military commodities. As stated earlier, arms technology transfers are usually done
secretly. Most state-to-state military transactions take place away from the public eye as
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suggested by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). SIPRI is a
think tank that monitors armaments, arms control and disarmament. It names Israel as
one of the few countries, which have not publically disclosed details about the export of
defense products. On the the arms receiving side (India), Kumaraswamy (2010) points
out the Indian government did not declassify official documents about the country’s
external relations. This includes arms arrangements with Israel. India did introduce a
right to information act in 2005, but the measure did not apply to documents on foreign
policy dealings. Nevertheless, SIPRI has published independent statistics about Israeli
military exports to India. The following chart (Figure 7) was created based on SIPRI data.

Figure 7 - Israeli Arms Transfers to India 1989-2014 (in millions of US dollars)
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Source: SIPRI

The chart above shows a steady increase in Israeli military exports to India from the
late 90s to the mid 2000s. This trend is especially noticeable in the immediate years after
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the 1999 Kargil War between Pakistan and India. During the crisis, Israel was one of the
few countries willing to provide weapons to India despite an arms embargo. Israel’s
assistance opened the door for additional weapons in the following years. Given the
challenging mountainous terrain of the battlefield, the conflict exposed deficiencies in
India’s military defenses, prompting the need to seek new military technologies.
After this period, a decline ensues. The slowdown may perhaps be attributed to
the shaping of a more constrained policy by Israel on military related exports in the
aftermath of Israeli-American tensions over controversial dealings with China. However,
the downward trend in military exports may also be a consequence of increased joint
Indian-Israeli ventures in the defense industry. Joint projects in the Indian-Israeli
relationship tend to entail the setup of manufacturing production lines in India.
Production in India may lessen the traffic of exported finished defense goods from Israel,
and thus would not necessarily register in arms trade estimates. In 2006, Israel and India
signed a joint development agreement to produce a medium range naval air defense
missile (Barak). The project aimed to help India address its major air defense liabilities
and to protect key strategic resources and assets. As noted earlier, defense sector related
interactions are usually secret undertakings, therefore it is likely that SIPRI data might
not fully capture the true magnitude of military exports, which opens up the possibility
that actual export volumes of armaments could be higher. Nevertheless, the numbers in
figure 7 suggest dealings associated with the defense sector are key components in
Indian-Israeli relations.
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INDIAN-ISRAELI EXCHANGES (DATA TRENDS)
Mutual exchanges are another aspect of robustness of bilateral ties. Exchanges
for the purpose of this study are comprised of two components: mutual visits and bilateral
treaties. Only official state sanctioned visits are considered. A list of visits was complied
based on official Israeli and Indian government information. Exchange visits can be on
any government level, like national, provincial, or municipal, or of other kinds, like
academic, as long as visits are officially published by either Indian or Israeli government
sources. A single visit exchange event is considered a single occurrence regardless of
how many meeting encounters take place. For example, an official may meet just one or
more counterparts on a visit. In this case the exchange would be registered as a singular
event. The second component of mutual exchanges are Indo-Israeli bilateral agreements
in the form of a treaty or memorandums of understanding (MOUs). The total sum of
bilateral exchanges is the number of exchange visits plus the number of bilateral
agreements per calendar year. See Appendix 5 for a comprehensive list of visits and
treaties. These numbers are considered on an annual basis. Figure 8 displays the number
of exchanges on a year-by-year basis.

263

Figure 8 – Israel-India Number of Exchanges (Visits and Treaties) 1991 -2014
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Sources: India Ministry of External Affairs and Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Figure 8 depicts downward and upward fluctuations in the number of exchanges
from year to year. However, overall there has been a rise in the number of exchanges in
more recent times since the start of full ties in 1992. It is important to note that even after
1992 India remained somewhat hesitant of openly engaging Israel. This was more the
case under the rule of the Congress Party and less so under the leadership of Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP). Some Indian politicians, responding to competing domestic and
international sympathies, were wary of creating a public perception of being seen as too
close to the Jewish State. The number of exchanges illustrated in Figure 8 is a general
trend indicator of bilateral exchanges, but they do not necessarily include an absolute or
true tally of official visits. Gilboa (2014) notes foreign-policy activities may be concealed
because a partner nation may be party to programs and policies in cooperation with third
party countries that have some kind of sensitivity to relations with Israel. The numbers
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displayed in the chart are solely based on Indian and Israeli government sources, and
hence do not account for an inventory of private meetings which may have transpired.
Israel and India seem to sometimes adopt opposing approaches about what and what not
to publish about exchanges. It appears as if, on the Israeli end, policymakers seek to
maximize the impression of gainful engagement with a major partner, perhaps with the
aim to dispel notions, which suggest political isolation. On the Indian side, some officials
may tend to want to minimize the significance of contacts with Israel. This may be
evidenced in part by inconsistencies between Israeli government and Indian government
published information on bilateral exchanges (visits and treaties). The official Israeli
government source shows a more comprehensive list of visit exchanges between the two
countries than the Indian government source. If you look at the Israeli government
information, you will find a longer list of bilateral visits than listed by the Indian
government. It is unknown if the discrepancies between Indian and Israeli government
information about visits are perhaps simply publishing errors or part of a calculated
policy. Nevertheless, a distinct spike in the number of exchanges occurred in the years
just after the upgrading to full diplomatic ties. The chart also displays some “dead” spots
when the number of exchanges registered 0 instances most notably in 1995 and 1997.
This does not necessarily mean that exchanges did not happen. They may have indeed
occurred, but not made public. Unlike the ties with China, Indian-Israeli relations for the
most part stayed clear of complications and frictions. However, allegations of corruption
and bribery dogged the important Barak missile deal between Israel and India. The vocal
controversy over alleged irregularities and bribery could have pressed Indian officials to
tone down public aspects of ties with Israel. Madan (2016) contends that despite growth
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in ties, the relationship experienced periods void of many high-visibility visits from India

to Israel.
TECHNOLOGY FACTOR (INDEPENDENT VARIABLE)

As mentioned earlier, overall Indian-Israeli relations have generally grown in terms
of trade volumes and bilateral exchanges. India has also shown signs of shifting towards
more neutral or balanced language regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the
international arena. Furthermore, content analysis of media materials of recent decades
suggests technology is as dominant a theme in Indian-Israeli relations as it was in SinoIsraeli relations. The main research question of this study explores a possible relationship,
however loose, between technology transfers and growth of Indian-Israeli relations. To
illustrate this possibility, a series of timeline diagrams are used to outline technology and
knowledge sharing occurrences in the Indian-Israeli narrative at distinctive points in time.
Overall two major time periods are distinguishable: before and after the establishment of
full diplomatic relations in 1992.

BEFORE FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS (1948-1992)

Prior to 1992, technology cooperation was less of a factor in contacts between New
Delhi and Jerusalem. Nevertheless, Israel and India had some early contacts revolving
around technology sharing exchanges, as Figure 9 below illustrates. For example, as
noted previously, India sought to draw on the Israeli experience as early as 1949, during
its first year after independence. At that time, India turned to Israel for cooperation in
farming. Interestingly, the technical interaction happened in the immediate years even
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before India initially recognizes Israel and allowed the opening of an Israeli consulate in
Bombay (now Mumbai). Despite seeming progress in relations marked by a recognition
of Israel and the opening of a very limited Israeli consulate, early contacts did not appear
to produce any significant advancement in ties between the two countries for some time.
Figure 9 – Narrative Timeline 1948 to 1959

1948 Israel Gains
Independence

1949 Agricuture
Assistance Requested
By India

1949 India Gains Independence
1950 Recognition and Israel
Consulate opens in Bombay
(Mumbai)

1956 Sinai Conflict
1959 Israel Foreigm
Minister Sharett
Visits India

Various Infrequent Informal Quiet
Diplomatic Contacts in Various World
Capitals ( dates varied )

Nevertheless, as contentious or seemingly non-productive as the interactions
were, Israel and India did maintain a line of communications which came to play from
time to time in unique periods. This was the case during the India-China border conflict
of 1962 when Israel was approached to supply weapons, which it did. In the period which
follows, (see Figure 10) relations between Israel and India experienced a mix of notable
high-level meetings and military related contacts. These included meetings of foreign
ministers and the start of intelligence sharing between India’s security agency, Research
and Analysis Wing (RAW), and the Israeli Intelligence Agency (MOSSAD).
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Also, there were additional episodes of Israeli input in India’s military affairs-this time by the Israelis responding to India’s outreach to secure a supply of weapons in
the 1965 and 1971 Indian-Pakistan wars. Indian-Israeli exchanges during times of trouble
have tended to appear isolated and inconsequential in terms of bringing the two countries
closer in the short run. In the long term such contacts have, at the very least, helped create
a template for further interactions involving military issues and overall technical
collaborations. In a sense, even quiet and secret interactions can set precedent and amass
an inventory of collaborations, which can be leveraged to legitimize future open
cooperation once, conditions permit. Once Israel and India upgraded their relations in
1992, it was expected that defense ties would play a central role in bilateral cooperation
based on past history. Indeed, that is what happened and continues in more recent times.
Figure 10 – Narrative Timeline 1960s to 1977

Israel India Intelligence
Sharing Begins in 1960s

1965 Indo-Pakistani
War Israeli Military
Input Requested

1962 India China Conflict Israeli
Military Input Reqested

1969 Israeli Foreign
Ministers Meeting

1971 Indo-Pakistani War Israeli
Military Input Requested

1977 Israeli Foreign Moshe
Dayan Minister Visits India ( in
the absence of full formal ties
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In the lead up to expanded ties, Figure 11 illustrates key interactions in the late
1980s--contacts leading to eventual establishment of full formal ties. This includes more
cooperation in agriculture and top level meetings. In this period, Rajiv Gandhi becomes
the leader of India in the aftermath of the assassination of his mother Indira Gandhi. As
Prime Minister he publicly met with Israeli officials, most notably meeting Israeli Prime
Minister Shimon Peres in New York in 1985. He also met with American pro-Israel
groups. Another sign of toward normalization came in 1989 when India allowed the
upgrading of the Israeli consulate in Mumbai.
Figure 11 – Narrative Timeline Mid-1980s to 1992
Mid 80s Indirect
Cooperation in Agriculture

1985 PM Gandhi Openly
Meets Israeli Officals
and US Pro-Israel
Groups

1984 Rajiv Ghandhi Becomes Prime
Miinister
1985 Indian -Israeli Prime
Ministers Meet

1989 Israel Consulate in Mumbai
Expands Operation

1992 Embassies
Open in Tel Aviv and
New Delhi Full
Diplomatic Relations
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FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 1992 AND BEYOND

After the establishment of full diplomatic ties in 1992, Indian-Israeli technical
cooperation accelerated. In the first decade of formal ties, levels of cooperation in the
defense and agricultural sectors rose. The period also marks more visible forms of
cooperation. In 1993, just a year after the start of formal ties, the first Indian-Israeli
agriculture agreement was signed (see Figure 12). Given the history of relations, the
agreement is not the first agricultural interaction between the two countries. However, the
agreement did formalize a partnership on a larger scale in an area of great significance in
terms of social and economic benefits to ordinary Indian citizens. The 1993 agreement
would introduce new Israeli farming techniques adapted to local Indian conditions, but
also be the start in a series of major agriculture collaborations to come such as the 1996
Indo-Israel Research and Development Farm.
Figure 12 – Narrative Timeline 1992 to 1999
1992 Embassies Open in
Tel Aviv and New Delhi
Full Diplomatic Relations

1996 Indo-Israel
Research and
Development Farm
inaugurated

1993 Argricultural Agreement
1998 Pro Leaning Israel BJP
Party Forms Government

1998 India Nuclear Tests

1998 US Imposes
Ban in Export of
Select Defense
Technology Material
to India

1999 Kargil Conflict India Seeks
Israeli Military Input.
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This time span also saw a noteworthy expansion of military technology transfers
especially given the 1999 Kargil conflict. The war created more opportunities for Israeli
arms sales, but more importantly, set the stage for turning Israel into a major armaments
supplier and joint venture collaborator in the defense industry. During this period, official
trade data (UN/Comtrade) become available as shown in Figure 13, below. So while
Israeli transfers activities increased, volumes of Israeli commercial exports to India too
echoed a general trend upwards as well.
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Figure 13 – Israel Exports to India 1995-1999
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Bilateral exchanges in terms of number of treaties and visits showed some growth
during the initial honeymoon period after the establishment of full diplomatic relations
(see Figure 14 below). There are also years in which no activity was registered such as in
1992 and 1995. In the realm of Indian-Israeli relations, the existence of formal ties did
not always translate into public bilateral engagement. The visibility of the relationship
between India and Israel has historically oscillated up and down. The party in power in
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India was a major factor in determining these oscillations. During the majority of this
time period, the Congress Party ruled India. Traditionally, the Congress Party has
minimized the public display of relations with Israel. This period also saw the beginning
of regular, high level interactions between the two countries when Israeli President, Ezer
Weizmann, visited India in 1996.
Figure 14 – Israel-India Number of Exchanges (Visits and Treaties) 1991-1999
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Furthermore, Figure 15 below suggests an overall shift in the type of language
used by Indian representatives during UN debates about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The chart indicates the easing of rhetoric directed at Israel by depicting a higher
frequency count of positive terms versus negative terms as defined earlier. While
language used is not devoid of criticism towards Israel, it occurred in moderated tones
and generally avoided only targeting Israeli policies.
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Figure 15 - India Ambassador Negative Vs. Positive Word Frequencies 1989 - 1999

Nevertheless, Israeli military technology transfers to India began to pick up after the
early 2000s (see figure 16). As the movement of armaments increased, India saw the first
visit by an Israeli Prime Minister. At this time, security matters were a prominent focus
of ties between the two countries. The very visible visit came while the Bharatiya Janata
Party (BJP) was in power. The Hindu linked BJP tended to favor wider ties with Israel. In
fact, in the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001 India’s BJP government
concurred with Israel’s assertion of growing threats especially from radical Islamic
groups. In addition to security matters, growing cooperation in agriculture was a major
topic of discussion between India and Israel.
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Figure 16 – Narrative Timeline 2000 to mid-2000s
2000 first senior Indian
minister to visit Israel since
the 1992

Early 2000s India benefits
from Cancelled SinioIsraeli Arms Deal

Early 2000s Israeli military technology
exports to India grow

2001 Barak Missile Scandal
2003 Israeli Prime Minister Visits India
2004 Congress Party
Returns to Power

Mid 2000s India benefits from
Cancelled Sinio-Israeli Arms Deal

During this period, the trend line in Figure 17 below shows Israeli commercial
exports to India demonstrating strong steady gains from 2000 to 2005. This is an
impressive increase of more than 100 percent.
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Figure 17 – Israel Exports to India 1999-2005
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In this period there was also an increase of bilateral exchanges as shown in Figure
18 below. This is noticeable just a year after the Kargil War and Israel’s crucial supply of
arms in the conflict. Interestingly, prior to the conflict, there were no publicized trips of
senior Indian officials to Israel despite having full diplomatic ties for eight years.
However, after the crisis in 2000, BJP leader L.K. Advani visited Israel, becoming the
first senior Indian minister to do so since 1992. The visit came a year before Prime
Minister Ariel Sharon’s historic trip to New Delhi. Also in the same year, multiple
bilateral agreements were signed. In 2004, the Congress Party returned to power. Despite
a more cautious approach towards Israel in comparison to the former BJP led
government, the growth of technical relations was not hindered.
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Figure 18 – Israel-India Exchanges (Visits and Treaties) 1999 -2005
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Additionally, this same period from 1999 to 2005 witnessed a more moderated and
balanced approach in terms of language used at the UN regarding the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. This is implied by a higher frequency of positive terms versus negative terms in
the chart below (Figure 19).
Figure 19 - India Ambassador Negative Vs. Positive Word Frequencies 1999 - 2005
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The period shown in figure 20 below illustrates milestones from 2005 to 2014.
During this time, India and Israel increased their collaboration in the areas of agriculture
and defense. Cooperation in these sectors not only increased in terms of volume but also
in terms breadth of collaboration. Several joint Indian-Israeli agriculture centers were
planned and initiated across India as part of an extensive multi-year plan. Furthermore, in
2007, the two countries moved beyond just the transfer of military equipment. India and
Israel set in motion a new level of engagement in defense, working on advanced weapons
as a part of joint production in India. Moreover, in 2011, the Arab Spring spread
instability across the Middle East. The unrest spurred a re-assessment in India about its
ties in the region and with Israel. As response to the changing political situation in the
Middle East New Delhi looked to further foster relations with countries in the region
including Israel, Gulf States but also Israel’s major foe, Iran. Toward the end of this
period, the BJP’s Narendra Modi became Prime Minister. His election spurred more open
ties and indications of political softening towards Israel.
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Figure 20 – Narrative Timeline Mid-2000s to 2014
Mid 2000s India Benefits
from Cancelled Sinio-Israeli
Arms Deal

2006 Argriculture Agreement
2007 Large Defence
Joint Venture Approved

2008 First Stage of the IndoIsraeli Agricultural
Cooperation Project

Joint Agricultural Centres of
Execllence Setup

2011 Arab Spring
Triggers Instability
Across the Middle
East

2014 Election of Modi (BJP)

During this time period, Israeli commercial exports to India peaked in 2011 as figure
21 below shows. There was a moderate declining trend after 2011. However, this
decrease appears not specific to exports to India. In the years 2012, 2013 and 2014,
overall total Israeli exports slowed in response to global economic uncertainty at the time.
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Millions

Figure 21 – Israel Exports to India 2005-2014
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During this period, bilateral exchanges were generally dynamic but at variable levels
(see Figure 22 below). There was a significant spike in exchanges in 2011 coinciding
with unrest across the Middle East which may have challenged India’s interests in the
region. Noteworthy exchanges include visits by Israeli Ministers of Internal Security and
Agriculture to India. In turn, the Chief Minister of the Indian State of Haryana and the
Indian Minister of Communications and Information Technology visited Israel.
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Figure 22 – Israel-India Exchanges (Visits and Treaties) 2005-2014
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In 2005, India and Israel agreed to a research and development cooperation pact
focusing on specialized technologies covering issues like nanotechnology, biotechnology,
space, water management and non-conventional energy sources. In the same period, we
see in Figure 23 below that India’s language at the UN with regard to the Israeli Palestinian conflict shows a higher frequency of positive terms (softer on Israel) than
negative terms. As mentioned, this trend takes place at the same time as a growth in
technical collaboration, especially in the field of agriculture, through the setup of multiple
joint demonstration farms and defense production projects.
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Figure 23 - India Ambassador Negative vs. Positive Word Frequencies 2005 - 2014

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The chapter reviewed India’s geography, recent history, and political and
economic systems. It looked at how these aspects of India tie into national vulnerabilities
(national security and food production/agriculture) and created by extension opportunities
for international engagement and partnerships with Israel in particular. Also, mutual
interests and milestones in Indian-Israeli relations were considered by drawing on
primary and secondary sources. Primary sources included expert interviews, while
secondary sources included scholarly literature, UN documents and news media content
spanning decades. The chapter sketched the mostly sluggish and secretive progress
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towards full diplomatic relations from 1948 to 1992. It also examined the growth of
relations after the 1992 opening of diplomatic missions in India and Israel. In addition,
distinct research methods were outlined.
Indian-Israeli contacts, which began discreetly, included forms of knowledge
sharing mainly in agriculture and security. India quietly benefited from ties with Israel
but held back from developing an open relationship. The prospects of full formal ties
between India and Israel were frustrated by Cold War politics, pro-Palestinian sentiments
in India’s large Muslim community, and New Delhi’s need to maintain sturdy ties in the
Arab world. India routinely demonstrated a pro-Palestinian stance but at the same time
received Israeli intelligence and military assistance during conflicts with China in 1962
and with Pakistan in 1965 and 1971. After the Cold War ended, India’s policies were less
ideologically driven and transitioned to a more pragmatic and balanced approach towards
the Middle East and Israel.
Once India and Israel established full diplomatic relations in 1992, bilateral
cooperation accelerated. Israel and India have developed robust open relations in terms of
growing trade, political, and cultural exchanges. The two countries have also nurtured a
better understanding of the other’s political conditions and constraints. India’s economic
liberalization and political transformations of past decades opened pathways for a
significant expansion of ties with Israel. Israel’s technical accomplishments and
experience offered tools which were useful in coping with the challenges faced by India
amid rapidly growing populations and mounting military threats. Against this
background, Israel and India expanded collaborations in a broad range of sectors,
including agriculture, science/technology and military/national security.
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In essence, a convergence of interests brought India and Israel closer together with
India’s need to advance critical sectors like agriculture and defense on the one hand, and
Israel’s desire to expand its international outreach on the other. For India, technology ties
with the West and Israel aimed at helping to improve standards of living and advancing
the country’s competitiveness in the global economy. India looked to confront food
production and national security shortcomings. These are two areas in which Israel has
gained a reputation for its expertise. Nevertheless, on the political front, India adopted a
two-track Middle East policy. One track included fostering ties with Israel, and a parallel
track included managing ties with the wider Middle East.
Knowledge and technical cooperation proved to be notable hallmarks in bilateral
ties both before and after the start of full formal relations. In absolute terms, because of
its very small size, Israel is a negligible market for Indian goods when compared with
India’s other trading partners. However, India offers a major opportunity in the way of
large markets for Israeli goods and cooperation for Israeli institutions and hi-tech
companies. Some scholars interviewed have loosely discounted the notion that technical
ties could impact India’s Middle East policies. Indeed, despite robust bilateral ties, New
Delhi has maintained support of the Palestinian cause. However, in more recent times
India appears to be less vocal in outright condemnation of Israel, adopting a more
middle-of-the-road stance by use of more moderated language in UN debates about the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
A combination of trade data trends (1995-2014) and NVivo assisted content
analysis of media sources and UN documents (1989-2014) infer technology transfers
have helped create settings, which help promote bilateral dialogues, softer images of
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Israel, wider collaborations and growing commerce. Furthermore, it should be noted that
since the election of Prime Minster Narendra Modi in 2014, India has demonstrated more
political understanding for Israel, shying away from its traditional diplomatic policies
related to Middle East issues. Overall, India supports Israel’s right to defend itself, but
does so in a fashion that does not harm its other interests in the Middle East. Perhaps, on
the surface, it is difficult to pinpoint outright dramatic political policy shifts towards
Israel as a result of overall bilateral technical cooperation, however, one would be remiss
to ignore the immense value of vigorous trade along with military and scientific
collaborations.
To summarize, India initially had irregular and private contacts with Israel, but
later advanced to formal open ties. Changes in international and Indian politics facilitated
Israel’s ability to broaden her outreach to India. Technology sharing was a vehicle for
contacts and exchanges between Israel and India before and after the establishment of full
formal relations. Technical ties mostly addressed matters in areas like the military and
agriculture, and came about as a product of the convergence of interests between the two
countries. Technology cooperation in one area helped to open new areas of collaboration.
Formal relations also produced extensive cooperation between Israel and individual
Indian states at sub state levels (state governments) as part of paradiplomacy.
It was postulated at the start of this chapter that specific intervening variables
could perhaps foster or impede the vitality of connections between the independent
(technology transfer) and dependent variables (trade, exchanges and policies towards
Israeli-Palestinian conflict). What follows is a summary of how the intervening variables
played a role in Indian-Israeli relations:
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•

Technology transfer addresses priorities. India wanted to find ways to increase
agricultural/food output while combatting water scarcity. These issues compelled
India to turn to Israel given the latter’s agricultural experience and produced a
myriad of contacts and collaborations.

•

Security/military/terror threats. India sought Israel’s experience in intelligence
sharing, upgrading of Soviet armaments, counter terrorism, and military
hardware.

•

Access to the US through Israeli channels. There are indications that this
intervening variable maybe a factor in Indian-Israeli relations but indirectly.
India’s ties to Israel have helped create better access to the American Jewish
Community and more importantly the pro-Israel lobby group, the American Israel
Public Affairs Committee. (AIPAC) which has worked to shape US foreign
policy.

•

Geo-Political Shifts. There have been domestic changes (rise of BJP) and
changes in India’s foreign policies as a consequence of the end of the Cold War,
and changes in the Middle East in the aftermath of the Arab Spring.

All of these have either hindered ties or opened opportunities for (further)
contacts between India and Israel. Since technical ties have been central aspects in
Indian-Israeli relations, it can be argued that Israeli technology offerings were and are
sources of attraction to Israel in the context of Nye’s soft power.
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APPENDIX 1
1000 most frequently used words in debates on Israeli-Palestinian conflict at UN
India Ambassador Word Frequency
Word

Count

Palestinian
India
Peace
Israel
Palestine
People
Also
east
international
process
united
region
support
security
situation
council
state
middle
israeli
violence
nations
Parties
Settlement
Community
General
humanitarian
Efforts
Conflict
Side
Arab
Gaza
comprehensive
Solution
Political
Must

491
463
435
313
266
218
206
204
196
177
176
170
162
159
156
149
148
141
138
138
134
119
118
116
114
111
107
106
103
102
102
100
100
98
94

Authority
Resolution
Two
Just
Activities
Assistance
development
Resolutions
Within
negotiations
Including
President
Quartet
Talks
Hope
Issues
Dialogue
palestinians
Minister
Time
Recent
End
Jerusalem
Year
Assembly
government
Secretary
Need
west
important
million
occupied
concerned
years
states
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93
88
85
79
77
77
77
76
75
74
72
72
70
70
69
69
66
66
63
63
62
61
61
61
60
60
60
59
58
57
57
57
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55
54

economic
lasting
progress
recognized
since
cause
road
building
construction
territories
towards
based
continue
prime
syria
action
full
syrian
continued
direct
map
countries
last
sides
viable
issue
living
one
secure
solidarity
call
continuing
supported
borders
concern

53
53
53
53
52
51
51
50
50
50
50
49
49
49
49
48
48
48
47
47
47
46
46
46
46
45
45
45
45
45
44
44
44
43
43

like
independent
bank
necessary
conference
occupation
rights
singh
new
status
take
national
tracks
acts
final
legitimate
long
peaceful
relevant
blockade
called
measures
1967
day
taken
therefore
today
essential
first
relief
remain
resumption
membership
steps
human
initiative
may
past
question
territory
loss
made

43
42
41
41
40
40
40
40
39
39
39
38
38
37
37
37
37
37
37
36
36
36
35
35
35
35
35
34
34
34
34
34
33
33
32
32
32
32
32
32
31
31

Non
Sovereign
Agreement
Aspirations
infrastructure
Negotiated
Report
representative
Arafat
Civilians
Delegation
developments
Forward
Immediate
Lebanese
Part
Projects
Puri
Statement
Capital
commitment
Country
Meeting
Movement
Remains
Right
Without
Expressed
implementation
Land
Serious
Struggle
Thank
Training
Well
World
Believe
Durable
However
Lives
Permanent
Remained
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31
31
30
30
30
30
30
30
29
29
29
29
29
29
29
29
29
29
29
28
28
28
28
28
28
28
28
27
27
27
27
27
27
27
27
27
26
26
26
26
26
26

return
september
trust
2012
242
338
activity
affairs
allow
budgetary
decision
law
lead
lebanon
member
strip
wall
work
1973
current
deep
life
south
terrorism
unrwa
actions
addressed
establishment
fact
leadership
month
restrictions
self
set
welcome
achieve
basis
consistently
crisis
debate
endorsed
force

26
26
26
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
23
23
23
23
23
23
23
23
23
23
22
22
22
22
22
22
22

hardeep
held
january
military
near
organization
population
positive
resume
settlements
various
africa
ago
areas
gharekhan
ongoing
several
special
step
withdrawal
come
express
financial
given
institutions
lands
needs
observer
occasion
principles
provide
reiterate
services
stability
technical
way
achieving
address
agency
continues
contribution
early

22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
19
19
19
19
19
19

Even
Fully
Importance
Many
Met
Months
Opportunity
Problems
Result
Resulting
Stop
Strongly
Asia
Attention
Confidence
Cooperation
Future
Ground
History
Implement
Let
Make
memorandum
November
Open
Principle
Refugees
See
Abbas
Accordance
Achieved
Adversely
Always
appreciation
Context
Cycle
Deeply
determination
Difficult
Ensure
Find
Foreign
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19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
17
17
17
17
17
17
17
17
17
17
17
17
17
17

led
nation
number
opinion
pledged
reiterated
resources
role
sharma
use
works
along
become
brazil
briefing
condemned
convinced
deportees
elections
equal
illegal
indeed
israelis
note
noted
sense
social
soon
stalemate
vote
welcomed
000
2002
affecting
agreements
application
attacks
ceasefire
complete
court
despite
entire

17
17
17
17
17
17
17
17
17
17
17
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15

every
exercise
extended
failed
golan
goods
great
help
innocent
june
leading
move
nambiar
negotiating
now
outside
particularly
per
period
problem
requirements
resolve
respect
severe
sheikh
table
tragic
urgent
wish
allowed
approach
april
back
bring
capacity
civilian
collective
conclusion
convening
critical
cultural
deal

15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14

Delay
Democratic
Emergency
Exacerbated
Far
Following
Hoped
Increased
Interim
Madrid
Meaningful
Members
Message
Much
Needed
Order
Outcome
Path
Peoples
Position
Possible
programmes
Put
Reached
reconciliation
Related
Summit
Unilateral
Unwavering
Visit
Access
Addition
Agreed
Almost
Assist
Centre
Complex
coordination
Draft
Effort
equally
events
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14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13

favour
geneva
implementing
justice
large
legal
material
mukerji
mutual
objective
obligations
october
others
plan
required
restraint
resulted
seriously
stated
suffering
three
view
vision
adopted
aimed
already
best
border
clear
contributed
contributing
ease
enable
facing
goal
grave
hard
health
impact
increasing
independence
july

13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12

justification
late
matter
mission
normal
offered
parts
policy
prosperity
provision
quest
recently
recognition
reconstruction
regional
religious
resolved
session
sharm
signed
unity
vocational
weapons
1397
act
aligned
among
area
authorities
began
cent
clearly
common
create
deterioration
document
established
factions
finding
fund
group
interest

12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11

Join
Line
Live
means
meet
mutually
paris
present
previous
Processes
Reach
Realization
Regard
Release
Renewed
Reports
Response
Results
Rise
Source
Terms
Track
understandings
Unifil
unprecedented
1992
1993
1998
2000
2003
2011
Atmosphere
Basic
Begin
Bilateral
Boundaries
Build
Committed
Committee
Contribute
Core
Creating
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11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10

Decades
Destruction
Elements
environment
Envisaged
Forces
Framework
Gandhi
Genuine
Give
Goals
Historic
Holding
Icrc
Imperative
Incidents
Information
Involved
Joint
Killing
Lack
Liberation
Lift
Links
Lost
Might
Ministers
Multilateral
Nearly
Office
Outset
overwhelming
Personnel
Place
Poverty
Power
Reaching
Ready
Reason
responsibility
Roadblocks
Schools

10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10

Sen
Serve
Share
Significant
Sincere
Supports
Thereby
Unless
Urge
Washington
Yesterday
1515
1988
425
Added
Advisory
Agenda
arrangements
Avoid
Beginning
Believes
Closures
Concerns
Conditions
Consistent
Coordinator
demonstrated
deteriorating
Dignity
Discussion
Earlier
Education
encouraging
Facilitate
Faith
Fields
Focus
Followed
Four
Freedom
Friendship
Good

10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9

Hamas
Hopeful
Inalienable
Inclusive
Increase
internationally
Kamalesh
Launched
Leaders
Manmohan
Option
Overall
Persons
Register
Relations
Restart
Spirit
Sponsored
Standing
Statements
statesmanship
Steadfast
Strong
Supplies
Taking
Technology
Threat
Times
Together
Urging
Vital
1978
Advocated
Afghanistan
Annual
Apart
Appeal
Believed
Bid
Bonds
Cessation
circumstances

299

9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8

Close
congratulate
Consider
Cost
Counter
Courage
Damage
Due
Earliest
Elected
emergencies
Encouraged
Ending
Erode
Establishing
Excessive
Face
February
Firm
Form
Forum
Functioning
Groups
Halt
Hardship
Heavy
High
Hostilities
Indian
Inter
Letter
Meanwhile
Meetings
Next
Paragraph
Play
Plo
Presidency
Property
Public
Quickly
Rather

8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8

Reaffirmed
Recognize
Regarding
Resource
Society
Sovereignty
Submitted
Supporting
Symbol
Territorial
Unarmed
understanding
Unfortunate
Urged
Voted
1996
2004
2010
799
Addressing
Affected
Agencies
Alia
Announced
Arabs
Attack
Bear
Certain
Changes
Children
Collapse
Condemn
Conducted
Control
Disputes
Easing
Endeavor
Escalation
Eschew
Essentially
Exacerbate
Extend

8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7

Extremist
Faced
Families
Friendly
Frustration
Fulfil
Homeland
Hour
Impasse
Larger
Level
Mahatma
Major
Modern
Momentum
Moral
Natural
Oslo
Party
Premise
Putting
Reality
Regrettable
Saudi
Seek
Separation
Series
Serry
Shah
Short
Shown
Signing
Southern
Spiral
strengthened
Task
Tensions
Terrorist
Tradition
transformation
Undermine
undermining
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7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7

Undertaking
Utmost
Wider
Wisdom
Women
Yet
1997
2005
Abiding
Able
Accept
Accords
achievement
Adoption
Although
Ambassador
Annex
Annually
Asoke
Available
Behalf
Break
Chairman
Channels
Chemical
Closely
Coexistence
communiqué
Completely
Concrete
Conducive
Connection
consequences
considerable
consideration
Constraints
Convey
Conveyed
Creation
Credible
Crossing
Crucial

7
7
7
7
7
7
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6

Danger
Dated
Demands
demonstrate
Deprivation
Described
Deteriorate
Differences
Direction
disproportionate
Donor
Doubt
Economy
Effective
Egypt
Enduring
Engage
Engaged
Exchange
Existing
Expressing
Expulsion
External
Firmly
Formation
Forums
Fragile
Frame
Free
Freezing
fundamental
Grievances
Hardships
immediately
Improve
indiscriminate
Insecurity
Institution
intensification
Interested
Interests
Keeping

6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6

Largely
legality
library
looked
mahmoud
manjeev
manner
militant
moment
nature
nehru
official
outstanding
passing
peres
personal
positions
potential
prevail
prospects
provided
provisions
pursuit
quarterly
reaffirm
Real
realize
realizing
reasons
redouble
reforms
reliance
require
requires
resolving
retribution
Risk
river
school
similar
smooth
stalemated
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6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6

stands
still
stock
stood
strategic
temporary
tension
threaten
ties
twice
undertaken
valid
visited
water
withdraw
wye
2013
absence
absolute
abu
acceptable
account
announcement
approximately
arms
aspect
assumption
august
away
beirut
beneficial
beyond
blockades
broken
brought
calling
calls
calm
carefully
cease
central
cherished

6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

civilization
commitments
condemnation
confronting
consolidate
consolidated
continuation
cooperative
courageous
course
cradle
crises
cross

5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

APPENDIX 2

Verbatim samples positive and negative word category entries.

Positive Category

Ambassador Mukerji (India): 2013
“Peace”
India has consistently supported a negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian issue with
a view to achieving a sovereign, independent, viable and united State of Palestine, living
within secure and recognized borders with East Jerusalem as its capital, side by side and
at peace with Israel, as endorsed in various Security
Council resolutions and the Quartet road map.
“Coexistence”
Ambassador Sen (India): 2006
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It is our firm belief that a negotiated outcome of this longstanding conflict is the only way
to ensure long-term peace, security and stability in the region, leading to the
establishment of a viable, united and sovereign State of Palestine, living in peaceful
coexistence and harmony with the State of Israel.
“Parties”
Asoke Kumar Mukerji (India) 2014
His Government continued to support Palestine by contributing directly and indirectly
through UNRWA and other means in construction and development. “An eye for an eye
will make one man blind,” he said quoting Mahatma Gandhi, encouraging the parties to
return to the negotiating table and resume their dialogue towards peace.
“Solution”
Mr. Mukerji (India) 2013
Those activities are creating new realities on the ground, threatening the very premise of
a two State solution. “
“Negotiations”
Ambassador Hardeep Singh Puri (India) 2011
Developments in the Middle East since February underline the need to reinvigorate the
search for that comprehensive peace, while the countries in the region undertake
inclusive political processes and implement reforms to meet the legitimate aspirations of
their peoples. It is important that the grievances of the people are addressed through
dialogue and negotiations, rather than by resorting to arms.
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“Achievement”
Mr. Hardeep Singh Puri (India):2012
For the achievement of that dream, India will continue to support all efforts, including
those of the Quartet. At the same time, for a comprehensive settlement of Arab-Israeli
problems, it is also important not to lose sight of other Arab lands under Israeli
occupation.

Negative Category
“Occupied”
India Ambassador Mr. GHAREKHAN (India) 1988
The Palestinian people and the peoples of the other occupied Arab territories were also
victims of grave injustice.
“Rights”
Ambassador Ansari (India) 1994
Therefore, finding a genuine solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict must begin and end with
putting an end to occupation, and by returning to the Arabs their lands and their usurped
rights.
“Activities”
Ambassador Mukerji (India): 2013
The situation in the occupied Palestinian territories has been deteriorating, due to
settlement activities in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Those activities are creating
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new realities on the ground, threatening the very premise of a two State solution. The
blockade of Gaza has also had serious consequences for the lives of Palestinians.

“Settlements”
Mr. Ansari (India Rep), 1994
Complete, just and comprehensive peace cannot be achieved under continuing occupation
or while new settlement plans are being carried out regardless of the illegitimate nature of
such settlements or the fact that they are a major impediment to peace.
“Aggression”
Ambassador Ansari (India) 1994
The substance of the conflict never was and never will be cooperation between Israel and
the Arabs. Rather, it is occupation, aggression, expansion, the acquisition of territory and
the expulsion of Arab citizens.
“Military”
HARDEEP SING. PURI (India) 2004
There could be no military solution to the Middle East problem. States of course had the
right to defend themselves, but they also had the responsibility to uphold international
law. The people of Palestine deserved the full support of the international community to
enable them to realize their national aspirations.

305

APPENDIX 3
AGGREGATE WORD FREQUENCY COUNTS IN NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE
CATEGORIES BY INDIAN AMBASSADORS AT UN
INDIA AMBASSADOR NEGATIVE VS. POSITIVE WORD FREQUENCIES
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APPENDIX 4
WORD FREQUENCY ISRAELI/TECHNOLOGY/COOPERATION

APPENDIX 5 OFFICIAL (STATE SANCTIONED) EXCHANGES (VISITS AND TREATIES)
Sources: (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of External Affairs Government of
India, Embassy of India in Israel, Embassy of the State of Israel in India
2014 Visits
Modi-Netanyahu phone call
Indian Defense Minister visits Israel
Modi-Netanyahu meeting in New York
Foreign Minister meeting in New York
Israeli National Security Advisor visits India
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Indian Home Affairs Minister Visits Israel
6 Visits+0 treaties - total 6 in 2014

2013
Minister of Indian Minister of Communications and Information Technology visits Israel
Chief Minister of Indian State of Rajasthan visits Israel
Israeli Minster of Economy visits India
3 Visits +0 treaties – total 3 in 2013
2012
Indian Minister of Tourism Visits Israel
Indian Minister of Communications and Information Technology and Human Resource
Development visits Israel
Indian Minister of Urban Development visits Israel
Indian Minister of External Affairs visits Israel
Israeli Minister of Energy, Water Resources and Infrastructure Visits India
5 Visits + 0 treaties total 5 in 2012
2011
Chief Minister of Indian State of Haryana visits Israel
Indian Minister of Communications and Information Technology visits Israel
Indian Parliamentary Delegation visits Israel
Reserve Bank of India Governor visits Israel
Indian Comptroller and Auditor General visits Israel
Israeli Minister of Finance visits India
Israeli Minister of Internal Security visits India
Israeli Minister of Tourism visits India
Israeli Minister of Agriculture visits India
9 Visits + 1 Treaty (Industrial Research) Total 10 in 2011
2010
Indian Parliamentary Delegation visits Israel
Indian Minister of State Science and Technology visits Israel
Indian Minister Commerce and Industry
Israeli Minister of Trade, Industry and Labour visits India
4 Total Visits in 2010 + 1 Treaty (Technology and Innovation) Total 5 in 2010
2009
Chief Minister of Indian State of Punjab visits Israel
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Chief Minister of Indian State of Himachal Pradesh visits Israel
2 Total Visits + 0 treaties Total 2 in in 2009

2008
Indian Chief Justice of Supreme Court visits Israel
Former Indian President (Kalam) visits Israel
Israeli Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development visits India
3 Visits + Treaty (Industrial Development) Total 4 in 2008
2007
Chief Minister of Indian State of Madhya Pradesh visits Israel
Indian Minister of State for Railways visits Israel
Indian Minister of State for Industry visits Israel
Israeli Interior Minister visits India
Israeli Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Transport and Road Safety visits India
5 Visits + 1 Treaty (agriculture) + 6 Total in 2007

2006
Chief Minister of Indian State of Nagaland visits Israel
Chief Minister of Indian State of Gujarat visits Israel
Chief Minister of Indian State of Rajasthan visits Israel
Indian Minister of Agriculture, Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution
Israeli Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Trade, Industry and Labour
Israeli National Security Advisor visits India
6 Visits+ 0 Treaties 6 Total in 2006
2005
Indian Minister of Agriculture, Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution visits
Israel
Indian Minister of Commerce and Industries visits Israel
Indian Minister of State for Urban Employment and Poverty Alleviation
Indian Minister of State Science and Technology visits Israel
4 Visits and 1 Treaty (Employment) total 5 in 2005

2004
Israeli Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Trade, Industry and Labour and
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Communications visits India
Indian Minister of Commerce and Industry visits Israel
Israeli Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister with Supreme Court Justice visit
India
3 Visits and 0 Treaties Total 3 in 2004
2003
Israeli Minister of Science and Technology visits India
Israeli Prime Minister with Deputy Prime Minster and Minister of Justice along with
Minister of Agriculture and Israeli Minister of Education visit India
2 Visits + 5 Treaties (Drugs) + (Environment) + (Health) + (Medicine) + (Exemption of
visa requirements) Total 7 in 2003
2002
Indian Minister for Communication and Parliamentary Affairs visits Israel
Israeli Environment Minister visits India
Israeli Deputy Prime Minster and Minister of Foreign Affairs visits India
3 Visits + 1 Treaty (Space) Total 4 in 2002
2001
Knesset (Israeli Parliament) delegation visits India
Israeli Minister of Regional Cooperation visits India
2 Visits + 0 Treaties 2 Total in 2001
2000
Deputy Chairperson of the Rajya Sabho (Upper House Parliament) visits Israel
Chief Minister of West Bengal visits Israel
Indian Minister of External Affairs visits Israel
Indian Minister of Home Affairs visits Israel
Israeli Minister of Regional Cooperation visits India
5 Visits + 0 Treaties 5 Total in 2000
1999
0 Visits + 0 Treaties Total 0 in 1999
1998
Indian Attorney General visits Israel
Principle Secretary to the Indian Prime Minister visits India
2 Total + 0 Treaties Total 2 in 1998
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1997
Israeli President Ezer Weizman visits India
1 Total and 0 Treaties Total 1 in 1997

1996
0 Visits + 5 Treaties Customs) + (Research) + (Investments) + (Taxes) + (Technical
Cooperation) Total 5 in 1996
1995
0 Visits + 0 Treaties Total 0 in 1995
1994
0 Visits and 4 Treaties (2 Aviation) + (Trade & Economic)
+ Telecommunications and Posts Total 4 in 1994
1993
Israeli Foreign Minister visits India
1 Visit and 3 Treaties (Agriculture) + (Culture) + (Tourism) Total 4 in 1993
1992
0 Visits + 0 Treaties Total 0 in 1992
1991
0 Visits and) Treaties Total 0 in 1991
INDIA – ISRAEL BILATERAL TREATIES (YEAR BY YEAR)
1993 Cultural Agreement
1993 Agreement for Cooperation in the Field of Agriculture
1994 Air Transport Agreement
1994 Agreement concerning Cooperation in the Field of Telecommunication and Posts
1994 Agreement on Trade and Economics Cooperation
1996 Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments
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1996 Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation/Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with
Respect to Tax
1996 Bilateral Agreement regarding Mutual Assistance and Cooperation in Custom matters
1996 Memorandum of Intent on a Joint High-tech Agricultural Demonstration
Cooperation Project
1996 Umbrella Agreement on the Development of Cooperation in the Field of Industrial &
Technological Research & Development
1996 Agreement on Technical Cooperation
1997 Executive Agreement for a Programme of Cooperation in the Field of Agriculture.
2003 Agreement on Cooperation in the field of Health and Medicine
2003 Agreement on Cooperation in combating illicit trafficking and abuse of narcotic
drugs and psychotropic substances
2003 Agreement on Cooperation in the field of Protection of the Environment
2003 Agreement on Exemption of Visa requirement for holders of diplomatic,
official and service passports
2005 Indo-Israel Industrial Initiative for R&D
2005 Agreement on Economic Cooperation
2006 Three-year Work Plan for Cooperation in the Field of Agriculture
2007 MOU between MASHAV (Israel's Agency for International Development
Cooperation) and ICRISAT (International Crops Research Institute for the Semi Arid
Tropics
2011 Joint declaration of the Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of India and the
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development of Israel for second phase of Agriculture
Cooperation
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2014 Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance IN Criminal Matters
2014 Agreement on cooperation in homeland and public security issue

313

CHAPTER VI CONCLUSION

OVERVIEW

Ever since its founding, the State of Israel has grappled with forces seeking to
delegitimize and isolate it in the international arena. To garner more friends and expand
its political reach, Israel’s leaders introduced a foreign policy strategy, which entailed
sharing specialized knowledge with other countries. The know-how/technology Israel
harnessed, was based on experience gained through distinctive challenges faced by the
country mostly in the fields of farming and security. It was hoped that technology
transfers, would help advance the Jewish State’s international outreach and thus facilitate
new relations or expand existing ones with other countries. The dissertation explored the
interplay of technology/knowledge in the agriculture and military sectors as a source of
attraction or soft power for Israel in international affairs.
China and India both exemplify cases of countries, which for decades ardently
refused full formal ties with Israel. Yet over time, each of these countries found ample
cause to set aside longstanding policy constraints which brought about significant change
in dealings with Israel. In doing so, Indian and Chinese policymakers opened new
pathways for initial contacts, which eventually gave way to full blown robust bilateral
relations with Israel. The study assessed whether technology sharing was a viable factor
in initiating, maintaining and extending diplomatic relationships broadly defined (trade,
bilateral exchanges and policy approach towards the Middle East). To do this, the
dissertation considered key mechanics in bilateral ties, like expected/reaped benefits and
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the convergence of interests between Israel and its partners in Asia. This chapter offers
overall conclusions about the role of technology as part of Israel’s diplomatic toolkit, in
relations with China and India. Finally, it will suggest what other countries, in particular
small states, can learn from Israel’s technical based foreign dealings.
In recent decades, China and India have developed intricate and much closer ties
with Israel despite an obscure history laced by murky meetings in the absence of full
formal relations. The exchange of embassies between Israel and both Asian countries
only became a reality after a thread of restrained irregular contacts occurring over the
span of several years. When encounters did happen between Israeli and Chinese or Indian
officials they were primarily informal, but often times touched on technical issues.
Leaders in Beijing and New Delhi looked to the outside world for new technologies in
lieu of rapid economic growth coupled with modernization ambitions. After the death of
Chairman Mao, the new leadership in the PRC started a series of political and economic
reforms. In doing so, China turned away from practicing established communist
doctrines, instead pushing to modernize important sectors like agriculture, military and
science/technology. Peng (2007) points out that when China’s leadership stopped looking
outwardly solely in terms of political polarity, it turned instead to an emphasis on broader
international cooperation. Beijing’s strong thirst to access new problem solving
technologies annulled traditional dogmatic political practices. Thus, clearing a once
forbidden pathway to establishing technology ties with Israel. Sobin (1991) sums up the
transition in Sino-Israeli relations eloquently contending that Israel slowly went from
being seen by Chinese leaders as inconsequential country to a potential partner and
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source of benefits, which could be helpful in finding ways to tackle some of the PRC’s
major national challenges.
India also experienced economic and political transformations, which stimulated
greater global engagement. The Indian economy became more open to foreign
partnerships. Furthermore, with the end of the Cold War, New Delhi lost its largest
military supplier, the Soviet Union. Inbar (2009) asserts India’s move to normalize
relations with Israel was part of a broader post-Cold War strategy to help India develop
new ties with major international actors like the United States, and gain access to
advanced technologies available from Israel to enhance national security. In essence, both
China and India set aside ingrained ideological sentiments in favor of technical ties with
the Jewish State. This pragmatic aspect of Chinese and Indian policies was part of what
would become dual track foreign polices towards the Middle East--one policy pertaining
to Israel and another policy for the wider Middle East. Meanwhile, on the Israeli side,
decision makers sought to expand international contacts beyond Israel’s traditional allies
in the West and turned eastwards to Asia. By mapping out the evolution of Sino-Israeli
and Indian-Israeli relations, the dissertation has offered a feasible case, which
underscores tacit and non-tacit benefits attained by Israel as products of technology
transfers in foreign dealings especially with influential countries like China and India.

DIPLOMACY SUCCESS?

The concept of diplomacy is a key component of the dissertation topic. As an
overriding concept in the study foreign affairs, diplomacy is widely accepted to be a
depiction of a country’s efforts to promote its international interests through non-military
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means. Though, gauging what distinctly constitutes diplomatic success has been, and
remains, somewhat problematic. This is because a commonly accepted definition of
success in diplomacy largely remains elusive. Johnson (2006) infers there is no consensus
about what diplomacy ought to deliver. The absence of a definitive diplomatic success
metric has made the probe of the dissertation topic a tricky endeavor. Therefore, it is
difficult to pinpoint the precise weight of technology transfers as tools of persuasion
(diplomacy) in foreign policy.
However, the use of historical narratives, coupled with a review of data trends
and content analysis used in the study, have helped to identify positive and negative
tendencies in Israel’s ties with India and China, which in turn implied variant levels of
diplomatic achievements in the case of Israel’s diplomatic outreach. The study adopted
various techniques to gather, organize, analyze and interpret data, while mindful of the
lack a clear “success” definition. It introduced the hypothesis, independent, dependent,
and intervening variables. To be clear, the study is not suggesting that any correlations
which may have been observed between the variables necessarily infer causation.
However, interview data suggest a linkage between Israel’s technology transfer activities
and the expansion of ties with China and India. The dissertation analyzed a blend of
quantitative and qualitative content. It also introduced a liberal analysis strategy, which
doesn’t conform to a specific theory. Given interdisciplinary and unconventional nature
of the dissertation theme, the broad theoretical approach was determined to be the most
realistic way to assess interconnections between the study variables: independent
variables (technology transfers), dependent variables (robust relations comprised of trade,
bilateral exchanges, and policy statements towards Israel), and intervening variables
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(Middle East conflict flare-ups, economic, and political factors). The research
incorporated software assisted and manual reviewing of tens of thousands of press
reports, and hundreds of NGO documents. The software assisted analysis (NVivo)
employed a qualitative summative research method, which considered word occurrences,
significance, positioning of words or concepts, in the context of Indian and Chinese
statements at the UN with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict specific issues.
Drawing on a broad range of literature, the study also examined a collection of overall
concepts inside and outside the field of International Relations. The theme of this
dissertation examined the implications of technology transfers in international relations
and how this type of engagement can be associated with central international relations
and international theory concepts like soft power, interdependence, and functionalism.
Within the realm of Israeli diplomacy, forms of Nye’s soft power (vehicles of attraction)
were explored as tacit tools of small state statecraft. The dissertation showed that these
concepts can be considered tools of statecraft and are very much in play in the confines of
Israeli diplomacy and Middle East politics. These conceptions were considered while
watchful of the increasing significance of small state actors in the international system
after the Cold War.
Soft power (ability to attract others) in Israel’s case, verified the concept’s utility
as a plausible way for smaller states to extend their presence internationally, despite the
limitations of their physical size. Israel also offers a unique scenario of a small country
with two noteworthy attributes, technical experience but also the lack of financial
resources. Rightly or wrongly, Israel has been perceived by some countries as a “power”
larger than it actually (physically) is. This may be attributed in part to Israel’s technical
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achievements and international technical engagements. This scenario suggests that even
smaller countries like Israel, which have little in terms of resources except for human
capital, can still have much to offer larger partner countries. Israel’s soft power in ties
with China and India was realized through agents of attraction in the form of military and
agriculture technologies. Technology or know-how transfers offered promises of
resolving problems, and as such are viable sources of attraction. Cristo (2005) suggests
utilization of soft power is contingent on how others, namely other states, recognize it.
China and India recognized Israel’s technical capabilities as helpful in dealing with their
own national challenges which in turn became bridges in achieving bilateral and multilateral understandings. All this against the background of an emerging global economy
which as Kutys (2009) asserts promotes interdependence between states, and generates
international cooperation opportunities to deal with problems. Also considered, was the
nature of Israel’s China and India partnerships in the framework of interdependence.
Andrews (2010) and Keohane (2012) assert interdependent relations are driven by mutual
or shared interests. Keohane and Nye (1977) argued interdependence fosters reciprocity
and is a chief tool in helping states gain benefits unlikely achieved by any other means. It
is reasonable to suggest Israel gained economic and strategic benefits as part of bilateral
exchanges. On the one hand, Israel needed to make more friends. On the other hand,
China and India needed Israel’s experiences and know-how to overcome challenges in
military and agricultural matters. However, this is not to say that Israel’s interdependent
relations with China and India were symmetrical. They were not. The relationship was
asymmetrical as Israel was more dependent on India and China than the other way
around. Furthermore, Israel-China and Israel-India relations can be explained along the
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lines of functionalism as described by Mitrany (1971) as a mechanism set up to tackle
overall mutual problems. On this point, Mitrany’s notion of functionism further resonates
the theme of common interests as central drivers behind international collaborations to
solve problems. Technical cooperation like joint ventures between Israel and her partners
also permitted the exchange of ideas and opened new opportunities. Joint ventures in one
sector likely helped to set the stage for discussions on wider contacts and spheres of
bilateral cooperation. In this way, non-political collaborations could be opened to bring
about relationships on political levels as well.
Israeli technology transfers have demonstrated the value of technical ties in
foreign relations and generating broader contacts. Israel’s, small yet pointed programs,
have maintained a measure of strategic significance. Past and present programs continue
to operate as mechanisms for initiating, maintaining, and developing broader
international opportunities for Israeli policymakers. Israel's success in specialized fields
offer much in way of talking points for Israeli leaders, diplomats, and pro-Israel advocacy
groups.
In agriculture, MASHAV, Israel’s development agency set up and bolstered joint
farming projects in India and China, which showcased the local benefits of Israeli
agricultural methods. While technologies and techniques were featured in the specific
demonstration farms they were designed to be adopted and applied in multiple areas
across India and China. In the defense sector too, there have been substantial interactions
among Israel, India and China. However, many of Israel’s military collaborations have
remained secret. Still, scores of published accounts in the media and other nongovernmental sources have made such secret dealings (worth billions) an open secret.
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Bozeman (2000) contends that the transport of knowledge produces political,
economic and social implications, which could impact a country’s behavior. The study
accentuated the merits of technology sharing in impacting the behaviors of others
(government or society) which might otherwise not occur. An example of this was the
introduction of technology from one country partner to another (Israel to China and
India), which helped to promote increased bilateral exchanges and opportunities for new
policies towards Israel.
The dissertation’s examination of UN textual data (ambassador statements) aimed
to sense how Indian and Chinese policies on the Middle East have altered over the past
few decades. Some scholars interviewed for the dissertation maintain there has been little
or no change in Chinese and Indian official political policies towards Israel despite strong
growing technical ties. However, in terms of diplomatic rhetoric in the case of India and
China there is some evidence, which questions the vitality of the support toward the
Palestinian cause. There have been subtle but noticeable changes in tones in speeches by
Chinese and Indian representatives at the UN. In more recent times there appears to be
less vocal outright condemnation by China and India of Israel. Over the past two decades
the rhetoric has veered more in the direction of middle-of-the-road balanced policy
statements. This assessment is based on the results of original software assisted content
analysis which closely examined textual data (speeches and statements) from 1989 to
2014. This range of time represents two significant periods in Israel’s relations with both
China and India. The first period being the immediate years leading up to full formal ties.
The second being the period after diplomatic relations became a reality. The analysis
entailed isolating key words usually used in debates on Palestinian-Israeli conflict issues.
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These words were then categorized as either positive or negative. Words like
“aggression” or “settlements” were coded negative because they were typically used to be
exclusively critical of Israel. Words like “peace” and “negotiations” were coded positive
because they are usually used to address both sides of the conflict and promote peace
building while avoiding singling out Israel for blame. In both, China and India cases
analysis showed that over time generally positive word usage occurred more frequently
than negative words. The analysis results implied a decline of critical rhetoric directed at
Israel in the years after diplomatic relations were established. It also concurs with the
notion that perhaps China and India are more attuned to Israel’s overall security
sensitivities. So, generally, China and India support Israel’s right to defend itself but at
times also expressing reservations about some Israeli military actions and opposition to
violence. Softer language suggested that both India and China have departed from past
more dogmatic driven approaches when it comes to Israel and Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Dhume (2014) emphasizes an amplified openness in Indian-Israeli relations introduced
by the Modi government perhaps suggests a strategic partnership with Israel carries more
weight for India than solidarity for the Palestinian cause. A seemingly subtle shift in
policy may be evidenced by India’s abstention on a pivotal vote at the UN aimed at
denouncing Israel for its 2014 military operation in Gaza. A 2014 address by the Foreign
Minister of China in Israel also offers a glaring departure from previous Chinese policy
statements which traditionally used words like “aggression” and “brutal” to characterize
Israeli territorial claims. Minister Wang Yi described Israel “as an ancient land of the
ancient Jewish people”. While symbolic, the statement suggests empathy towards Israel’s
controversial, yet biblical and core claims to territory.

322

SINO-ISRAELI RELATIONS VS INDIAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS: STRIKING SIMILARITIES

There are striking similarities on how Israel formed its relationships with China
and India. First, technology/knowledge sharing was a vehicle for contacts and exchanges
even in the absence of full diplomatic relations with both countries. Although, to a lesser
extent in the case of India. Second, both India and China initially conducted contacts with
Israel covertly as to not upset Muslim and Arab countries. Third, China and India sought
technology/knowledge from Israel, which they believed would be useful in addressing
national (food security and national security) concerns. Fourth, in both cases, the
usefulness of technology and knowledge acted as a bridge between Israel and its Asian
partners beyond national levels extending to sub-national levels through paradiplomacy
mechanisms. Fifth, with the end of the Cold War, Beijing and New Delhi realized that
they needed a more balanced approach to the Middle East in order to play a more active
role in the region. Sixth, both India and China were mindful that full formal relations
with Israel might harm long term relationships with the Arab countries and at first
hesitantly initiated ties. Seventh, both countries adopted dual track Middle East policies,
in essence delinking the issue of the conflict with the Palestinians from the workings of
relations with Israel. Eighth, once full formal ties were established with India and China
in 1992, technical collaboration accelerated especially in agriculture through joint
demonstration farms and in the defense sector through the transfer of advanced military
weaponry. Ninth, also after start of diplomatic relations in 1992 robust relations
blossomed in terms of trade and bi-lateral exchanges between Israel and both India and
China. Finally, India and China have demonstrated increased sensitivity to Israel’s
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security concerns through more moderate stances at the UN on Israeli Palestinian conflict
issues. All of these factors have helped lessen Israel’s isolation in international forums,
which is a major objective in the business of Israeli diplomacy.

SINO-ISRAELI RELATIONS VS INDIAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS: NOTABLE DIFFERENCES

There are some notable differences between the Sino-Israeli and the Indian-Israeli
narratives. First as a liberal democracy, India was more responsive than the PRC to
internal constraints. In India there was political opposition and electorate grievances
about expanding relations with Israel (Muslim community concerns), which tended to
question and mitigate intentions for greater ties with Israel. China did not seemingly
contend with domestic apprehensions outside the communist party apparatus. Second, in
earlier times (pre-1992) India maintained a cold subdued approach towards Israel, but
New Delhi did allow the presence of an Israeli Consulate. No such equivalent Israeli
mission was permitted in China. Third, Washington worked to limit the scope of SinoIsraeli relations but generally did not obstruct Indian-Israeli ties. This was especially
noticeable when it came to the transfer of defense and/or dual use products. The US
stopped Israeli military exports to China yet in sharp contrast did not object to IndianIsraeli joint defense production of weapons systems. Fourth, Israel’s ties with China have
negatively impacted US-Israeli relations. Israel’s relations with India did not adversely
impact ties between Washington and Jerusalem. Finally, against the background of
regional rivalry, China was the first to forge full relations with Israel while New Delhi
followed so as not be outdone by Beijing.
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Regardless of political based limitations holding back ties with Israel, a strong
case can be made to demonstrate that technology offerings functioned as catalysts in
kindling bilateral engagements once specific areas of cooperation were identified. This
was true in the absence of diplomatic relations like when a delegation from China
traveled to Israel in 1985 for discussions on possible joint projects in agriculture and
cooperation opportunities in other areas like solar energy, robotics, and arms
manufacturing (Sobin, 1991) and (Sufott, 1997). Another example was the dispatch of
Indian agricultural specialists to Israel to observe farming methods before full relations
between Israel and India were instated in 1992.
Technology transfers were also a factor in nurturing and expanding ties once open
formal relationships were established. Israel’s efforts to expand ties have steadily
produced results. The Jewish State built agricultural and defense relationships, which
spilled over into broader areas of technology engagements helping to spur political and
cultural exchanges. The spillover into others areas is notable both in the case of relations
with India and China. For example, in China, broader collaboration areas like the
transfer of Israeli solar power technologies to Henan Province. In India, expanded
collaboration through a bilateral agreement establishing a research and development
cooperation pact involving specialized technologies like nanotechnology, biotechnology,
space, water management and non-conventional energy sources.
Technological transfers as Larson (1998) suggests are driven by the prospects of
achieving maximum mutual benefits for the technology receiver and sender. Interactions
to achieve the most shared objectives offer opportunities for face-to-face talks. This is
what happened in Israel’s relations with India and China. Irrespective of political
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rhetoric, Israel largely continues to experience noteworthy achievements in terms of
increased international trade and recognition. Countries typically look at what experience
and skills prospective partners can contribute.
In summing up, overall Israel's technology offerings have helped it widen
political, military and trade ties. However, Israel’s technical cooperation vis-à-vis China
and India did not evolve through traditional diplomatic protocol. On this very point,
Israel’s first ambassador to China, Zev Suffott, offers a helpful agricultural metaphor to
neatly unpack the pathways taken to reach the normalization of diplomatic relations
between Israel and China. The metaphor can also be used to describe the making of
Indian-Israel relations (Goldstein, 1999). There are four stages in the metaphor. First, is
drought, which is the period of no political/diplomatic progress. Second, is ploughing,
which is the period of unofficial indirect contacts limited to technical fields like
agriculture, defense, science, and technology. Third, is sowing, which is a period of
progress in the larger geopolitical context of Arab-Israeli peacemaking. Finally, harvest,
a period diplomatic relations.

WHAT OTHERS CAN LEARN FROM THE ISRAELI EXPERINCE AND FINAL REMARKS

By traditional standards, Israel is a small country in terms of territory and
population. It’s a country which contends with unique existential issues and foreign
policy challenges. Overall though, Israel is no different than other states in the
international system which vie for self-preservation. Simply, states are seeking security to
survive (Waltz 1979). To fulfil this endeavor Israel, has devised ways to help overcome
its adversities. In the process, Israel has succeeded in turning the skills and technologies
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developed to deal with national challenges into marketable products and services which
are of critical use to other states. In other words, converting disadvantages (lack of water,
national defense burdens) into advantages (innovations in arid farming, advanced military
industry).
On this very point, Aharoni (2012) an Israeli diplomat asserts Israel’s country
positioning or branding was accomplished by utilizing the county’s competitive edge in
selected sectors to marketing itself. Put another way pegging the country’s image to a
certain proven and desired skillsets. Aharoni points out people who eagerly care about
specific issues will set aside political disparities to listen to offers in areas they are
interested in. The Israeli case is an important example because it de-facto shatters the
belief that small states cannot be operational global players. Small state global payers like
Israel can harvest noteworthy benefits. Other small states, too can also benefit from the
foreign policy approach Israel has adopted in a number of ways.
The perception of being a global player in itself offers small states the following principle
prospects:
•

Securing wider circles of partnerships with other countries in public or through
secretive ties.

•

More international engagement ties enhance trade opportunities and even political
benefits both in non-tacit and tacit forms.

The dissertation also hypothesized that specific intervening variables could
perhaps foster or impede the strength of connections between the independent
(technology transfer) and dependent variables (trade, exchanges and policies towards
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Israeli Palestinian conflict). What follows is a summary of how some intervening
variables played a role in both Sino-Israeli and Indian-Israeli relations:

•

Technology transfer addresses priorities. India and the PRC sought ways to
boost agricultural/food output while struggling with water scarcity. These issues
have spurred interest in the Israeli agricultural experience and produced a myriad
of contacts and collaborations with Israel.

•

Security/military/terror threats. Responding to border conflicts and various
security threats, India and China found interest in learning about Israel’s military
hardware and experiences.

•

Access to the US through Israeli Channels. This intervening variable is an
indirect factor in Indian-Israel relations but not a significant feature in Sino-Israeli
Relations. There has been collaboration between the predominant pro-Israel
(AIPAC) and Indian American Groups like US-India Political Action Committee
(USINPAC) which promotes India-US Relations. However, China’s ties with

Israel have helped boost access to the influential leaders in the American Jewish
Community.
•

Geo-Political Shifts. Events such as the end of the Cold War, Middle East
interests, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Arab Spring. All of these issues have
either hindered ties or opened opportunities for contacts among Israel, China and
India. For example, the 1956 Sinai War halted potential progress towards formal
ties. However, concerns about upheavals in the Middle East in the wake of Arab
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Spring uprisings gave cause for China and India to look for ways to reduce risk
and diversify their interests in the region including expanded ties with Israel.

It would be difficult to deny that technical engagement with India and China have
not produced tangible and worthy gains for Israel. In fact, the dissertation demonstrated
through a collection of common interests, data trends and software assisted content
analysis that technology transfer engagement has helped create settings which promote
bilateral exchanges and openings for expansive collaborations.
Despite challenges posed by lack of land and resources, Israel has successfully
branded itself as a world leader in specialized knowledge. The Israeli experience armed
policymakers and diplomats with an inventory of skills which could be offered to other
nations. The dissertation showed how national vulnerabilities of both China and India tie
into the development and growth of ties with Israel. India-Israel and Sino-Israeli ties
exemplify realpolitik, and underscore self-interest in international relations. Ironically, as
Israel’s ties with Beijing flourish, China’s growing global role may not necessarily be in
Israel’s overall interest. A more powerful global position for the PRC could diminish the
international influence of Israel’s most important partners like United States and India
which in the long run may not play well for the Jewish State.
The study showed reasonable cause suggesting Israel’s technology sharing was a
viable factor in initiating, maintaining and extending diplomatic relationships broadly
defined (trade, bilateral exchanges and policy approach towards the Middle East).
However, in retrospect the study could have also been done differently.
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HOW THE STUDY COULD HAVE BEEN DONE DIFFERENTLY:

The dissertation could have studied a single case study instead of two. In this way,
a more in-depth analysis could have been accomplished. The study could have explored
wider aspects of a single case study narrative. The content analysis sections (with two
cases) could have utilized a larger number of positive and negative word indicators.
Furthermore, the analysis, could have utilized consolidated frequency word counts of
words with similar meanings and by doing so legitimately generate higher frequency
words counts. Higher word frequency counts could help produce more pronounced
visualizations of data trends. Also, the study could have made more use of NVivo’s
extensive analytical features.

FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS:

To further explore the role of technology transfers in diplomacy it would be
constructive to study the case of countries which have similar diplomatic challenges like
those of Israel. One example that stands out is Taiwan. Like Israel, it is known as a
technically advanced country. At the same time, also like Israel, Taiwan must contend
with military threats and diplomatic isolation. It would be interesting as a follow-up study
to investigate how Taiwan’s international technical relations play a part in expanding ties
with other countries despite challenges posed by doing business with Taipei at the risk of
upsetting Beijing.
Another direction for further research can include a more systematic assessment
of the dependent and independent variables using econometric methodologies. While
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some of the variables will require coding and identification of the needed data,
quantitative data is already available for the other variables currently used in the study.
Such a large-n study could better demonstrate causation.
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